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Abstract 
Arguments relating to anti-corruption agencies have grown in prominence over the last two 
decades. These arguments have been largely related to the various international agreements 
binding countries on how best to deal with corruption and the minimum requirements that 
should be considered in the establishment of Anti-corruption agencies. Critically, key to the 
effectiveness and impact of anti-corruption agencies are their independence, which renders the 
agency impartial and free from favour and/or prejudice. Many academics and international 
organisations call for the independence of anti-corruption agencies tirelessly so as to embed 
the knowledge necessary for the implementation of independent agencies. The Special 
Investigating Unit is no different as its mandate is core to both the South African constitutional 
and anti-corruption imperatives. Hence these must be seen and function independent of 
political or other influence. The independence of anti-corruption agencies cuts through three 
critical aspects that must be considered when determining the level of independence it enjoys. 
These include: organisational, functional and financial independence. The South African 
Special Investigations Unit does enjoy some independence. However, the emerging question 
is whether it is independent to the degree that it complies with South Africa’s Constitutional 
obligations in terms of what is required by existing international obligations or agreements as 
ratified by South Africa. Establishing the Unit’s overall independence against the test of 
national legislation and that of the international requirements therefore, paves the way for a 
critical analysis of the Unit’s organisational, functional and financial independence; which are 
the focus of this inquiry. The research results show, that while the Unit does not stand out 
overwhelmingly against international standards, its current statutory independence along with 
its associated far-reaching powers, appear to have enabled it to remain effective in the fight 
against corruption. There does however, appear to be a need for some legislative amendments 
which would only serve to enhance its independence and improve its positioning in South 
Africa as one of the key, if not the key anti-corruption agency, in South Africa.    
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Opsomming 
 
Pleidooie in verband met anti-korrupsie agentskappe het oor die afgelope twee dekades 
toenemend na vore gekom. Hierdie pleidooie het grootliks verband gehou met die 
verskillende bindende internasionale ooreenkomste tussen lande ten opsigte van die beste 
manier om korrupsie te hanteer en die minimum vereistes wat by die vestiging van anti-
korrupsie agentskappe in ag geneem moet word. Kritiek in hierdie verband is hul 
onafhanklikheid – die sleutel tot die effektiwiteit en impak van anti-korrupsie agentskappe – 
wat die agentskap onpartydig en vry van gunste en / of vooroordeel stel. Baie akademici en 
internasionale organisasies pleit onvermoeid vir die onafhanklikheid van anti-korrupsie 
agentskappe ten einde die kennis wat vir die implementering van onafhanklike agentskappe 
nodig is, in te bed. 
Die Spesiale Ondersoekeenheid is geen uitsondering nie; sy mandaat is sentraal in beide die 
Suid-Afrikaanse grondwetlike en in teenkorrupsie-imperatiewe. Gevolglik moet dit 
onafhanklik van politieke of ander invloede gesien word en ook so funksioneer. Die 
onafhanklikheid van anti-korrupsie agentskappe betrek drie kritieke aspekte wat oorweeg 
moet om die vlak van onafhanklikheid wat geniet word, te bepaal, naamlik organisatoriese, 
funksionele en finansiële onafhanklikheid. Die Suid-Afrikaanse Spesiale Ondersoekeenheid 
geniet wel 'n mate van onafhanklikheid. Die vraag wat opduik is egter of dit sodanig 
onafhanklik is dat dit aan Suid-Afrika se grondwetlike verpligtinge in terme van bestaande 
internasionale verpligtinge voldoen, of aan ooreenkomste soos deur Suid-Afrika bekragtig.  
Om die algehele onafhanklikheid van die Eenheid teen die toets van nasionale wetgewing en 
dié van die internasionale vereistes te bepaal, het dus die weg vir 'n kritiese analise van die 
Eenheid se organisatoriese, funksionele en finansiële onafhanklikheid gebaan. Dit was die 
fokus van hierdie ondersoek. Die navorsingsresultate toon dat die eenheid, alhoewel dit nie 
oorweldigend by internasionale standaarde uitstaan nie, wel deur sy huidige statutêre 
onafhanklikheid en sy verwante verreikende mag in staat gestel word om effektief te bly in 
die stryd teen korrupsie . Dit blyk egter dat daar 'n behoefte bestaan vir 'n sommige 
wetswysigings wat sal dien om die eenheid se onafhanklikheid te bevorder en sy posisie in 
Suid-Afrika as een van die belangrike, indien nie die heel belangrikste anti-korrupsie 
agentskap nie, te verbeter. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the independence of anti-corruption 
agencies 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
More than two decades into democracy, corruption has presented itself as the most challenging 
phenomena for the South African government. Although corruption is identified as a global 
phenomenon, Webb (2005:151) points out that it is especially in developing countries that it 
manifests itself unchecked. These sentiments are qualified by Gbadamosi (2006:262), in a 
paper on Botswana’s Anti-Graft Agency Experiences, where he points out that unethical 
practices and corruption issues have become one of the greatest challenges to Africans and 
their leaders. Gbadamosi (2006:262) notes further, that these challenges manifest in threats to: 
economic growth, democratic stability, sustenance and general developmental efforts.  
On the public sociology of ethics and corruption, Pillay (2014:53) highlights that awareness 
about corruption has increased proportionately to the overwhelming number of corruption 
matters reported. These Pillay (2014:53) notes, could become increasingly synonymous with 
societal degradation in a country which neglects the implementation of stringent anti-
corruption measures or reforms. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC, 2014) in commenting on corruption and development on International anti-
corruption day, democracy is considered as a prerequisite for development, and is threatened 
when corruption prevails. The increase in corruption within South Africa requires that the 
South African government intensify its efforts to improve the functionality of institutions 
charged with investigating and combating corruption. The provisions for such efforts are 
provided in Section 181 of Chapter 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 
108 of 1996 (RSA, the Constitution, 1996b), which requires that institutions supporting 
constitutional democracy should be strengthened. This, in light of the argument by the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2014), will seek to protect the fundamentals of democracy. 
The effect is that, agencies charged with an anti-corruption mandate in South Africa, or at least 
one of the key agencies, should be strengthened, whether through legislation, resourcing and/or 
budgetary support. In essence this implies the degree of autonomy or independence provided 
to the agency which in South Africa’s case, is a Constitutional imperative.  As a result, the 
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intensity of South Africa’s anti-corruption efforts should be measured by the level or degree of 
independence afforded to its anti-corruption agencies.  
 
1.2 Motivation or Rationale 
 
Anti-corruption efforts in South Africa cannot be over-emphasized as there is a need to enhance 
efforts to curb corruption in order to limit its negative effect on the growth and development 
of the economy. This is illustrated by Tamukamoyo (2013:10), who points out that the financial 
implications of the increase in fraud and malfeasance in the public sector, between 2006-2007, 
cost the taxpayer R130.6 million. By 2011-2012 however, Allwright (2013), a senior forensics 
manager at law firm Edward Nathan Sonnenbergs, in a report on “the real state of the nation” 
concluded that this amount had increased to almost R930 million. 
The steady decline of ethical behaviour in governments around the world is highlighted by 
Pauw, Woods, Van Der Linde, Fourie and Visser (2009:342), who warned that if this type of 
behaviour was not averted by way of decisive action by government, service delivery failures 
could result which would: 
 “Compromise public sector efficiency; 
 Rob the poor; 
 Distort public spending; 
 Cause a country to lose its potential to provide for the well-being of its citizens; and 
 Promote a negative and even damaging international reputation.” 
Pauw et al. (2009:348) further identifies three essential causes of ethical failures namely: 
dishonesty, opportunity and motive. According to Irwin (2011:9) in her interpretation of a 
survey conducted in 2010 by Transparency International, these failures appear to be prevalent 
in the context of the South African public sector as it was found that bribery, corruption and 
fraud was still considered to be a problem. The survey presented the view that corruption was 
considered to be more prevalent in public, than private sectors. In addition Irwin (2011:9) 
points out that one of the major issues confronting South Africa, was the “low credibility of 
law enforcement officials.” This, according to McBride, Pillay and Dramat (2016) in an online 
article on Politicsweb, coupled with government’s apparent efforts to derail agencies critical in 
the fight against corruption by virtue of its attack on senior officials of the Independent Police 
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Investigative Directorate (IPID), Directorate for Priority Crimes Investigation (DPCI/Hawks) 
and the South African Revenue Service (SARS) including Robert McBride, Anwar Dramat and 
Ivan Pillay; presents the emerging necessity for significant effort to be levered into 
strengthening the independence of institutions responsible for investigating and combating 
corruption in order to eliminate prospective corrupters and corrupted, no matter what 
hierarchical positions they occupy in the country. 
Over the past few years, arguments relating to anti-corruption agencies have grown in 
prominence in South Africa. This has resulted in heightened arguments and deliberations over 
their independence. McBride et al. (2016) petitioned the Constitutional Court with the 
contention that independent State institutions required constitutional protection. They alluded 
to the successive “removal” of senior officials that had served their institutions with distinction; 
to the “remarkable coincidence” in the methods used to remove them; the individuals involved; 
and, their “intersecting interests”. The trio argue that attacks on individuals responsible for 
these institutions undermine the fight against corruption. They point out that their respective 
plights emanate from investigations by their individual institutions into what they term “a 
common thread” of matters involving “individuals or entities with questionable relationships 
to those in public office” (McBride et al., 2016).   
Perhaps the most prominent argument for the independence of anti-corruption agencies came 
about after the disbandment of the Directorate of Special Operations or the Scorpions 
(DSO/Scorpions) in 2008, and their incorporation into the DPCI/Hawks within the South 
African Police Services (SAPS) (Berning & Montesh, 2012). Essentially Bruce (2008:11) 
indicates that the tensions between the ruling party and the Scorpions emanated from as early 
as 2001 after the National Prosecuting Authority had approved the arms deal investigation. 
Progressively however, it is highlighted that the then National Director of Public Prosecutions 
(NDPP) Bulelani Ngcuka, while condemning the actions of Schabir Shaik (convicted fraudster) 
and former financial adviser to Jacob Zuma; announced a decision not to prosecute Jacob 
Zuma. A subsequent negative finding against Ngcuka led to his resignation in 2004. By April 
2005 and 2006, the African National Congresses’ (ANC) hostility towards the Scorpions grew 
as the Unit took on politically sensitive cases against the former ANC Chief Whip, Tony 
Yengeni (convicted and imprisoned on the arms deal); ANC Parliamentarians implicated in the 
Travelgate saga; and, corruption charges against the former National Commissioner of Police, 
Jackie Selebi for which he was convicted and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment (Bruce, 
2008:11-13).   
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
4 
 
In fact, while Moe Shaik (2008:7); brother of Schabir Shaik, challenged the so-called 
“unbridled power” of the National Prosecuting Authority and Scorpions labelling their abuse 
of power as a “festering sore”; and questioning who prosecutes the  top officials of these 
respective agencies for their abuse of power; Irwin (2011:10) in concurrence, associates the 
disbandment of the Scorpions on the premise that it compromised its objectivity by virtue of 
investigations into the then Deputy President Jacob Zuma, which appeared to be politically 
influenced. This appears to have led to the subsequent collapse of the corruption trial against 
Jacob Zuma and the abolishment of the Scorpions. Interestingly, Shaik’s (2008:3-9) article 
which was published in the SA Crime Quarterly No. 24 during June 2008, argued for the 
dissolving of the Scorpions at the very time that it was disbanded in June 2008. 
There have been many arguments over the years relating to the independence, or the lack 
thereof of key corruption-fighting agencies, some including the Hawks, the Special 
Investigating Unit (SIU), the Public Protector, and the National Prosecuting Authority. In fact 
as early as October 1999, Camerer (1999:8) at the 9th International anti-corruption conference, 
highlighted the concern raised by the then Justice Minister Dullah Omar as to whether the SIU 
should “continue existing as an independent body, given the existence of the Public Protector 
and the Auditor General.” The argument raised by government was whether a rationalisation 
of agencies was necessary in order to rather consider a consolidated single agency instead of a 
number of agencies with overlapping mandates or focus. In the same occasional paper, Camerer 
(1999:2) identified four critical aspects necessary for anti-corruption agencies to function 
effectively, including amongst other things: adequately skilled and knowledgeable staff with 
special investigative powers; elite information sharing and co-ordination; and, operational 
independence. Camerer (1999:3) goes on to argue that anti-corruption agencies must be both 
shielded from political interference, and guaranteed “operational independence”.     
On the eve of the disbanding of the Scorpions in June 2008, Bruce (2008:15) already argued 
the principle that criminal justice agencies like the Scorpions, be permitted to investigate 
individuals in positions of authority “without fear or favour.” He challenged the ANC at the 
time, to influence government to enforce guidelines regulating relationships between senior 
government officials and heads of “investigative” and “prosecutorial” agencies to both 
“discourage and prevent” political interference and manipulation. He argues that the 
disbanding of the Scorpions and the “concentration” of investigative powers in the form of the 
Hawks under the police would in fact only heighten the problem of political interference and 
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send a negative message to investigative agencies that they would face punishment if they 
dared pursue senior party officials (Bruce, 2008:15).   
In a Mail and Guardian article (2011), the Public Protector’s spokesperson Oupa Segalwe is 
cited as having argued that the need for the Public Protector sourcing the SIU’s assistance with 
a SAPS investigation was due to the fact that the office of the Public Protector had pointed out 
on numerous occasions, that it did not have the necessary resourcing and capacity to fully 
execute its mandate. This was a rather peculiar and compromising revelation for an institution 
like the Public Protector which ought to have enjoyed “Constitutional” independence, where 
organisational, functional and financial independence should have been guaranteed. Almost in 
concurrence, De Lange (2012) in an online article, goes on to point out that the Constitutional 
Court required that whatever anti-corruption capacity was decided upon, such agency should 
be “adequately resourced” and free from political interference to “ensure its independence.”  
A further argument posed by Tamukamoyo (2013:12) on a close examination “of the three 
most important agencies responsible for tackling corruption, namely the Hawks, National 
Prosecuting Authority and SIU; was that a fundamental shortcoming has been a failure to 
entrench their independence”. He goes on to argue that “while South Africa ticks the boxes for 
having the agencies in place, the characteristic that allows them to be successful, namely 
independence, is sorely missing.” 
Hartley (2012) in a Business Day article on the risks faced by the SIU to investigate corruption, 
highlights that financial and operational functionality are affected through a lack of 
independence. Hartley (2012) further points out that an advisory was used by  the SIU Head of 
Corporate Governance and Risk Management, Advocate Gerhard Visagie in 2012, to 
Parliament’s Justice Committee, on the Unit’s financial limitations and its effects on the SIU’s 
functionality as an anti-corruption agency. Hawker (2015) attributes this advisory as being 
linked to a legal opinion that prevented the Unit from billing government departments for the 
cost of its investigations. The resultant effect according to Visagie in Hartley (2012) was that 
the staffing of the Unit was reduced by an estimated 100 forensic investigators. Additionally, 
the appointment procedure for the Head of the SIU was publicly criticized in Hawker (2015), 
by Newham from the Institute of Security Studies, who suggests that there have been problems 
in the SIU with poor leadership appointments by the Presidency. This is supported by 
Tamukamoyo’s (2013:17) view that leadership instability can weaken the effectiveness of an 
institution like the SIU.  
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Efforts at securing the necessary degree of independence would be impossible if political will 
is absent, as political interference is often the major contributor to lower levels of independence 
within anti-corruption agencies (Tamukamoyo, 2013:19). South Africa currently has several 
institutions mandated to investigate, and prosecute corruption. The most prominent of them 
being the Hawks, the Public Protector and the SIU (RSA, National Anti-Corruption Forum, 
2005). This research has however, focused specifically on the independence of the SIU as an 
anti-corruption agency in South Africa. The study takes cognisance of several past events that 
relate to anti-corruption agencies.  These include the controversial demise of the Scorpion’s 
and its re-generation as the Hawks. Further, the recent attack on the Public Protector’s 
credibility over the Nkandla investigation, as well as the recent effects of the delayed 
appointment of the SIU Head are important in considering the independence and functionality 
of anti-corruption agencies within South Africa, and particularly for the SIU (Tamukamoyo & 
Mofana, 2013). 
Research on the SIU’s independence as a corruption fighting institution is a fairly new area of 
research and is somewhat limited. Although there have been some documents, articles and 
media publications relating to anti-corruption agencies in general, and more especially the 
disbanding of the Scorpions and the introduction of the Hawks, and their independence at being 
placed within the Police Service, there has been no significantly focused, or in-depth research 
delving into the independence of anti-corruption agencies like the SIU, in South Africa. This 
research therefore sought to provide some answers to the research problem of whether the SIU 
indeed enjoys the degree of independence required of agencies entrusted with combating 
corruption. It is hoped that this research will provide a baseline of information for further 
research, and it is from this perspective that this investigation sought to contribute to the body 
of knowledge related to anti-corruption agencies. This study kept its focus primarily within the 
ambit of the SIU, but also drew on some insight and facts relating to some of the other 
prominent anti-corruption agencies in South Africa. The research examined the SIU’s 
independence, and in so doing examined the extent to which it enjoyed organisational, 
functional and financial independence and concurrently, the effect thereof on its ability to 
execute its respective mandate of combating corruption in South Africa.    
The rationale of the study was motivated by a number of factors that include the local and 
global need for independent anti-corruption agencies as envisaged by international legal 
instruments like the UNCAC and Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
Protocol against corruption, to which South Africa is party to.  It is evident too that the level 
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of corruption in South Africa is particularly high according to Uwimana (2016) on Sub-Saharan 
Africa, in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index 2015, who points out that 
South Africa is one of the continent’s powerhouses showing serious corruption with no 
improvement. Leadership and financial constraints in relation to the SIU have also been 
publicized. In addition, there appears to have been a number of Constitutional court challenges 
relating to enforcement agencies on their authority, independence and mandate amongst other 
things.  
Some of these court challenges include that of the Presidency on the authority of the Public 
Protector; civil society against the Police Minister on the independence of the Hawks; Robert 
McBride, Anwar Dramat and Ivan Pillay on political interference relating to the removal of 
senior management from agencies like the IPID, Hawks and SARS (McBride, Dramat & Pillay, 
2016). These constitutional court findings and precedents guide current practice and it is 
therefore critical that the manner in which South African agencies are organized, function and 
financed; must meet constitutional muster as well as international standards. In this vein, 
studies into the independence of South African anti-corruption agencies like the SIU, will be a 
critical step at seeking appropriate remedies and progressive guidance. 
 
1.3 Background 
 
The predecessor to the SIU - the Heath Commission, was established in 1996 in terms of the 
Proclamation R72 of 1997. Subsequently, according to a Constitutional Court judgement by 
Yacoob J (2008), in Chagi and others v Special Investigating Unit (CCT 101/07) [2008] ZACC 
22, the then Head of the Heath Commission, Judge Willem Heath, had to step down as a result 
of the ruling that a sitting Judge could not be the Head of the SIU. As a result, the SIU was 
established in 2001 by virtue of Presidential Proclamation R118 of 2001 (RSA, Proclamation 
R118, 2001) which repealed proclamation R72 of 1997 (RSA, Proclamation R72, 1997) that 
established the Heath Commission. The SIU was headed by then Presidential appointment: 
William Andrew Hofmeyr. The Unit grew from a staff compliment in 2001 of sixty seven 
members to currently more than five hundred (Walker, 2013).The SIU over the years since 
2001 has made contributions towards the investigation of fraud, corruption and 
maladministration within and against the public sector.  
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The SIU was able to facilitate prompt prosecutions through a multi-agency approach with the 
Scorpions/Hawks and National Prosecuting Authority, make disciplinary recommendations 
against public servants suspected of having defrauded the public sector; as well as recover ill-
begotten gains from identified fraudsters and corrupt public servants (Somiah, 2016). On the 
09th December 2011, President Zuma by way of General Notice 899 of 2011 published in 
Government Gazette No. 34849 removed Hofmeyr as Head of the SIU and appointed Willem 
Hendrik Heath as Head of the SIU. According to Hawker (2015) however, barely a month later, 
due to some controversy around his public comments relating President Mbeki and Zuma, 
Heath resigned. 
Yet again, the SIU was without a Head at which point, President Zuma announced Advocate 
Nomgcobo Jiba as the Head of the SIU. Barely weeks later however, Advocate Nomvula  
Mokhatla was appointed as Acting Head of the SIU in terms of General Notice 196 of 2012 
published in Government Gazette No. 35136. Subsequently, in an AllAfrica.com article “SIU 
Head – 19 months and waiting”, the Shadow Deputy Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development, Schafer (2013) indicated that it had been nineteen months prior to July 2013 that 
Advocate Nomvula Mokhatla had been acting in the position as SIU head having been formally 
appointed by President Zuma after Hofmeyer, the previous Head of the Unit, had returned to 
the leadership of the Asset Forfeiture Unit within the National Prosecuting Authority. The 
appointment and tenure of Adv. Mokhatla as Acting Head for a period of close to two years, 
as well as the President’s delay in making a permanent appointment to the position of Head of 
the SIU, had attracted a huge outcry, public debate and criticism in the media. 
In addition, and on its financial standing, Hartley (2012), in a Business Day article presented 
the dilemma faced by the SIU in terms of its funding crises as set out by the SIU’s Head of 
Corporate Governance and Risk Management: Advocate Gerhard Visagie. In an attempt to 
resolve this issue, Advocate Visagie advised that the SIU initiated and submitted a Judicial 
Matters Amendment Bill in consultation with the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development (DOJ&CD), for an amendment to its founding legislation to enable it to bill 
departments for investigations conducted on its behalf, as previously; funding was obtained 
through baseline funding from the DOJ&CD as well as through cooperative “service-level 
agreements” between the SIU and the department under investigation (Judicial Matters 
Amendment Act 11 of 2012 – [the JMA Act]).  
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According to Hofmeyer (2007) in his presentation to Parliament’s Standing Committee on 
Public Accounts (SCOPA) during the General report of the Auditor-General 2006/07; funding 
as a result of service level agreements contributed greatly to the SIU’s budget, but the Unit 
wanted to limit its reliance on department’s monies as not all investigations were the result of 
cooperation between the SIU and departments. In this case the SIU would place a reliance on 
National Treasury for additional funding. These situations had a negative effect on the SIU’s 
financial independence and ability to investigate maladministration, fraud and corruption 
within and against government (Somiah, 2016). 
The SIU’s dependence on the DOJ&CD for its budget allocation, may be indicative of a lack 
of financial independence, as well as a dependence on various departments under investigation 
by virtue of service level agreements with the respective departments; hence its request for 
legislative amendments to enable it to charge departments for forensic services and, to compel 
departments to pay for SIU investigative services rendered (the JMA Act). The JMA Act has 
been enacted and now enables the SIU to charge for its services and compels departments or 
agencies to pay for the SIU’s services and further requires of the departments or agencies rather 
that the SIU, to approach Treasury should they encounter funding problems to pay for the SIU’s 
services. Although this development has enhanced the SIU’s financial capability somewhat, 
delays and non-payment for services rendered by the SIU to government departments; have 
been encountered (Lubita, 2016). This development also did not eliminate the SIU’s reliance 
on the DoJ&CD for its baseline budget. 
In addition, the reliance on the President for the appointment of the Head of the Unit has already 
received a fair amount of criticism, in that the appointment is seen as political rather than 
independent.  Further, delays by the President in the appointment of a permanent Head have an 
adverse effect on the Unit’s independence and its ability to fulfil its mandate of investigating 
corruption (Tamukamoyo, 2013:16-17). In the article “SIU Head – 19 months and waiting” 
Schafer (2013) indicates that reports from members of the SIU suggest that Advocate Mokhatla 
appears to have lost all interest in the SIU, and that the consequences of her disastrous tenure 
were becoming more and more apparent. She went on to criticize the Presidency for not making 
a timeous appointment of the SIU Head and insisted that it was “high time that the President 
complied with his obligation to appoint an SIU Head” urgently (Schafer, 2013).  
The overwhelming criticism of the President by the media as well as opposition political parties 
in respect of the timeous appointment of a permanent head for the SIU gained momentum and 
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eventually led to the appointment of Advocate Vasantrai Soni: Senior Counsel (SC) in October 
2013 (RSA, Government Gazette 36940, 2013). Based upon the abovementioned issues and 
concerns, the issue of the independence of anti-corruption agencies in South Africa, especially 
the SIU cannot be ignored.  It is for this reason that this study seeks to interrogate the extent to 
which the SIU actually enjoys the degree of independence required of it to function effectively 
as an anti-corruption agency. 
The Jakarta Principles provide some basis as to the composition of anti-corruption agencies 
and further, proposes guidelines that could assist in securing the independence of anti-
corruption agencies. This study therefore sought to analyse the SIU as an anti-corruption 
agency focusing specifically on its organisational, functional and financial independence in the 
execution of its mandate, by reviewing the Unit’s current legislative form and mandate in 
relation to Chapter 9 institutions and, the level of independence that should be expected of an 
institution set up as an anti-corruption agency. International insights and perspectives on anti-
corruption agencies were also sought and reviewed in relation to the South African context. 
 
1.4  Conceptual Framework 
1.4.1 Corruption  
 
Corruption is certainly no new phenomenon. In fact Bosman (2012:6) points out that one of 
the most famous cases of corruption in antiquity in as early as 399 BC, was that of Socrates 
who was brought to trial in an Athenian court, found guilty and condemned to death for 
allegedly “not recognizing the gods the city recognizes,... introducing new divinities,... and 
corrupting the youth”. The essence of the indictment against Socrates was that he taught 
subversive ideas that corrupted the minds of his pupils which would purportedly lead to the so-
called grave consequence of irreverent and politically irresponsible actions and, cause 
intergenerational conflict in the city. 
Current legislation governing corruption is much more specific than what prevailed in as early 
as 399 BC and the punishment is most certainly not death. In fact thus far, of the corrupt in 
society or at least those that have seen their day in court like the ex-National Commissioner of 
Police: Jackie Selebi who received a 15 year jail term for corruption (Newham, 2012); have 
gotten off far more lightly in comparison to Socrates. In fact, Socrates actions in 399 BC when 
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measured up to the ‘current-day’ corrupt in society, would make him more of a Saint than a 
sinner. Progressively over the years however, corruption has certainly evolved and so too have 
methods and efforts by governments, aimed at curbing this scourge. Many such efforts have 
comprised the establishment of anti-corruption agencies or bodies to function in an 
investigative capacity, to identify, investigate and prosecute corruption. 
A documentary and content analysis search was conducted for success stories from the 
international environment in terms of anti-graft structures, models and independence; from 
which South Africa could adapt, learn and develop, optimal independent institutions which 
would help strengthen Constitutional democracy in the country. Significantly, Marshall 
(2006:234), in the Role of Parliament in Curbing Corruption, suggests that “parliaments should 
promote the independence and adequate staffing of anti-corruption commissions and other 
specialized agencies” as they have the legislative authority to influence the provision of 
independence to anti-corruption agencies. 
While the South African Development Community (SADC) Protocol against corruption  
provides an in-depth definition of acts corruption in Article 3 of the SADC Protocol (2001:2-
3), it defines corruption as “any act … [including] bribery or any other behaviour in relation to 
persons entrusted with [public office] responsibilities … which violates their duties as public 
officials … [for the purposes of] obtaining an undue advantage of any kind for themselves or 
others”, Bosman (2012:2) simply describes corruption as “the abuse of a public or an official 
position in one’s own interest”. In the South African context, section 3 of the Prevention and 
Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 creates and defines the general offence of 
corruption simply as, the giving or receiving of a gratification for acting inappropriately. 
Although this Act provides an extensive breakdown of this definition, the difference that can 
be concluded between the two former and latter definitions is that while the two former 
definitions place specific emphasis on persons of public office, the latter lays emphasis on “any 
person”. This means that both private and public persons may be implicated in corruption. This 
is evidenced by the State’s conviction of a private person, Schabir Shaik for corruption in S v 
Shaik and Others (CCT 86/06) [2007] ZACC 19; 2008 (2) SA 208 (CC); 2007 (12) BCLR 1360 
(CC); 2008 (1) SACR 1 (CC). As a result a surmised definition of corruption can simply be 
construed as, the giving or receiving of any gratification by any person in exchange for any 
inappropriate act related to state functions.      
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1.4.2 Institutional Independence 
Hussman, Hechler & Penailillo (2009:29) in referring to the three categories of institutional 
independence as identified by the Institute of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI), 
recognises organisational, functional and, financial independence as key categories.  These 
they define as: 
 “Organisational Independence: refers to the least possible degree of government 
participation in the appointment of authorities, implementation of functions and decision-
making. 
 Functional Independence: refers to ensuring that the agency can carry out its functions 
without the undue interference of any third party or the executive.  
 Financial Independence: refers to the impossibility of the government to impede or restrict 
the agency’s activities by reducing its budget and/or budget of other associated agencies”.  
Hussman et al. (2009:21) further point out that although these conceptual definitions relate to 
Supreme Audit Institutions (SAI’s), they are in fact broadly applicable in understanding the 
forms of independence relating to preventative agencies in various political and legal contexts. 
It is therefore evident that in the context of this study, the independence of anti-corruption 
agencies refers to institutions that are autonomous, not subject to the influence, control, action 
or jurisdiction of others in the execution of its work. Interestingly, on independence, Kuris 
(2012) argues that while it matters:  
“it is neither necessary nor sufficient for such independence to be formally built into the 
agency’s structure within the government system. Rather, independence depends upon 
carefully drafted rules, especially for the selection and removal of agency leadership”. 
 
This study has drawn on significant insight from the following main source in relation to the 
core focus of this research being the independence of anti-corruption agencies: “The South 
African Anti-Corruption Architecture”, published by the Basel Institute on Governance: 
International Centre for Asset Recovery (Pereira, Lehmann, Roth, Attisso, 2012). The 
significance of this document was its key findings and recommendations as a result of its 
mandate by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development to 
implement the Public Service Reform Programme in South Africa. Due to the fact that amongst 
other areas, the Public Service Reform Programme, according to Pereira et al. (2012:8), 
supports the effective implementation of the national anti-corruption programme of South 
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Africa, and since there have been an addition of new organisations and structures to the 
institutional framework in 2011, research was deemed necessary with an aim to conduct an in-
depth analytical study of the anti-corruption architecture in South Africa. 
 
Chapters 3, 4 & 5 of the study by Pereira et al. (2012) has offered great value to this research 
as it analysed the international framework which explores different models of single and multi-
agency approaches for the anti-corruption framework, South African legislation and the 
structure of its anti-corruption framework, and it further presented an overview of different 
country models and their anti-corruption framework. This study focused on three of the nine 
key findings, and one of the eight recommendations made by Pereira et al. (2012:9) as follows: 
 
Key Findings: 
 The Constitutional Court’s ruling in respect of the need for an independent anti-corruption body 
with structural and operational autonomy; 
 South Africa’s comprehensive anti-corruption architecture composes of a range of important 
institutions which address corruption from different angles; and 
 The rules and regulations are sometimes unclear and not transparent and therefore undermine 
the effectiveness of the anti-corruption architecture of South Africa and hinder the 
independence of the anti-corruption institutions. 
 
Recommendation: 
 Ensuring the independence and impartiality of the institutions comprising the 
anti-corruption architecture of South Africa. 
 
Despite the above key findings and recommendations, Peirera et al. (2012:8) clearly pointed 
out that South Africa’s multi-agency anti-corruption model was however, fully compatible with 
applicable international standards and in line with good practice of other comparable countries. 
The Anti-Corruption Task Team (ACTT) established by the Presidency during 2010, is a 
typical example of this type of model. Heilbrunn (2006:135) on Anti-Corruption Commissions, 
in the Role of Parliament in Curbing Corruption; presents a view that South Africa’s multi-
agency anti-corruption model may, in fact, prove effective when he indicates that “numerous 
governments have adopted anti-corruption commissions despite growing evidence that such 
commissions fail to reduce corruption”. However, in a later elaboration which supports the 
focus of this study, he further indicates that “evidence of dysfunctional anti-corruption 
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commissions is manifest in the numerous agencies that lack independence from the executive” 
(Heilbrunn, 2006:135).  
 
Similarly, Van Vuuren (2008:67), a member of the Institute for Security Studies, at the third 
National Anti-Corruption Summit; held the view that South Africa did not need a single anti-
corruption agency given the current political environment. His view was that South Africa 
should proceed with its ‘multi-headed dragon’ (multi-agency) approach due to its significant 
investment on advanced legal frameworks, strategy and institutions mandated to combat 
corruption. In hindsight however, he later pointed out that; South Africa did need an 
‘independent’ anti-corruption agency free from political meddling; quoting the location of the 
Hawks under the SAPS as having the potential of attracting interference from the executive, in 
high profile cases.    
 
1.5 Research problem 
 
In an Internet Online article De Lange (2012) presents Paul Hoffman SC’s view that South 
Africa was failing as a State and therefore urgent corrective steps were necessary to address 
the influx of corruption. This coupled with flawed appointment processes by the President  of  
heads of the SIU as pointed out by in a Kgosana & Eggington (2011) in a Timeslive article; 
and, public condemnation of the Public Protector’s office by various senior government 
officials and other individuals of the political elite within the ANC as reflected on the 
Constitutionally Speaking website (2014), has lent significant momentum to a barrage of public 
criticism relating to the precarious situation of anti-corruption agencies in South Africa 
including the  Hawks, the Public Protector and the SIU.  Newham (2012), in a Moneyweb 
article, further points out that South Africa was not only obligated to have an anti-corruption 
agency that was structurally and operationally independent, it also had to be seen as 
independent by the public. 
 
The issue of the independence of the SIU surfaced during the recently criticized appointment 
of the Head of the SIU, as well as the recent legislative amendments regarding the Unit’s 
funding (RSA, Judicial Matters Amendment Act 11 of 2012). As a result of developments, 
relating to the delay in the appointment of the SIU head and its effect on operations, as well as 
some of its politically sensitive investigations, there have been some arguments relating to the 
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independence of the SIU. Additionally, the SIU’s status of its investigation into the highly 
publicized and often criticized Nkandla security upgrades at the President’s private residence, 
changed from completed, to ongoing on the SIU’s website, just before the May 2014 general 
elections (News24, 2 April 2014). Other incidents include the delayed and controversial 
appointment of the Head of the SIU (Schafer, 2013), and legislative amendments (Reeves 
2012:23.  
 
The research question that arose therefore was whether the Special Investigating Unit enjoyed 
sufficient independence as required of an anti-corruption agency in South Africa. The study 
therefore sought to encapsulate attempts at determining the degree of deviation in the levels of 
independence within the Special Investigating Unit comparatively, to some of the other 
established anti-corruption agencies in South Africa. Additional terms of references for this 
research were the key findings and specifically the recommendation made by Pereira et al. 
(2012) for South Africa to ensure the independence and impartiality of anti-corruption 
institutions, as well as the recent Glenister III (2014) judgement on the matter of the Helen 
Suzman Foundation v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others; Glenister v 
President of the Republic of South Africa and Others, CCT 07/14 and CCT 09/14.  This case 
related to the placement of the Hawks within the SAPS and the Constitutional court’s ruling 
that South Africa needed an independent anti-corruption body with structural and operational 
autonomy.  
 
As a result, the emerging question or concern was whether the SIU, as a key role-player in anti-
corruption, mandated through its enabling legislation the SIU Act, enjoyed the independence 
and autonomy required of an anti-corruption agency. The results of this study aims to indicate 
whether the SIU’s organisational, functional or financial independence is in line with what is 
required for it to function as an anti-corruption agency. It is assumed that should the results of 
this research present evidence that the SIU was sufficiently independent, then this would 
indicate that there were no impediments to the functioning of the SIU as a statutorily 
independent, anti-corruption agency. These aspects will be elaborated on further in a later 
chapter during the analysis and interpretation of the research data.  
 
1.6 Objectives of the study 
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The objectives of the study are: 
 To assess the nature and the level of independence of the  SIU and the challenges 
thereof; 
 To compare the  SIU’s level of independence in relation to other anti-corruption 
agencies in South Africa; 
 To determine what the international standards and practices are in terms of the 
establishment and mandates of anti-corruption agencies; 
 To establish the level of compliance by South Africa in terms of its international multi-
lateral anti-corruption obligations; and 
 To make recommendations based on the research findings on the degree of 
independence which is incumbent of an anti-corruption agency in South Africa. 
 
1.7 Research Questions 
The research questions guiding this investigation are: 
 What is the level of independence of the SIU and the challenges thereof? 
 Examine the SIU’s level of independence in relation to other anti-corruption agencies 
in South Africa. 
 Identify what the international standards and practices are in terms of the establishment 
and mandates of anti-corruption agencies. 
 Determine the level of compliance by South Africa in terms of its international multi-
lateral anti-corruption obligations. 
 What recommendations, based on the research findings on the degree of independence 
which is incumbent of an anti-corruption agency in South Africa, can be made? 
 
1.8 Research Design and Methodology 
 
This study comprised of an empirical study as it entailed a qualitative case study approach to 
study the independence of the selected institution through a comprehensive qualitative 
literature review and semi-structured interviews which were targeted to all 32 SIU managers 
nationally with the aim of securing responses from the total population of managers responsible 
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for the supervision, coordination and operational execution of SIU mandated investigations. 
Although the geographical area of the research was not restricted to Gauteng, but extended to 
SIU managers nationally, availability and access to managers around the country became 
problematic.  
As a result however, the bulk of the research participants that responded, were from the Pretoria 
office as they could be easily accessed and reminded to complete the questionnaire. The 
response rate was 12 of the 32 managers, or 37% of the total population sample. This 
represented at least one-third of the total operational management population in the Unit. 
Accessibility problems to some respondents outside of Gauteng resulted in the semi-structured 
questionnaires being emailed to the participants upon which telephonic interviews for further 
clarification, were held based on the questionnaire. Participants were requested to document 
their responses on the emailed questionnaire and return them via email.  These responses were 
then retrieved via email and collated and indexed using anonymous, avatar detail e.g. SIU-1 to 
SIU-12, and archived for later analysis and interpretation. 
The managers were selected using non-probability, purposive sampling as the participants had 
to have been knowledgeable and competent to provide specific detail of their on-the-job 
experience relating to independence in the execution of the Unit’s mandate. Semi-structured 
questions were posed to the participants to elicit real-life experiences pertaining to the 
independence or lack thereof within the SIU. Questions and the recording of responses did not 
contain personal details of the respondents in order to maintain anonymity and to ensure that 
they would be more open and amenable to providing objective responses. A case study 
approach was used to specifically analyse, the independence of the SIU. Participants were 
given the assurance of confidentiality in respect of their responses.  
The objective in using this case study and action research approach was explicitly “directed at 
understanding the uniqueness and idiosyncrasy” of the independence of the SIU in all its 
complexity as suggested by Welman & Kruger (1999:190); and what should also be borne in 
mind, is the fact that information sourced from an expert need not necessarily be accepted 
unilaterally without first examining such evidence or information. He goes on to argue that we 
may even call on the opinion of friends or peers to obtain knowledge instead of experts 
(Welman & Kruger 1999:2-3).   
In addition, by virtue of the researcher being a member of the SIU and with the associated first-
hand access to day-to day operational exposure, information and research participants, 
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participant observation was also utilised to document specific and, day-to-day observations 
between 2014 and 2016; on the composition of the Unit and how it operated as an anti-
corruption agency. As a member of the Unit, the researcher also adopted the action research 
approach as a reflective practitioner to source relevant information from within the Unit. 
Reason and Bradbury (2001) describes action research as a “participatory, democratic process 
concerned with developing practical [knowledge] … in pursuit of worthwhile human purposes” 
which seeks to bring together “action and reflection, theory and practice, in participation with 
others, in pursuit of practical solutions to issues of pressing concern to people” for the purposes 
of enhancing such persons and communities. Where possible, efforts were made to obtain 
primary sources of information instead of secondary sources, this by way of interviews, 
participant observation, and action research. .  
Relevant documents were analysed using content analysis by searching for key themes and 
words relating to the independence of anti-corruption agencies. The information retrieved from 
literature and other sources, but more especially from members of the SIU, through the semi-
structured interviews and questionnaires were subject to stringent internal and external 
criticism. This was mainly due to the view that members would either attempt to protect the 
interests of the SIU by being biased, or criticize the SIU’s current level of independence to 
force intervention from the respective authorities as it would be in their own interests as 
members of the Unit to secure a higher degree of independence which would, in turn, secure 
their tenure of service in the SIU.  The caution here was therefore that the respondents could 
be more subjective than objective in their responses.  Respondents selected first had to fit the 
profile of having adequate knowledge and experience within these organisations to be able to 
provide informed responses to the questions (Welman, Kruger & Mitchell, 2012:63).  
The questions in the semi-structured questionnaire focused squarely on three aspects of the 
independence factor of the SIU, namely: organisational, functional and financial 
independence. 
 
1.9 Data collection 
 
An extensive literature review was conducted to gather academic insight into the area of study 
and to conceptualize the problem. Academic insights from the literature review were reviewed 
against the results of personal insights and real-life experiences derived from the questionnaire 
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to provide meaningful data that served to address the research problem. The study was both 
empirical and non-empirical comprising of a qualitative and quantitative review of data relating 
to the independence of anti-corruption agencies and, specifically; the SIU.  
An empirical qualitative approach was utilized to obtain primary data. A minimum of five 
years’ experience within the organisation served as criteria for the research participants. With 
the fourteen year existence of the SIU, participants with experience within at least this period 
of time were deemed to be able to present practical insight into the SIU’s independence and 
the effect thereof on the execution of its functions and mandate. The non-probability, purposive 
sampling technique used to select the candidates for the interviews was based on the 
presumption that they manage and therefore influence, and are involved in investigative 
operations, the execution of which, requires a certain degree of independence. A semi-
structured questionnaire circulated amongst all 32 managers of the SIU with a view to obtaining 
responses of at least one third of the total population. Of these 12 SIU managers responded. 
With easy access to the research participants, the questionnaires were administered to 
participants both personally for members within the Pretoria office, and via email to members 
at the regional offices as this served to minimize the cost of the research due to problems with 
accessibility of some participants.  
It is important to note that as a member of the SIU since 2005 and progressing through the 
ranks from Chief Forensic Investigator to management over the years, the researcher was in a 
unique position to allow for the first-hand experience and observations of the Unit’s operational 
environment which provided relevant information and data on the Unit’s progressive 
operational evolution. As a result, the researcher also employed an action research, reflective 
practitioner approach in the gathering of information and data relevant to the research which 
essentially entailed working with practitioners through partnership and participation as 
envisaged by Huang (2010:93) who presents action research as “an orientation to knowledge 
creation that arises in the context of practice, and requires researchers to work with 
practitioners”.  
Critically, this type of research in the context of analysing the SIU’s independence as an anti-
corruption agency, is not only intended at understanding the phenomenon of independence, but 
to also effect desired change as a path to generating knowledge and empowering stakeholders, 
like the SIU as an organisation in the anti-corruption realm; as to the appropriateness of the 
independence it enjoys as an anti-corruption agency.  
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In taking on the role of a reflective practitioner, participant observation was employed which 
resulted in the extensive use of notes and observations within the Unit. This documented 
process unfolded between the years 2013 and 2016, and resulted in the production of rich texts 
that documented day-to-day observations and developments, which were used in the write up 
of this research. This method revealed valuable first-hand, primary data which offered some 
support to primary data obtained from the interviews questionnaires. For the purposes of this 
study, the observation notes were categorized and captured against the three dimensions of 
independence namely: organisational, functional and financial. 
It is important to note here that: 
 the SIU did not fund this investigation; 
 Ethical standards were maintained in terms of sensitivity of information; 
 Names of respondents are provided only where they have agreed; and 
 The information interrogated in this investigation does not compromise the legality or 
confidentiality of ANY of the cases investigated by the SIU; 
 No case-sensitive information not already forming public record, has been discussed.  
Additional data was sourced through semi-structured interviews with an ex-Programme 
Manager of the SIU to provide some historical context to the SIU’s operations and obstacles 
during its early teething days. Follow-up, clarification interviews were also conducted with a 
Senior Forensic Lawyer for additional context to the SIU’s operations.  
The research also entailed the use of an empirical design through which secondary data was 
gathered through a qualitative, content analysis approach by reviewing media publications, on-
line articles, legislation, academia, government publications and other relevant literature. The 
main source of data for this research was however, the primary data obtained from the 
interviews as it was envisaged that these personal insights would provide valuable answers 
otherwise not available amongst literature. This was as a result of minimum academic research 
having been conducted into the independence of anti-corruption agencies in South Africa. The 
results of these two processes were then meaningfully interpreted to provide insight on the 
focus of this study. 
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1.10 Research Limitations 
 
There were two main limitations to this study.  The first related largely to a very limited pool 
of documented and published articles and/ or research on the issue of anti-corruption agencies, 
especially in regards to the South African context. The second limitation, which had a profound 
impact not only on the scope but duration taken to complete this investigation, can only best 
be understood through a documentation of the journey towards obtaining permission. 
Having initiated the research during early 2013, the researcher commenced with a 
comprehensive literature review assuming that the obtaining of primary data through 
interviews with members of the SIU would not prove a challenge. The researcher’s confidence 
was based on the fact that permission for previous similar academic research on anti-corruption 
was given by the then Acting Head of the SIU, Advocate Nomvula Mokhatla. As the research 
progressed however, and on seeking permission in writing during early 2014 from the newly 
appointed Head of the SIU Advocate Vasantrai Soni SC, the researcher was met with an 
obstacle, in that the Head of the SIU raised concerns relating to the confidentiality of 
information that would be obtained through the required research interviews.  
Despite negotiations with the Head, by providing a list of the proposed questions along with 
an indication that the research would not entail extracting any operationally sensitive material, 
the permission sought was not forthcoming. As a result, the researcher was forced to revisit the 
research focus to an alternate anti-corruption agency. The researcher then, in an attempt to 
marginally shift the focus of the study, sought permission in writing, from the Head of the 
DPCI, General Anwar Dramat. Unfortunately, no response was received to this request.  
What became apparent to the researcher was that despite the media and societal outcry relating 
to the prevalence and effects of corruption in South Africa and the increasingly overwhelming 
criticism of the independence of its anti-corruption agencies, both agencies directly affected by 
the criticism, evidently failed to see the potential of research in this area with a view to 
effectively adding value or contributing positively towards South Africa’s anti-corruption 
efforts, as well as to the independence of its anti-corruption agencies. In hindsight however, 
perhaps both agencies perceived this type of research to be a threat to their very existence. 
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This study was therefore stalled midway and the research focus and data collection methods 
initially envisaged, had to again be reviewed and revisited. However, still intent on the research 
problem of the independence of anti-corruption agencies, it was decided that the research 
would continue with a study of the independence of the SIU based on an in-depth literature 
study, using a grounded-theory approach. Predominantly, a comprehensive literature study was 
followed with this research with a focus on researching publicly available material including 
annual reports, departmental reports, parliamentary reports, government publications, 
legislation, the mass media, journal articles, articles, academia, and other available literature 
relating to anti-corruption agencies. 
Coupled with this, it was observed that the SIU, over recent years, had experienced increased 
staff turnover at senior levels, generally due to better job opportunities outside the SIU, and 
therefore it was decided that semi-structured interviews could be conducted with ex-SIU 
members who had occupied management level positions within the Unit prior to their 
departure. This data collection method however, would have had to be approached with caution 
as the possibility of bias did exist where members may have left the SIU as disgruntled staff. 
The questions therefore had to be structured in such a way that biased responses were 
minimized or completely eliminated. 
The essence of the research, including the motivation and rationale therefore, did not change 
significantly as the focus was still on the independence of the SIU as an anti-corruption agency 
in South Africa; although the population sample had changed slightly. 
 
In 2015, the Head of the SIU was approached again in a final desperate bid to obtain the 
requisite permission to conduct research within the Unit. Permission was granted by Advocate 
Soni. This approval however came along with interesting perspectives for consideration during 
the course of the research. Without intending to interfere with the research approach, Advocate 
Soni (2015) punted the following aspects as having some significance to the research:  
 
“First, having regard to the principles governing our constitutional dispensation and the 
applicable statutory measures, is the SIU required to be independent. Second, having regard to 
the manner in which it has gone about fulfilling its statutory (and constitutional) mandate, is 
the SIU independent (as it should be on a proper interpretation of the applicable principles and 
statutory measures). Third, is the SIU seen, by those who are to be interviewed, as 
independent”. 
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These perspectives warranted some thought processing and revealed themselves to be relevant 
to this research and were therefore incorporated into the research questionnaires which were to 
be administered to SIU managers by way of semi-structured interviews, to extract qualitative 
data. 
 
1.11 Data analysis 
 
The data sourced from literature including books, legislation, reports, on-line articles and 
academic papers, websites and other statistical data was analysed using content analysis by 
searching for keywords, themes and their frequency, relating to the independence of anti-
corruption agencies. Main concepts and themes from various academia and publications were 
collated onto excel and indexed for use in the study. Participant observation notes were 
transcribed from hard copy to electronic format in the three dimensions of independence and 
subsequently analysed according to frequency and relevance to the research. The responses 
from the questionnaires were collated in typed format and thereafter populated on Microsoft 
excel (See Appendix 1) where after the data was analysed according to the frequency of 
responses relating to specific themes, namely: organisational, functional and financial 
independence. The interview questions were semi-structured, prompting real-life practical 
responses from the participants.  
 
1.12 Summary of Chapters 
 
Having provided a brief overview, background and the methodology to be followed to address 
the research questions, a literature review unfolds in Chapter Two which serves to provide a 
conceptual framework for anti-corruption agencies both in a national and international context.   
Chapter Three provides a case study analysis of the legislative framework within which the 
SIU works, its mandate, current structural and institutional form, resource and skills capacity. 
Further, it covers an analysis of the SIU’s independence in relation to the prescripts governing 
the SIU’s mandate and operations in relation to its organisational, financial and functional 
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independence by interpreting the results of the case study research within the organisation, in 
conjunction with applicable documents, academic writing and other relevant literature.  
Chapter Four presents the results of the content and documentary analysis as well as interviews 
with the selected managers within the SIU, which was analysed and interpreted in the context 
of the research to provide responses to the research questions that have guided the study.  
The research findings and recommendations as well as the conclusion, is presented in Chapter 
Five. Here conclusions from the data interpretation and other pertinent inferences and 
information relating to the level of independence experienced currently in the selected anti-
corruption agency, as well as some recommendations are offered, towards enhancing the 
independence of anti-corruption agencies in South Africa. 
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Chapter 2: Conceptual Framework for Anti-Corruption Agencies 
2.1 Introduction to Corruption in South Africa 
 
Pring (2015:2) notes that corruption has increased significantly over the last year within South 
Africa.  Pring’s comments form part of an Afro-Barometer Report which emphasises an 
increase in powerlessness amongst citizens, combined with increased levels of corruption, poor 
government responses to reported cases of corruption and poor perceptions by citizens of 
government responses to the prevalence of corruption. These poor perceptions seem to emanate 
from a deep-rooted deficiency within South Africa’s institutions tasked with an anti-corruption 
mandate. Accordingly, Tamukamoyo (2013:19) warns that although South Africa has a 
laudable anti-corruption framework, positive results will only materialize in the fight against 
corruption if anti-corruption agencies are insulated from political interference and when 
independent people of unquestionable character are appointed to head such agencies. This 
sentiment is further collaborated by one of South Africa’s opposition political parties, the 
Democratic Alliance (2015:21) which, in its paper on ‘Defending our Democracy’, pointed out 
that it was critical that any democracy protects its institutions to enhance their effective 
functioning and their independence regardless of who is heading up the executive.   
Research according to Pring (2015:6), points out that more than 83% of South Africans 
surveyed alluded to perceptions of increased corruption over the preceding 12 months while 
79% thought “poorly of their governments’ anti-corruption efforts with around four-in-five 
saying that their government was doing badly in fighting corruption (Pring, 2015:11).  In a 
prior period however, Richmond and Alpin (2013), in the 2011-2013 Afro-Barometer Report, 
found that 66% of South Africans rated the government’s handling of the fight against 
corruption as ‘fairly or very badly’. This in essence represents an increase of 13%, from 66% 
during 2011-2013 to 79% in 2015 of South Africans who thought their government’s anti-
corruption efforts were poor.  
In response to the prevailing situation, Pring (2015:2) calls for government to take more action 
against corruption. Pring’s call is supported by Mantzaris (2016:63) who warns that corruption 
may be difficult to conquer or combat once it has reached endemic proportions. As a result, it 
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is important for government to act in response to this deepening crisis in consideration of the 
poor perceptions that citizens have of government. 
 
2.2 Anti-Corruption Agencies in an International Context 
 
According to Kuris (2012:1), the need to manage corruption in the post-Cold War era, 
prompted the need for an international agenda on corruption. Consensus was reached in relation 
to the resultant effects of corruption on development with significantly varying responses to 
corruption in countries establishing specialized anti-corruption agencies. Kuris (2012:1) points 
out further that this consensus was “reflected in the priorities of [many, including: academics,] 
international donors and in the mandates of international law”.   
The UNDP (2009:5) has noted that there has been acceptance that anti-corruption efforts are 
necessary, which has led to the emergence of a number of anti-corruption agencies as well as 
associated trends relating to such bodies. Some successes include the multi -purpose agencies 
of Hong Kong, Singapore, and Botswana. However, it must be noted that efforts to replicate 
these successes by other countries, and to promote the “formula of specialized multi-purpose 
agencies, have been largely disappointing” (UNDP, 2009:5). These sentiments are echoed by 
Camerer (2008:6) whose view was that many established dedicated anti-corruption agencies in 
Southern Africa were often “regarded as ineffective”. In fact, the UNDP’s interpretation of 
Article 36 of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) requirements, is 
that anti-corruption bodies or agencies need be neither multi-purpose, nor specialized, nor 
singular (body or bodies). The emphasis is rather on the provision to these bodies or body of, 
‘the necessary independence to enable the execution of functions free from undue influence’ 
(UNCAC, 2004:10).   
Anti-corruption agencies, as suggested by the OECD (2008:31) are generally grouped into 
three models: multi-purpose with law enforcement powers; law enforcement type (single-
function); and preventative, policy development and co-ordination institutions. In this regard, 
single-function agencies have investigative responsibilities while multi-purpose agencies 
operate with two or more (usually all) of the full range of anti-corruption functions identified 
by the OECD (2008:9) as follows: 
 Policy development, research, monitoring and co-ordination; 
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 Prevention of corruption in power structures; 
 Education and awareness raising; and 
 Investigation and prosecution. 
 
The current trend with anti-corruption agencies however, according to Chene (2012:2), appear 
to have originated with that of Singapore’s single-function Corrupt Practices Investigation 
Bureau (CPIB) and Hong Kong’s multi-function Independent Commission Against Corruption 
(ICAC). Whilst the international community sought out successful reforms against corruption, 
these two agencies appear to have withered the storm as solid “replicable” models that 
transformed their respective countries into “highly respected havens of transparency and 
lawfulness” (Kuris, 2012:3). Kuris (2012:3) further points out that as models that stood out 
amongst the international communities, these two agencies that “survived and gained strength” 
whilst others faded into “irrelevance”; demonstrated three critical assets including “political 
commitment, resource,  and  structure”. 
Interestingly, Kuris (2012:3) links these assets as having ‘contributed to three factors of success 
[including] strength, independence, and sustainability’. The critical factors were that a strong 
and independent agency had the potential of influencing transitions in societal ideology into 
canvassing for anti-corruption reforms. This becomes difficult however without “working 
complementary institutions and conditions” that are conducive, “such as a political 
opportunity” amongst other things, which often presents itself through ‘a scandal or economic 
crisis to which corruption contributed’. Similarly, the OECD (2008:10) points out that whilst 
some of the established criteria for effective anti-corruption bodies include “independence, 
specialization, adequate training and resources,” the key prerequisite for the independence of 
these agencies is, a “genuine political will” to fight corruption.  
 
2.3 Legal Instruments on Anti-Corruption 
 
As a result of the recognition of corruption as a subject of international concern, several 
international organisations including the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Organization of American 
States, the African Union, and the European Union, have collaborated at various stages, since 
the 1990’s, to establish a multitude of legal instruments on corruption to address “common 
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standards for addressing corruption at the domestic level through its [criminalization], 
enforcement of anti-corruption legislation,” and prevention (OECD,  2008:18-19).  
A common thread in some of these international legal instruments, comprising guidelines, 
treaties and conventions, was that of independence or the strengthening of bodies or agencies 
charged with tackling corruption. This thread as tabulated hereunder in Table 2.1.  
 
Table 2.1: Legal Instruments on Anti-Corruption 
 
ORGANISATION REGIONAL / 
INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL 
INSTRUMENT 
YEAR REFERENCE GUIDELINES  ON INDEPENDENCE OF ANTI-
CORRUPTION BODIES/AGENCIES 
Inter-American 
Convention  
Inter-American 
Convention 
against 
Corruption 
1996 Article III Create, maintain and strengthen oversight 
bodies charged with preventing, detecting, 
punishing and eradicating corrupt acts 
Council of 
Europe 
Twenty guiding 
principles for the 
fight against 
corruption 
1997 Principle 3 Ensure that corruption agencies or bodies enjoy 
the independence and autonomy appropriate to 
their functions and, are free from improper 
influence. 
Council of 
Europe 
Council of Europe 
Criminal Law 
Convention on 
Corruption 
1998 Article 20 Entities specializing in the fight against 
corruption shall have the necessary 
independence in accordance with their legal 
system. 
South African 
Development 
Community 
(SADC) 
SADC Protocol 
against 
Corruption 
2001 Article 4 Create, maintain and strengthen institutions 
responsible for implementing mechanisms for 
preventing, detecting, punishing and eradicating 
corruption. 
African Union 
(AU) 
AU Convention on 
Preventing and 
Combating 
Corruption  
2003 Article 5 Establish, maintain and strengthen independent 
national anticorruption authorities or agencies. 
United Nations 
Convention 
against 
Corruption 
(UNCAC) 
UN Convention 
against 
Corruption  
 
2004 
 
Article 6 & 
36 
Grant anti-corruption bodies the necessary 
independence in accordance with their legal 
systems, to enable the execution of functions 
free from undue influence. 
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Source: Adapted from OECD (2003:6-7) 
 
The Table emphasizes the prescriptive guidelines to member countries, presented by these 
international organisations on the establishing and maintaining of agencies or bodies charged 
with dealing with, and eradicating corruption; with amongst other things, a strong focus on 
independence.     
 
2.4 South Africa’s Legislative Framework Governing Anti-Corruption 
Obligations 
 
South Africa has a strong legislative framework for combating corruption (Pillay 2014:56). 
Coupled with a strong legislative framework, are anti-corruption strategies and policies. 
Additionally, South Africa is party to various international conventions and protocols which 
imposes certain obligations on the country as a signatory thereto. These obligations will be 
discussed briefly, in this chapter. Whilst there are many pieces of legislation in South Africa 
that either directly or indirectly support South Africa’s key piece of anti-corruption legislation, 
the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 (RSA, the PACOCA Act, 
2004) , is the main guiding document beyond the Constitution. For the purposes of this 
investigation, this research will focus specifically on the provisions of the Constitution, and the 
PACOCA Act. These, this dissertation argues, impose an obligation on South Africa to enhance 
its anti-corruption initiatives as well as institutions mandated with combating corruption.  
Section 181 of the Constitution (RSA, Constitution, 1996b) makes provision for the 
establishment of institutions that support Constitutional democracy. Given that South Africa 
was on the verge of a constitutional crisis as a result of the undermining of democratic 
institutions (Democratic Alliance, 2015:1); the prevalence of corruption and its damaging 
effects on democratic principles and values, and economic development, efforts and initiatives 
aimed at combating corruption need to be guided by the constitutional imperatives. In order to 
provide some basis for the legislative discussions and arguments, it is important to highlight 
the role and findings of the Public Service Commission (PSC) from as early as 2001.  
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2.4.1 Public Service Commission (PSC) 
 
According to the PSC Website (RSA, PSC, 2016), the PSC; is a constitutionally mandated 
national body responsible for “investigating, monitoring and evaluating the organisation, 
administration and personnel practices of the public service” and advising national and 
provincial organs of state accordingly. In its State of the Public Service Report on the aspect 
of the legacy of apartheid (RSA, PSC, 2001a:10-11), the PSC suggested that the “apartheid 
state created opportunities for corruption and mismanagement at every level [including] the 
stripping of public resources by low-level officials as well as structural social engineering that 
promoted the emergence of a society based on nepotism and exclusivity”. In the same report, 
the PSC argued that one of the key challenges at the time facing the public sector related to, 
amongst other things, combating corruption and maladministration, and improving service 
delivery.   
In its earlier report on A Review of South Africa’s National Anti-Corruption Agencies (RSA, 
PSC, 2001b:3), the PSC found that “South Africa’s complex political economy [had] given rise 
to several forms of corruption”. One of the many alleged causes being the fact that the new 
historically disadvantaged social forces governed the country in a context where the state was 
being seen as a major mechanism for the accumulation of wealth.  The PSC also found that 
there were several state agencies in place for combating and preventing corruption. However, 
there was a need for central coordination of these agencies activities to improve their 
effectiveness. The suggestion by the PSC was that the absence of such coordination was not 
enough to motivate ‘for the establishment of a single anti-corruption agency’. What is 
noteworthy however is the PSC felt at the time, that the establishment would be costly and 
undesirable especially where the more “pressing priorities” were amongst other things: job 
creation and poverty alleviation.  
The significance of the above aspect is that despite the growing negative views, both locally 
and internationally, on the effects of corruption on economic development and the ripple effects 
thereof on the poor, the PSC still felt that, more pressing than considering setting up a single 
anti-corruption agency or assessing & strengthening the country’s anti-corruption capacity in 
response to the key challenge of combating corruption, was job creation and poverty 
alleviation. Considering Treasury’s conservatively estimated R30 billion lost annually in 
government procurement due to fraud and corruption (Tamukamoyo, 2013:10), it might have 
been prudent for the PSC to reconsider its stance on anti-corruption agencies as early as 2001, 
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as this may have significantly alleviated the predicament the country currently finds itself in. 
Thirty billion rand is a considerable amount of money to be lost annually to fraud and 
corruption and one can only imagine the substantial economic growth and the resultant positive 
spin-offs this amount of money would have had on job creation and poverty alleviation, had 
significant efforts to curb corruption started as far back as 2001.    
Conversely, now in recent years, approximately 14 years later, it is clearly evident that the 
opportunities for corruption and maladministration including the stripping of public resources, 
nepotism and exclusivity found by the PSC (RSA, PSC, 2001b:10-11) to have been created by 
the apartheid state was not exclusively in such era, but has compounded and now exists, and is 
practiced, more blatantly in the government sector than ever before. This is affirmed by 
Corruption Watch (2014:5) in its 2014 Annual Report, in which they point out, that there is 
increasing evidence that:  
“people across all spheres of life, including many holding positions in the government and the 
ruling party, are becoming more intolerant of the way in which corruption seems to have 
become a way of life, a method of transactional engagement that allows people to sidestep 
official channels”. 
In order for government to have effectively dealt with the “pressing priorities” of job creation 
and poverty alleviation, in hindsight, perhaps it would have been prudent for them to have 
considered dealing with all obstacles to government functionality.  
 
2.4.2 The Constitution 
  
An extract of selected, but relevant aspects from the preamble of the Constitution (RSA, 
Constitution, 1996b), reads as follows:  
“We, the people of South Africa, ... through our freely elected representatives, adopt this 
Constitution as the supreme law of the Republic so as to ... establish a society based on 
democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights; lay the foundations for a 
democratic and open society in which government is based on the will of the people ...; 
Improve the quality of life of all citizens...”. 
Section 2 of the Constitution (RSA, Constitution, 1996b) clearly prescribes that the 
Constitution “is the supreme law of the Republic and that [any] law or conduct inconsistent 
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with it, is invalid, and that the obligations imposed by [the Constitution] must be fulfilled”. 
Over the years, public outrage regarding, corruption has been gaining momentum (Ndungane, 
2014:6). Corruption and its associated negative effects on society, economic development and 
democratic order can more often than not, be seen to go against several rights that are 
entrenched in our Constitution, namely: the right to equality, human dignity, life, environment, 
housing, health care, food, water, social security and education. It is important to note that the 
Constitution (RSA, Constitution, 1996b) protects the abovementioned fundamental human 
rights and therefore offences of corruption, which prejudices society’s rights, committed by 
public officials in their capacity as government employees, could render the State liable for 
damages. This is especially relevant if it is proven that the State failed to act, or acted 
negligently in implementing reasonable governance or control measures to prevent such 
occurrences. By implication therefore, and in terms of section 7(2) of the Constitution, the 
Constitution imposes a positive obligation on the State to adopt adequate measures to protect 
these fundamental human rights.  
Public sector corruption hampers service delivery by diverting public funds from sorely needed 
public or community projects or purposes e.g. housing, schools, water and sanitation, 
healthcare and its effects on a person’s well-being. The rise in public service protests signifies 
the frustration felt by ordinary citizens, who may potentially be in a position to bring successful 
cases of Constitutional infringements against government. This notion is reinforced in a 
Constitutional Court judgement in Ngaka Modiri Molema District Municipality v Chairperson, 
North West Provincial Executive Committee and Others [2014] ZACC 31 paragraph 13, 
wherein the court found that local government’s obligations “to provide basic municipal 
services” are sourced from both the Constitution and legislation. This compels the municipality 
to provide that part of society dwelling within its boundaries, with basic municipal services 
whether a contractual relationship existed, or not. The court found that the State had a 
constitutional obligation in terms of section 7(2) of the Constitution (RSA, Constitution, 
1996b), to respect, protect and promote the rights of society and that where access to basic 
human rights including water and sanitation fail to exist where it once did; this may constitute 
a violation of fundamental rights.   
In fact what precludes a group, or groups of citizens from bringing about a “class action 
lawsuit” against government in relation to the lack of service delivery as a result of collusive 
behaviour or unbecoming conduct of public servants which may result in a loss of state funds 
destined for specific services to the public? In essence, national and provincial government as 
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the custodian of state funds (derived from taxpayers – ordinary citizens), is according to the 
Auditor General South Africa (2013:56-57), compelled to account and to ensure that stringent 
processes are in place to manage and safeguard these funds and to expend same with due 
diligence under the public finance management regulatory framework. What needs to be 
proven is that either poor systems, or poorly managed systems as a result of negligence or 
intentional misdemeanour, existed that may have permitted the loss of funds with the resultant 
prejudice to the taxpayers.  
In fact the Auditor General South Africa (2013:57) already acknowledges and highlights the 
common concerns raised, that relate to accountability of officials; and emphasises the need for 
consequences for poor performance, misappropriation and fraud; that leaders must take action 
and implement remedies appropriate to the transgressions; and that, everyone must play their 
part. Interestingly, in Women’s Legal Centre Trust v President of the Republic of South Africa 
[2009] ZACC 20, Cameron in paragraph 17 of the judgement, highlights the significance of the 
Constitutional section 7(2) obligation on the State to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the 
Bill of Rights. Further, the focus on the “State” is heightened by section 8(1) of the Constitution 
(RSA, Constitution, 1996b) which “binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all 
organs of state” with a Constitutional duty and “primary burden” to secure the fulfilment of the 
rights as contained in the Bill of Rights.  
In this regard, Olaniyan (2014:275) makes an interesting observation that the case of the state’s 
failure to secure the independence of the Hawks as an anti-corruption agency, as a failure by 
the State to fulfil the requirements of its section 7(2) Constitutional obligations. He further 
argues that the extent to which a court may be able to sufficiently address a complaint of 
corruption with a causal link to human rights violations, along constitutional guidelines; 
depends on the ability of victims to bring these complaints to the courts, Human Rights 
Commission or other relevant bodies (Olaniyan, 2014:275). Only in hearing these matters more 
frequently by applying legal principles and precedents will we realise the successes of matters 
of this nature. The emerging sense however in light of our legal principles, appears to be that 
success may well be inevitable.     
        
To assist South Africa in maintaining a democratic state with democratic values, social justice 
and fundamental human rights, section 181 of Chapter 9 of the Constitution sets out some of 
the institutions that are expected to support constitutional democracy. The Constitution (RSA, 
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Constitution, 1996b) prescribes that “these institutions are independent and subject only to the 
Constitution and the law and [are expected to] be impartial and [to] exercise their powers and 
perform their functions without fear, favour or prejudice”. Other organs of state are expected 
“to assist and protect these institutions to ensure their independence, impartiality, dignity and 
effectiveness”. The Constitution further prescribes that no person or organ of state may 
interfere with the functioning of these institutions. The Constitution makes these institutions 
only accountable to the National Assembly. 
In fact, considering the endemic proportions that the prevalence of corruption has reached and 
its resultant effect on society and subsequent infringements, albeit indirectly, of the 
constitutional rights of society, it might be necessary for Parliament/the National Assembly to 
give due consideration as to whether the institutions listed in section 181 as at 1996, are 
sufficient and/or efficient enough, to support constitutional democracy in South Africa. 
Consideration should therefore be given as to whether the Public Protector as an investigating 
body into the affairs of the state, should be fully entrusted with the anti-corruption mandate, in 
collaboration with the Auditor General and/or other statutory or departmental agencies, or 
whether an independent anti-corruption agency should be established in terms of chapter 9 of 
the Constitution to combat corruption in the country especially considering the effects of 
corruption on economic development and society at large and the associated infringements on 
constitutional imperatives (Antonie, 2013:3). Alternatively, consideration could be given to 
strengthen other entities which have an anti-corruption mandate through legislative 
amendments which could make additional provision for the purposes of enhancing the 
organisational, functional and financial independence. In this regard, political will would be 
key.  
 
2.4.3 The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (PACOCA) 
 
The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 (PACOCA Act, 2004) 
points out a number of aspects in relation to its purpose. Most significantly, the Act provides 
for “the strengthening of measures to prevent and combat corruption and corrupt activities”. 
The Act also serves to clarify the offence of corruption and further criminalizes several offences 
relating to corrupt practices. It also caters for investigative measures relating to corruption, the 
establishment of a Register to restrict persons and enterprises convicted of corrupt activities, 
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reporting obligations of corrupt transactions on responsible persons and, extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in respect of corruption and related offences. 
At the onset, the Preamble of the PACOCA Act (RSA, PACOCA Act, 2004) makes first 
reference to the Constitution, to the effect that, “the Constitution enshrines the rights of all 
people in the Republic and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and 
freedom”. The preamble goes on to point out that “the Constitution places a duty on the State 
to respect, protect, promote and fulfil all the rights as enshrined in the Bill of Rights”. This 
Constitutional duty on the State itself, should be the key driver of anti-corruption efforts and 
initiatives, but practical, efficient and effective reforms. 
The preamble to the PACOCA Act (RSA, PACOCA Act, 2004:2-4) makes it clear and 
acknowledges that: 
“corruption and related corrupt activities undermine the said rights, endanger the stability and 
security of societies, undermine the institutions and values of democracy and ethical values and 
morality, jeopardize sustainable development, the rule of law and the credibility of 
governments, and provide a breeding ground for organized crime”. 
 
 Corruption has an impact on human rights, stability, security, institutionalism, ethics, morality, 
development, the rule of law, and credibility of governments (RSA, PACOCA Act, 2004:2). 
This knowledge or understanding suggests support for a vigorous approach towards combating 
corruption in the country. Whilst South Africa’s efforts may have to some degree been 
somewhat progressive and according to Tamukamoyo (2013:11) appeared to be doing well in 
adhering to anti-corruption conventions and protocols more needs to be done.     
The PACOCA Act also affirms South Africa’s commitment to compliance with some of its 
international obligations with the South African Development Community Protocol against 
Corruption (SADC Protocol, 2001) and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption 
(UNCAC, 2004). The PACOCA Act thus provides for a comprehensive anti-corruption 
legislation. The Act, by making reference to South Africa’s Constitutional obligations, also 
sets out its national and international obligations in terms of dealing with corruption and related 
offences both in the country, and abroad.  
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2.4.4 Other relevant legislation 
 
South Africa has a multitude of other legislation that bears some other relevance to corruption 
in terms of prohibitions and so forth. Corruption Watch (2015:7-19) elaborates on some of 
the other relevant legislation which is presented in tabulated format in Table 2.2 below. 
 
Table 2.2: Other Relevant Legislation 
 
ACT YEAR PURPOSE 
The Public Service 
Act (PSA) 
1994 The PSA provides for the organisation and administration of the public service 
and prohibits outside remuneration without permission, for public service 
employees.  The Code of Conduct prescribes that Public Servants must act in the 
best interests of the public and honestly; in dealing with public money, and to 
report fraud and corruption. 
The Competition 
Act 
1998 Certain conduct prohibited by the Competition Act also amounts to corruption 
under the PACOCA Act, eg. where tender processes are manipulated by way of 
cover pricing or any other form of collusion in contravention of the Competition 
Act  
The Prevention of 
Organised Crime 
Act (POCA) 
1998 The POCA is aimed at combatting organized crime; money laundering; criminal 
gang activities and racketeering activities. These offences are often closely 
linked to corrupt activities. The POCA provides for the forfeiture of assets 
obtained through criminal activities.  
The Companies Act 1998 It provides for mandatory establishment of ‘social and ethics’ committees which 
must monitor the companies’ activities, including the company’s standing in 
terms of the OECD recommendations regarding corruption. It also provides that 
disclosures of illegal activity can be made to a broader category of people and 
entities than under the Protected Disclosure Act. It also requires the 
maintenance of systems and procedures for facilitating whistleblowing. Those 
who disclose information in terms of the Companies Act are given immunity 
from civil, criminal and administrative liability for that disclosure. 
 
The Executive 
Member’s Ethic Act 
and Code (EMEA) 
1998 The EMEA provides for the establishing of a code of ethics for members of the 
Cabinet, Deputy Ministers and members of provincial executive councils. The 
Code of Ethics prohibits MECS from: undertaking any outside paid work; acting 
in a way that is inconsistent with their office; exposing themselves to a situation 
of conflict between their public and private interests; using their position to 
enrich themselves or act in a manner that compromises the integrity of their 
office. 
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The Witness 
Protection Act 
(WPA) 
1998 The WPA provides for procedures for the protection of those who are witnesses 
who are giving evidence in commissions of enquiry, tribunals and criminal cases. 
People who blow the whistle on corruption are only protected under the WPA if 
they are witnesses in criminal proceedings. 
The Public Finance 
Management Act 
(PFMA) 
1999 The PFMA sets out specific obligations on organs of state to investigate 
corruption within the sphere of public procurement. The PFMA is applicable to 
both national or provincial government departments. 
The Protected 
Disclosures Act 
(PDA) 
2000 The PDA creates a framework for employees to disclose information about 
criminal or other irregular conduct in the workplace, and provides for protection 
against any employment-related reprisals as a result of such disclosures 
The Promotion of 
Access to 
Information Act 
(PAIA) 
2000 The PAIA promotes transparency in Government, as well as in the private sector 
and regulates how to access recorded information from both public and private 
bodies. 
The Promotion of 
Administrative 
Justice Act (PAJA) 
2000 The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA) gives effect to the right to 
‘administrative action’ that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. It also 
provides for the right to request reasons for decisions taken. 
The Municipal 
Finance 
Management Act 
(MFMA) 
2003 The purpose of the MFMA is to secure sound and sustainable management of 
the financial affairs of inter alia municipalities in the local sphere of 
government. It also provides for measures for the combatting of abuse and 
corruption in the supply chain management system. 
 
Source: Adapted from Corruption Watch (2015:7-19) 
 
The above table is by no means exhaustive of other supportive legislation, but present a high-
level overview of the critical pieces of legislation that support South Africa’s anti-corruption 
prerogatives. The legislation also presents a chronological implementation of these prescripts 
which are often relevant pieces of legislation often used by South Africa’s anti-corruption 
agencies to hold departments, entities and people to account.  
 
2.4.5 South Africa’s Regional and International Obligations 
 
South Africa has according to the OECD (2003: 6), also acceded to and ratified a number of 
important international and regional anti-corruption initiatives as tabulated in Table 2.3 
below; to enhance its anti-corruption efforts. 
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Table 2.3: Anti-Corruption Instruments 
 
NO ORGANISATION PURPOSE 
1 The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) 
Convention  on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International 
Business Transactions 
To establish legally binding standards to criminalise bribery of foreign 
public officials in international transactions as well as other related 
measures to give effect to this. 
2 The Southern African 
Development Community 
Protocol on Corruption 
(SADC Corruption Protocol) 
This is the first sub-regional anti-corruption treaty in Africa set up to 
promote the development of anti-corruption mechanisms at national 
level, promote the co-operation in the fight against corruption by State 
Parties, and to harmonize of anti-corruption national legislation within 
the region. 
3 The African Union 
Convention on Preventing 
and Combating Corruption 
(AUCPCC / AU Convention) 
To promote and strengthen the development in Africa by each State 
Party, of mechanisms required to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate 
corruption and related offences in the public and private sectors and to 
further regulate cooperation among parties, harmonize policies and 
legislation, promote socio-economic development and, establish 
conditions to foster transparency and accountability in the 
management of public affairs. 
4 The United Nations 
Convention against 
Corruption (UNCAC / the 
UN Convention) 
To foster cooperation with member countries on aspects relating to the 
fight against corruption, including prevention, investigation and 
prosecution. To this end, South Africa has engaged in mutual legal 
assistance in the gathering and transferring of evidence for use in 
courts outside the country as well as asset recovery.  
 
Source: Adapted from OECD (2003: 6) 
 
The progressive development of South Africa’s legislative framework and regional anti-
corruption initiatives and strategies stemmed from its ratification and membership with these 
international and regional legal instruments. This has been key to South Africa’s campaign to 
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root out corruption in the country. It is important that South Africa maintains its affiliation and 
momentum in this regard in order to curb and reduce the levels of corruption in the country in 
order to improve economic development and foreign investment confidence.  
 
2.4.6  The National Development Plan 2030 (NDP) 
 
According to the Minister and Chairperson of the National Planning Commission, Trevor 
Manuel, in his foreword in the National Planning Commission’s Diagnostic Overview (June, 
2011), the Commission was appointed by President Jacob Zuma in April 2010 to take an 
“independent and critical view of South Africa”, to develop a vision for South Africa in the 
next 20 years, by identifying the key challenges and mapping out a path to achieve this vision. 
This set the tone for the National Development Plan 2030. One of the four areas singled out in 
the National Development Plan 2030 (2011:447-448) was the building of a “resilient anti-
corruption system [through] anti-corruption efforts that” that foster the creation of a system 
that could function freely without political meddling and which can be supported by both public 
servants and society. In this proposal, the Commission proposed that a functioning anti-
corruption system should have adequate staff and resources with “specific knowledge and 
skills; special legislative powers; high level information sharing and co-ordination; and 
operational independence”. In addition, the Commission recommended that the independence 
of each agency should be strengthened to guard and protect them from political pressure. It was 
proposed that this should be done by increasing the agencies’ specialist resources, as well as 
funding to employ skilled personnel and sophisticated investigative techniques. 
Subsequent to the publication of the National Planning Commission’s Diagnostic Report in 
June 2011, which served as a base document, the National Development Plan 2030 was 
released in November 2011. One of the measures proposed in the National development Plan 
2030 (2011:57) to strengthen South Africa’s anti-corruption arsenal was that “competent and 
skilled institutions like the Public Protector and the SIU need to be adequately funded and 
staffed and free from external influence”. Furthermore, chapter fourteen of the National 
Development Plan 2030 (2011:446), emphasizes that “corruption undermines good 
governance, sound institutions and the effective operation of government in South Africa”. The 
NDP therefore proposes the need for “an anti-corruption system that makes public servants 
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accountable, protects whistle-blowers and closely monitors procurement” (National 
Development Plan 2030. 2011:446). 
Critically, the NDP 2030 explicitly points out that, “overcoming corruption and lack of 
accountability in society requires political will, sound institutions, a solid legal foundation and 
an active citizenry that holds public officials accountable.” The NDP’s vision for 2030 is for 
South Africa to have a zero tolerance towards the scourge of corruption, but more importantly, 
that anti-corruption agencies must have the sufficient and necessary resources, be independent 
and shielded from political influence, have the necessary powers to investigate corruption, and 
that their recommendations must be acted upon. 
 
2.4.7 The Medium Term Strategic Framework (MTSF) 
 
The MTSF is government’s strategic plan for the 2014-2019 electoral term, and reflects the 
governing party’s commitments in the election manifesto, which includes the implementation 
of the NDP. The aim of the MTSF (2014) “is to ensure policy coherence, alignment and 
coordination across government plans [and] alignment with [budget] processes”. One of the 
priorities of the electoral mandate in terms of the MTSF is “fighting corruption and crime” by 
reducing levels of corruption in the public and private sectors thereby improving investor 
confidence in South Africa (MTSF, 2014).  
 
2.4.8 The Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy (PSACS) 
 
In his keynote address, at the Roundtable of the United Nations (UN) Global Compact Network 
in South Africa, Minister for Public Service and Administration, Chabane (2014:2) indicates 
that the PSACS has been a key driver for all public sector anti-corruption initiatives. It 
advocates an integrated and coherent approach to fighting corruption. The Strategy recognizes 
solid management practices to prevent, detect and combat corruption which would inevitably 
prevent any opportunity for corrupt practices (PSACS, 2002). 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
41 
 
2.5 South Africa’s Anti-Corruption Agencies  
 
South Africa has several agencies that are tasked with the investigation and combating of 
corruption. The three most prominent of then, namely: SIU, the DPCI/Hawks and the Public 
Protector, based upon an analysis of the respective legislative mandates, are considered to be 
the only agencies with a common mandate to investigate offences referred to in Part 1 to 4 of 
the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, 12 of 2004 (RSA, PACOCA Act, 
2004) with the exception of the Hawks whose mandate is not limited to offences referred to 
in Chapter 2 and section 34 of the PACOCA Act. The following table 2.4 provides an 
analysis of the three agencies’ founding legislation and a comparative breakdown of their 
institutional form, appointment procedures, mandates and reporting lines.  
 
Table 2.4: Comparison of South Africa's Anti-Corruption Agencies: Public Protector, SIU 
and DPCI 
 
Agency Type of 
Institution 
Establish
ment 
Appointm
ent & 
Removal 
of the 
Head 
Terms of 
Reference 
Mandate Reporting 
Line 
Public 
Protector - 
1994 
Independent 
Chapter 9  
Constitution
al Institution 
Chapter 9 
of the 
Constitutio
n / 
Parliament 
The 
President, 
on 
recommend
ation by 
Parliament 
(National 
Assembly) 
 
The Public 
Protector Act. It 
is competent to 
investigate, on 
its own 
initiative or on 
receipt of a 
complaint 
falling within 
its mandate. 
Corruption;  
 
Maladministration in 
connection with the affairs 
of government 
at any level; 
 
Improper or dishonest act 
or omission, or offences 
referred to in Part 1 to 4, or 
section 17, 20 or 21 (in so 
far as it relates to the 
aforementioned offences) 
of Chapter 2 of the 
Prevention and Combating 
of Corrupt Activities Act, 
2004, with respect to 
public money;  
 
Improper or unlawful 
enrichment, or receipt of 
any improper advantage, or 
Required to 
report only to 
Parliament. 
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promise of such 
enrichment or advantage, 
by a person as a result of 
an act or omission in the 
public administration or in 
connection with the affairs 
of government at any level 
or of a person performing a 
public function 
SIU - 2001 
(previously
, Heath 
Commision
- 1997) 
Independent 
Statutory 
Body 
SIU Act / 
the 
President 
President 
 
The Special 
Investigating 
Unit & Special 
Tribunals Act 
74 of 1996 (as 
amended); and 
only what is set 
out in relevant 
Presidential 
Proclamations. 
It cannot initiate 
investigations 
of its own 
volition on 
receipt of 
complaints 
falling within 
its mandate. 
Corruption;  
 
Serious maladministration 
in connection with the 
affairs of any State 
institution; 
 
Offences referred to in Part 
1 to 4, or section 17, 20 or 
21 (in so far as it relates to 
the aforementioned 
offences) of Chapter 2 of 
the Prevention and 
Combating of Corrupt 
Activities Act, 2004, and 
which offences was 
committed in connection 
with the affairs of any 
State institution  
Required to 
submit a final 
report to the 
Presidency; and 
to further report 
to Parliament, 
twice annually. 
Directorate 
for Priority 
Crimes 
Investigatio
n AKA 
Hawks – 
2009 
(previously
,  Scorpions 
– 1999) 
National 
Government
, 
Department 
of Police 
The SAPS 
Act, as 
amended / 
The 
Minister of 
Police 
The 
Minister of 
Police  
with the 
concurrenc
e of cabinet  
The SAPS 
amendment 
Act. It can 
initiate 
investigations 
on the receipt of 
a complaint 
falling within 
its mandate. 
Corruption; 
 
National priority offences 
which in the opinion of the 
head of the Directorate 
need to be addressed by the 
Directorate;  
 
Selected offences not 
limited to offences referred 
to in Chapter 2 and section 
34 of the Prevention and 
Combating of Corrupt 
Activities Act (Act No. 12 
of 2004); 
 
Any other offence or 
category of offences 
referred to it from time to 
time by the National 
Commissioner, subject to 
policy guidelines issued by 
the Ministerial Committee. 
 
Required to 
report to the 
Minister of 
Police. 
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Source: Adapted from the Public Protector Act; The SIU Act and the SAPS Amendment Act. 
 
These three agencies are core anti-corruption functionaries and despite their distinctive 
organisational structure, function and mandates, they often work in a complimentary and 
collaborative manner in the execution of their investigations (Somiah, 2016). This is done for 
example, by way of the Public Protector and the SIU’s reliance on policing powers of the 
Hawks for criminal investigations, arrests and prosecutions on matters falling within their 
respective mandates were criminality is identified. There is also a reliance by the Hawks on the 
SIU for its forensic investigative expertise and skills as well as its civil litigation powers to 
recover unlawfully acquired State funds. Often, matters stemming from an SIU proclaimed 
investigation are investigated by the SIU’s forensic capacity after which it is referred to the 
Hawks via the National Prosecuting Authority, for further criminal investigation and 
prosecution. Similarly, the Public Protector completes an investigation and refers criminality 
to the Hawks. This collaborative engagement is essential in the South African context to 
compliment power or functionary limitations across agencies.  
 
2.6 Comparison of Anti-Corruption Agencies in the South African and 
International contexts 
 
There are a number of anti-corruption agencies in the international context. These agencies 
vary in their make-up and model or type. For the purposes of this research, a comparison of six 
countries’ anti-corruption agencies including South Africa, was compiled as reflected in  table 
2.5 below, in relation to their descriptions, type, population volume, date of establishment as 
well as their respective Transparency International Corruption perception index and ranking 
over the last four years between 2012 and 2015.  
 
The undermentioned table 2.5 was compiled using data extracted from the Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Indexes (CPI) (Transparency International, 2012, 2013, 
2014 & 2015), Heilbrunn (2004:3-10), and Country population statistics extracted from 
Infoplease.com (2016). The Table seeks to provide a comparative analysis of five countries 
and their anti-corruption agencies, to South Africa. Transparency International’s data is 
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interpreted as the higher the CPI (score), the lower the rank and the cleaner the country. This 
information was scrutinized and is discussed in greater detail further in this section. 
 
Table 2.5: Comparison of Anti-Corruption Agencies in the South African and International 
Contexts 
 
 
Source:  Adapted from Transparency International Corruption Perception Indexes 2012 to 2015; 
Heilbrunn (2004:3-10), and, Country population statistics extracted from Infoplease.com (2016). 
 
2.6.1 Population per million 
 
The six countries, as reflected in Figure 2.1 below, have a diverse population volume from 
between 2.26m in Botswana, to 320m in the United States. The population volume may have 
an effect on the ability of the relevant anti-corruption agencies to combat corruption in the 
respective jurisdictions. This may therefore have an effect on the corruption perception index, 
where countries with a higher population volume, may attract a negative corruption perception, 
whilst countries with a smaller population volume, may attract a positive corruption index. 
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SINGAPORE CPIB
Corrupt 
Practices 
Invstgation 
Bureau
INVESTIGATIVE 
MODEL 5.54 1960 -3 1 8 167 85 1 7 174 84 1 5 175 86 1 5 174 87
NEW SOUTH 
WALES ICAC
Independent 
Commission 
against 
Corruption
PARLIAMENTA
RY MODEL 7.64 1989 -6 2 13 167 79 2 11 174 80 2 9 175 81 2 7 174 85
UNITED 
STATES USOGE
United States 
Office of 
Government 
Ethics
MULTI-AGENCY 
MODEL 320 1978 3 3 16 167 76 3 17 174 74 4 19 175 73 4 19 174 73
HONG 
KONG ICAC
Independent 
Commission 
against 
Corruption
UNIVERSAL 
MODEL 7.3 1973 -4 4 18 167 75 3 17 174 74 3 15 175 75 3 14 174 77
BOTSWANA DCEC
Directorate 
on 
Corruption 
and Economic 
Crime
INVESTIGATIVE 
MODEL 2.26 1994 2 5 28 167 63 4 31 174 63 5 30 175 64 5 30 174 65
SOUTH 
AFRICA DPCI
Directorate 
for Priority 
Crimes 
Investigation
MULTI-AGENCY 
MODEL 55 2008 8 6 61 167 44 5 67 174 44 6 72 175 42 6 69 174 43
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Figure 2.1: Population per million in selected countries with anti-corruption agencies 
 
 
 Source: Adapted from table 5 - comparison of anti-corruption agencies in the South African and 
international contexts 
Of the four countries with the lowest populations, Singapore has the lowest corruption 
perception ranking of 8 in 2015, with the second lowest population of 5.54 million, whilst the 
USA has the third lowest corruption perception ranking of 16, with the highest population of 
320 million. Singapore’s corruption perception ranking of 8 is two times lower than USA’s 
ranking of 16. Its population of 5.54 is more than 57 times smaller than the USA’s. Similarly, 
whilst Singapore’s corruption perception ranking of 8, is more than 7 times better than South 
Africa’s ranking of 61, its population is about 10 times smaller than South Africa.    
It is interesting to note that the four countries with the lowest corruption perception ranking of 
28, 8, 18 and 13, have smaller populations ranging from 2.26, 5.54, 7.3 and, 7.64 million 
people, whilst South Africa with the highest ranking of 61, has a population of 55 million. This 
could infer that anti-corruption agencies, despite their type/model and/or independence, are 
more effective in countries with smaller populations.  The USA figures however, bring this 
inference into doubt with its own massive population of 320 and corruption perception ranking 
of a fairly low, 16. This may suggest that perhaps the multi-agency model utilized by the USA 
is in fact, effective.   
SINGAPORE, 
5.54
NEW SOUTH 
WALES, 7.64
HONG KONG, 
7.3
UNITED 
STATES, 320
BOTSWANA, 
2.26
SOUTH 
AFRICA, 54.96
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Within this context and comparatively, whilst the USA’s corruption perception ranking of 16 
is almost 4 times lower than South Africa’s 61, its population of 320 million is still almost 5 
times more that South Africa’s 55 million. This might be a good example of two countries, 
which, despite utilizing the same agency type (multi-agency model) with different population 
sizes, have different experiences and results where USA appears to be doing better than South 
Africa.    
 
2.6.2 Transparency International Ranking – 2015 
 
Transparency International ranks countries according to the level of corruption perception 
index, ie. between 0-100, with 0 being highly corrupt and 100 being very clean. Therefore, 
from Figure 2.2 below, it is evident that countries with a higher CPI score (very clean) ranked 
lower. This indicates that a country with a lower ranking is perceived as less corrupt.  
The Transparency International Index, in the figure, shows Singapore’s CPIB’s ranking of 8 as 
the lowest of the six countries which essentially means that it has the highest CPI score 
indicating that it is very clean. Contrarily, South Africa’s higher ranking of 61 is indicative of 
a lower CPI score which suggests that it is perceived to be highly corrupt in comparison to the 
six countries assessed in Table 2.5 above.  
Figure 2.2: Transparency ranking in selected countries with anti-corruption agencies 
 
1 - CPIB
2 - NSW
ICAC
3 - USOGE 4 - HK ICAC 5 - DCEC 6 - DPCI
RANK 8 13 16 18 28 61
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
R
an
k
RANK 2015
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
47 
 
Source: Adapted from table 2.5 - Comparison of anti-corruption agencies in the South African and 
international contexts 
 
2.6.3 Rank Difference between 2012 and 2015 
 
Figure 2.3 below provides an indication of the rank difference between 2012 and 2015 between 
the six countries. While three of the countries present a decline in ranking from between -3 to 
-6, the other three shows an improvement from between 2 to 8. As indicated earlier, the higher 
the CPI (less corrupt), the lower the rank. In other words, Singapore ranking dropped from 5 
in 2012 to 8 in 2015. This represents a drop by 3 positions in ranking as a result of the CPI 
decreasing from 87 in 2012 to 85 in 2015. This indicates an increase, albeit minimal, in the 
perceived levels of corruption in Singapore.  
In stark contrast, South Africa’s ranking improved from 69 in 2012 to 61 in 2015. This 
represents an improvement by 8 positions in ranking as a result of the CPI increasing from 43 
in 2012 to 44 in 2015. This indicates a decrease, albeit minimal, in the perceived levels of 
corruption in South Africa. 
Figure 2.3: Rank difference between 2012 and 2015 in selected countries with anti-
corruption agencies 
 
Source: Adapted from table 2.5 - comparison of anti-corruption agencies in the South African and 
international contexts 
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2.6.4 Corruption Perception Index between 2012 and 2015 
 
Figure 2.4 below presents a fairly consistent view of the CPI scores for the six countries.  The 
Figure indicates that Singapore has a consistently higher CPI score than the other 5 countries 
between 2012 and 2015.  South Africa, on the other hand, has a consistently lower CPI score 
over the same period. The other 4 countries remain fairly consistent with their CPI scores. This 
represents a higher perception of corruption in South Africa (highly corrupt) than Singapore 
with a lower perception of corruption (very clean).   
Figure 2.4: Corruption perception index between 2012 and 2015 in selected countries with 
anti-corruption agencies 
 
Source: Adapted from table 2.5 - Comparison of anti-corruption agencies in the South African and 
international contexts 
 
2.7 South Africa’s Multi-Agency Approach towards Anti-Corruption 
 
South Africa has an international obligation in terms of Article 38 of the UNCAC (2004:27), 
to take the necessary measures to maintain cooperation between its national authorities, 
including its public sector authorities and its officials. Additionally, it is required in terms of 
this Article, to maintain cooperation with its law enforcement authorities “responsible for 
investigating and prosecuting criminal offences”. Interestingly, Article 39 of the UNCAC also 
makes provision for “encouraging cooperation between national authorities (investigating and 
prosecuting authorities) and entities in the private sector, in particular; financial institutions” 
(UNCAC, 2004:28).  In this regard, having ratified the UN Convention on the 22 November 
2004, South Africa was bound in terms of Article 65 of Chapter VIII of the UNCAC (2004:53), 
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to take the necessary legislative and administrative measures “to ensure the implementation of 
its obligations” under the Convention.  
South Africa is a constitutional democracy wherein the Constitution guides the establishment 
and functioning of state departments, institutions or agencies. Accordingly, on inter-agency 
coordination, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2013:10) aptly points out that 
section 41(1) of the Constitution (1996), requires all spheres of government to “cooperate with 
one another in mutual trust and good faith by fostering friendly relations, assisting and 
supporting one another, consulting on matters of mutual interest and adhering to agreed 
procedures”. This is generally achieved through mutual cooperation or the formal conclusion 
of a “Memorandum of Understanding” between two or more entities, agencies or departments. 
Coupled with this obligation, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2013:4) further 
points out that South Africa having ratified the UN Convention as an international legal 
instrument, is further bound to compliance with the UNCAC by virtue of section 231(2) and 
(4) of the Constitution. This section prescribes that “an international agreement binds the 
Republic after it has been approved by resolution in both houses of Parliament and a self-
executing provision of such an agreement is law in the Republic, unless it is inconsistent with 
the Constitution or an Act of Parliament” (Constitution, 1996). 
In line and in concurrence with these prescriptive UNCAC requirements as set out above, De 
Sousa (2008:19) suggests therefore, that it is essential for anti-corruption agencies ‘to establish 
healthy inter-institutional cooperation with the other bodies responsible for the preventing and 
combating of corruption (such as criminal investigation forces, the police, public prosecutors, 
courts, state supervision bodies, etc.)’. Instead of adopting a single powerful agency approach, 
South Africa has adopted a multi-agency approach in combating corruption. South Africa has 
a multitude of agencies responsible for anti-corruption work which according to the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2013:9) are guaranteed investigative and operational 
independence.  
These agencies cut across the various powers usually assigned to bodies that are set up to curb 
corruption. For example, as set out in the table hereunder presented as Table 2.6, while the 
Hawks are responsible for investigating corruption, they cannot prosecute offenders. These 
powers are conferred on the National Prosecuting Authority. While the Hawks can investigate 
and the National Prosecuting Authority can prosecute, the SIU can litigate civilly on behalf of 
government departments to recover illicit gains on behalf of the respective government 
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departments. Civil litigation is a power that is conferred on neither the Hawks nor the National 
Prosecuting Authority. These are but some of the critical powers which are normally applicable 
to anti-corruption agencies. These agencies amongst other things have a variety of powers 
which cannot curb corruption, nor make the impact necessary to eradicate corruption; without 
the complementary effort of its counterparts.   
Table 2.6 below presents a comparative view of the powers of four main agencies in South 
Africa tasked to deal corruption from investigation to prosecution. The table was compiled 
with information that was extracted from the SAPS Act as amended (RSA, SAPS Act, 1995),  
the SIU Act as amended (RSA, SIU Act, 1996a), the National Prosecuting Authority Act (RSA, 
NPA Act, 1998) and the Public Protector Act (RSA, Public Protector Act, 2004), as well as 
from SIU Senior Forensic Lawyer (Maharaj, 2016). 
 
Table 2.6: Powers of South African Agencies that Investigate and Prosecute Corruption 
 
POWERS TO... 
H
A
W
K
S
 
S
IU
 
P
U
B
L
IC
 
P
R
O
T
E
C
T
O
R
 
N
P
A
 
Investigate X X X X 
Search and Seizure X X X X 
Arrest; X -  -  -  
Require from any person, particulars & information,  X X X X 
Subpoena any person to produce books, documents or objects X X X X 
Subpoena and question any person under oath or affirmation at one of its own 
proceedings  -  X X -  
To compel a person during its own proceedings, to answer any question which 
may expose him/her to a civil action/criminal charge (such evidence however may 
not be used in subsequent criminal proceedings 
-  X -  -  
Institute and conduct civil proceedings in its own name or on behalf of a State 
institution in a Special Tribunal or any court of law -  X -  -  
Prosecute -  -  -  X 
Attach assets through civil litigation -  X -  -  
Charge and recover fees from a State Institution for investigations/work done -  X -  -  
Members qualified and admitted as advocates/ attorneys, may perform such work 
in a Special Tribunal or any court of law on behalf of the Unit or a State institution -  X -  -  
Make systemic recommendations to state institutions -  X X -  
Make recommendations for disciplinary action -  X X -  
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Make recommendations for civil action to the state attorney or to state institutions - X - - 
Develop policy, research, monitor and co-ordinate anti-corruption efforts -  -  -  -  
Prevent corruption in power structures -  -  -  -  
Educate and raise awareness -  -  -  -  
 
Source: Adapted from the SAPS Act (1995), SIU Act (1996a), NPA Act (1998) and Public Protector 
Act (2004).  
 
Pope & Vogl (2000) suggest that the relationship between an anti-corruption agency and the 
prosecuting authority is critical, and that their joint efforts must be seen to have “real impact 
leading to prosecutions and convictions or else they will be widely viewed as a farce”. It is 
important to note that no anti-corruption agency in South Africa has universal all-
encompassing powers. However, their powers appear to complement each other and much 
emphasis is placed on collaboration. The SIU, in comparison, has far-reaching powers which 
cover both investigative and civil litigation powers, where no other agency has the powers of 
litigation. However, the SIU does suffer the lack of arrest and prosecutorial powers. This 
however does not seem to be restrictive in nature in the South African context as the country’s 
agencies seem to progressively follow the multi-agency approach. Interestingly s.12 of the SIU 
Act prescribes that non-compliance with directives, refusal and interference by any person with 
an SIU investigation carries a 5 year prison term, while other agencies carry minimal sentences. 
It is evident therefore that failure to cooperate with the SIU carries a greater penalty than that 
of its counterparts.  
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Chapter 3: Case Study of the SIU as a South African Anti-Corruption 
Agency 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The SIU is a South African anti-corruption agency whose vision and mission is to work 
together with government, society and law enforcement agencies to combat corruption in 
society, through quality forensic investigations and litigation (Special Investigating Unit 
Annual Report 2010-2011, 2011:7). The SIU is one three agencies in South Africa that is tasked 
with an anti-corruption mandate. The other two are the DPCI and the Public Protector. The 
mandate as anti-corruption units is derived from the respective pieces of enabling legislation 
i.e. the SIU Act, Public Protector Act and the SAPS Amendment Act which empowers all three 
agencies to investigate matters certain offences which are criminalized by the PACOCA Act. 
The prerogative of establishing an SIU is that of the executive by way of a Proclamation. The 
SIU is an independent statutory body accountable to both the President and to Parliament. It is 
funded by the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (RSA, Special 
Investigating Unit Annual Report 2010-2011, 2011:7).  
According to the Special Investigation Unit website (SIU, 2016), the SIU was preceded by the 
Heath Special Investigating Unit which was established by President Mandela in 1996 as a 
statutory body in terms of the SIU Act for the purpose of “investigating serious malpractices 
or maladministration in connection with the administration of State institutions, State assets 
and public money as well as any conduct which may seriously harm the interests of the public” 
(RSA, SIU Act, 1996a). At that stage, the Unit was headed by Judge Willem Heath. The Unit 
at the time comprised of 67 members nationally (Walker, 2013). However, as a result of a 
Constitutional Court ruling in South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath 
and Others 2001 (1) SA 883 (CC), that a Judge could not head a Special Investigating Unit, 
Judge Heath resigned in 2001. Subsequent to this, the new SIU was established by the erstwhile 
President Thabo Mbeki by virtue of Proclamation R118, issued on 31 July 2001, to which he 
appointed William Andrew Hofmeyr as Head of the Unit (Chagi and others v Special 
Investigating Unit 2009 (2) SA 1 (CC)). 
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3.2 The SIU’s legislative Mandate 
 
The mandate of the SIU is to conduct multi-disciplinary forensic investigations; civil recovery 
of state assets and monies; recommending and supporting disciplinary processes arising from 
its investigations; referring criminal matters identified during the course of its investigations to 
appropriate law enforcement agencies; and, to provide an advisory service on systemic 
improvements in relation to government departments and state entities (Special Investigating 
Unit, 2016). The SIU executes its mandate by virtue of its founding and enabling legislation, 
the SIU Act. More importantly though, while the SIU Act provides for amongst other things, 
the powers and functions of the Unit, are derived from Presidential Proclamation that gives 
effect to the exercise of these powers. Critically, the SIU cannot exercise its investigative 
powers in the absence of a Presidential Proclamation (Maharaj, 2016). 
 
3.2.1 The SIU Act 
 
The key piece of legislation that governs the SIU’s mandate and functioning is the SIU Act 
(RSA, SIU Act, 1996a) as amended. For the purposes of this research, the Act sets out the 
following relevant prescripts in relation to the SIU which must be noted:  
 Section 2 sets out the basis for the establishment of an SIU; 
 Section 3 sets out the composition of the Unit, including appointment procedures 
for the Head of the Unit and staff,  
 Section 4 sets out the functions of the Unit; 
 Section 5 sets out the powers of the Unit; 
 Section 5A deals with the delegation of powers and functions by the Head of the 
Unit; 
 Section 6 deals with search and seizure; 
 Section 12 sets out the offences and penalties for non-compliance with the Act; 
 Section 13 deals with the Liability of the Unit;  
 Section 13A deals with the funding of the Unit; and 
 Section 13 B deals with the Unit’s financial accountability. 
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3.2.2 The Presidential Proclamation 
 
A proclamation essentially sets out the terms of reference for any SIU investigation. A 
proclamation is issued by the Presidency, either at the behest of the Presidency, or after the 
SIU on receipt of a complaint, submits a motivation for a proclamation to the Presidency. 
According to Maharaj (2016), any proclamation issued by the President is very specific in that 
it must contain a schedule which sets out the actual allegations which the SIU must investigate. 
As a creature of statute, the SIU is subject to the dictates of the Act. The Act as read with such 
proclamations do not allow for material deviations or out of scope investigations by the SIU. 
Any such work undertaken would be outside the ambit of the Act and therefore be regarded as 
invalid and unlawful. 
The SIU can in effect, only commence its investigations on receipt of a proclamation from the 
President as published in the Government Gazette. It can only use its powers and exercise its 
functions once this proclamation is published. The SIU cannot commence or initiate an 
investigation on receipt of a complaint from a member of the public or a state institution. If a 
complaint is indeed made to the SIU, the SIU must first without exercising any of its powers, 
assess the merits of such complaint against the scheme of the Act and then draft a motivation 
for a proclamation to the Presidency. Only once this motivation is considered and approved, is 
a proclamation signed by the President.      
 
3.3 How the SIU operates as an anti-corruption agency 
3.3.1 The SIU Organisational Structure 
 
As a member of the Unit, the researcher has noted that the SIU operates with three core business 
divisions which include: Business Management; Business Operations; and, Business Support. 
Each of these divisions complement each other with Business Management handling the 
overall management of the organisation, Business Operations tasked with executing the core 
forensic investigative business of the Unit, and Business Support providing the required 
administrative support to all business units. All three business units fall under the direct 
supervision of the Head and Deputy Head of the Unit. The High level organisational structure 
is set out in Figure 3.1 below:  
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Figure 3.1: High level organisational structure for the SIU 
 
Source: Adapted from the Special Investigating Unit, Business Support Department; and, the SIU 
Annual Report 2012-2013 (2013:7) 
 
This organisational structure was approved and signed-off by the then Head of the Unit, 
Advocate Hofmeyr. The full and detailed structure however, still remains with identified future 
positions that have not been filled to date. The Unit is currently in a recruitment drive to fill 
these positions. In addition, the Unit has identified a need to review this Organisation Structure 
and has embarked on a review process to determine progressively since 2009, whether changes 
may now be necessary and the implications of such changes on the Unit (Personal Observation, 
2015-2016). 
 
3.3.2 The SIU Operating Model 
 
The SIU has a national presence in all nine provinces and each office comprises of a Regional 
Head and several project teams (Personal Observations, 2013; Gauteng, 2014-2016). Legal 
support is present at all offices, while the Cyber and Data Forensics divisions are situated at 
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the Unit’s Head Office in Pretoria. The Accounting CoE has limited capacity but is available 
in some of the Unit’s offices and are utilised as and when required.  
On receipt of its mandate in terms of a Proclamation signed by the President, the SIU proceeds 
to scope an investigation and set-up a multi-disciplinary project team to initiate a forensic 
investigation into the allegations concerned. The Programme and Project teams are supported 
by the various centres of expertise (CoE’s) including the Legal, Cyber, Data and Accounting 
CoE’s. These divisions as reflected in SIU Operating Model set out in Figure 3.2 below, all 
form part of the Unit’s core Business Operations and are supported by Business Support which 
include Finance, Human Resources and Information and Communication Technology (ICT), 
as set out in Unit’s organisational structure. Once a Proclamation is signed, the Projects 
Director normally assigns a Programme Manager to assess and scope the matter, put together 
a programme and project team thereafter a project plan is developed for approval. Once this is 
completed and approved by the Projects Director, a forensic investigation ensues (Maharaj, 
2016).  
Figure 3.2: SIU operating model 
 
 HEAD OF THE UNIT 
PROJECTS DIRECTOR 
DEPUTY HEAD OF THE UNIT 
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Source: Adapted from personal observations, 2013 to 2016, and Maharaj (2016) 
 
As a Project Manager, the researcher has been part of several project teams. The Project team 
works strictly in line with a project plan which is based on project management principles and 
is time-bound. All investigative activities identified during the scoping stage is set out in the 
project plan on Microsoft Project (MS Project), which is monitored and evaluated regularly 
until finalization. A Programme Manager exercises control and oversight and reports to the 
Projects Director on progress with programme/s which comprises a number of projects while 
a Project manager reports to the Programme Manager on project-based investigative activities. 
The Project Manager does the groundwork and the day-today management of the projects 
which include investigative guidance, team meetings, progress reporting, project review, and 
general staff management and administration (Personal Observation, 2013-2016).   
With the exception of the Legal centre of expertise and the Project Management Office, all 
other centre of expertise work with the project teams as and when required by the Programme 
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and Project Managers. The Legal centre of expertise and the Project Management Office 
provide support to the teams from inception until finalization of a project. All respective centre 
of expertise are experts in their fields and can provide expert evidence and testimony in any 
court.   
 
3.3.3 The functions and powers of the SIU 
 
During the course of an investigation, and by virtue of its functions and powers as set out in 
sections 4 and 5 of the SIU Act respectively, the SIU in exercising its powers in terms of section 
4 of the SIU Act (RSA, SIU Act, 1996a) , may; 
 Investigate all allegations regarding the matters concerned; 
 Collect any evidence connected with its investigation; 
 Institute civil proceedings in a Special Tribunal or any court of law for any relief to 
relevant to its investigations, itself or to a State institution; 
 Refer incidents of criminality to the relevant prosecuting authority 
 Not perform functions that are in conflict with its founding Act; 
 Upon conclusion of its investigation, submit a final report to the President; and 
 Submit a report at least twice a year to the Parliament on its investigations, activities, 
composition and expenditure. 
The SIU in executing its functions in terms of section 5 of the SIU Act (RSA, SIU Act, 
1996a), may: 
 may determine the procedure to be followed in an investigation; 
 charge and recover fees associated with its services from a State institution; 
 request any information as may be reasonably necessary in its investigations; 
 Subpoena any person by a notice in writing under the hand of the Head of the SIU or a 
duly delegated member to appear before it and produce any book, document or object 
under the control of such person; 
 Administer an oath or affirmation on a person required to appear before it and question 
him or her; 
 refer any matter which could best be dealt with by the Public Protector, to the Public 
Protector;  
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 institute and conduct civil proceedings in its own name or on behalf of a State institution 
in a Special Tribunal or any court of law; and 
 bring any matter that justifies the institution of civil proceedings by a State Institution 
against any person, to the attention of the state attorney or the State institution 
concerned. 
During the course of an investigation, the project teams will gather evidence relating to the 
allegations concerned which are within its terms of reference as contained in the relevant 
proclamation (Somiah, 2016). Although some of the Unit’s intrusive powers are similar to that 
of the SAPS’s search and seizure and section 205 subpoenas (RSA, Law of Criminal Procedure 
and Evidence Act 51 of 1977, 1977), the unit is in no way a substitute police force, as it can 
only investigate matters contained within its terms of reference. In other words, according to 
Maharaj (2016), its investigations are not open-ended and it cannot extend its powers. In this 
vein, the SIU’s core function is to seek civil remedy for State institutions that may have been 
subjected to maladministration or criminality by its state officials or third parties. This is where 
the SIU must be seen to make the greatest impact, as it has to go after individuals or corporates 
(and their assets), that misappropriate state funds. All the SIU’s investigations are guided by 
expert forensic lawyers, to ensure that investigations meet all legal standards before the 
necessary action can be recommended or taken (Maharaj, 2016). 
Section 5 of the SIU Act (1996) empowers the SIU to bring civil proceedings including 
disciplinary action, against officials, to the attention of the State Institution concerned 
(Maharaj, 2016). In making this recommendation, and in support thereof, the SIU compiles a 
full dossier of evidence for submission to the State institution concerned so that the relevant 
action can be expedited speedily. The SIU also adopts a highly cooperative approach with other 
Law Enforcement Agencies in executing its functions, which in essence, is crucial to the 
success of anti-corruption initiatives (Special Investigating Unit Annual Report 2010-2011, 
2011:9). This type of cooperation assists the SIU in complementing it where it lacks certain 
powers, access or authority. The cooperation extends to secondment of its members to other 
Law Enforcement Agencies and vice versa (Personal Observation, 2015-2016).  
 
3.3.4 The SIU’s intrusive powers 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
60 
 
3.3.4.1 The Power to subpoena persons 
 
According to Maharaj (2016), unlike any other agency, the SIU has highly intrusive powers.  
Specifically, section 5(2)(c) of the SIU Act allows the Unit to subpoena persons to appear 
before it in a hearing presided over by a delegated official of the Unit; to produce books, 
documents or objects relevant to an SIU investigation; and to be questioned under oath in 
relation to his/her knowledge about the relevant allegations/evidence. This section also 
empowers the Unit to compel such person to answer questions even if it incriminates him/her. 
However, such evidence shall not be admissible in any criminal proceedings except if the 
person stands trial on a charge of perjury (Personal Observation, 2014). Aside from evidence 
obtained where a person is compelled to answer, all other evidence obtained through the 
exercise of the SIU’s section 5 functions, are admissible in any court of law.   
 
3.3.4.2 The Power to search and seize 
 
The SIU’s powers to search and seize are very similar to that of the police and, is intrusive. In 
some instances however, this has proven to be somewhat of a conundrum for the Unit. 
Particularly, there have been instances where the SIU has exercised its powers in terms of 
section 6 of the SIU Act, to enter and search premises and seize evidence related to its 
investigations. However, by virtue of overlapping investigations between the SIU, the Public 
Protector and the DPCI, sometimes evidence relevant to either agencies investigation may, by 
virtue of all three agencies having the power to search and seize, result in a clash of authorities 
where the same evidence is required. Often, evidence sought by the DPCI had already been 
seized by the SIU or vice versa; or evidence sought by the SIU had already been seized by the 
Public Protector (Personal Observation, 2014-2015). This has the potential to lead to frustration 
between agencies for relevant evidence. The question that arises here is which of these agencies 
would carry supreme authority in searching and seizing evidence and can they exercise these 
powers against each other? This may require further research from a legislative point of view.    
 
3.3.5 How the SIU investigates 
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For the purposes of this investigation the researcher, using the participant observation 
approach, between 2013 and 2016, observed and documented the SIU’s methodology and 
processes in pursuing its investigations. This methodology is set out as follows. The SIU prides 
itself with its forensic capabilities and is on par with many of its private forensic business 
counterparts, for example Delloite & Touche, PriceWaterHouse Coopers, and Gobodo. The 
Unit executes all of its investigations following a project management approach which 
comprises the full project management life-cycle, from inception to close-out. Once a project 
plan is drawn up, the project team immediately sets out to gather all the relevant evidence by 
way of request for evidence, search and seizures, and interviews. The evidence is then recorded 
and subject to various investigative processes by briefing and utilising the Unit’s various 
centres of excellence, which includes data extraction, data analysis, cyber examination, 
financial and cash flow analyses for financial transactions, procedural reviews of prescribed 
process.  
The project team meets regularly, at least weekly, to discuss progress and developments on 
each activity performed on the investigation. Once these initial steps are concluded, the team 
sets out to conduct the field work as set out in the project plan and based on information found 
during the initial investigative steps. More often than not, the information retrieved from the 
initial investigative steps and feedback from the Unit’s centres of excellence set the tone for 
the field work (Personal Observation, 2013-2016; and Somiah, 2016).  
The team then sets out to interview all persons relevant to an investigation, with the Project 
Manager under the control and oversight of the Programme Manager; taking the lead and 
overseeing all investigative activities and assigning project activities to team members. During 
this time, the Chief Forensic Investigator investigates and supervises the Forensic 
Investigator’s activities. Forensic Lawyers provide legal support on site, during operations. 
Interviews entail documenting responses by way of interview notes, while affidavits are drafted 
in consultation with Project Managers and the Unit’s Forensic Lawyers. During this process 
additional relevant evidence is sourced (Personal Observation, 2013-2016; and Somiah, 2016). 
Once the field work is finalized, the team commences with the chronological compilation of 
evidence. Parallel to this process, the team initiates a profiling of all persons suspected of 
wrongdoing. Additional information clarification sessions unfold and further supporting 
information and evidence is requested from other agencies. Throughout the investigative 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
62 
 
process, the steps are well documented and each completed activity is regularly updated on the 
project plan (Personal Observation, 2013-2016). 
Once an evidence file is completed, the relevant referral letters and investigative reports are 
drafted by the investigator and according to Maharaj (2016), is reviewed by the Project 
Manager, Forensic Lawyer, Programme Manager and the Senior Forensic Lawyer before it is 
signed off by the Projects Director and Head of the Unit to go out to the relevant State 
departments or prosecuting authority. On finalization of all allegations relating to a 
Proclamation, the Programme Manager in consultation with the Project Manager, Project Team 
and Forensic Lawyers; drafts a final Presidential report for submission to the Presidency. This 
report is subject to a stringent set of reviews by the Project Manager, Forensic Lawyer, 
Programme Manager, Senior Forensic Lawyer, Projects Director and finally the Head of the 
Unit who signs off and submits the report to the Presidency. The matter is then concluded and 
closed off on the SIU record (Personal Observation, 2013-2016). 
   
3.3.6 Referrals to the Relevant Prosecuting Authority 
 
The SIU like the police, where criminality is uncovered, must refer the matter to the National 
Prosecuting Authority for a decision to prosecute. In terms of section 4(1)(d) of the SIU Act, 
the SIU must refer any matter where evidence of criminality (fraud/corruption etc.) is identified 
to the National Prosecuting Authority. The National Prosecuting Authority is thereafter obliged 
to consider and determine the veracity of evidence submitted to it by the SIU. Once a decision 
is taken by the National Prosecuting Authority, the matter with the National Prosecuting 
Authority’s instructions endorsed thereon, is referred back to the SIU to be referred to the 
DPCI. According to Maharaj (2016) as tabulated in Figure 3.3 below, the current process flow 
entails the following: 
 The SIU refers matters where evidence of criminality is identified, to the National 
Prosecuting Authority; 
 The National Prosecuting Authority considers the merits of the case, makes a 
decision and refers the matter back to the SIU with instructions to the SIU from the 
Head of the National Prosecuting Authority - the National Director of Public 
Prosecutions (NDPP); to hand over to the SAPS/DPCI; 
 The SIU then hands the matter over to the DPCI/ SAPS. 
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Figure 3.3: Multi-agency process flow - Referrals to the relevant Prosecuting Authority 
 
 
Source: Adapted from personal observations 2013-2016 and Maharaj (2016) 
 
One of the challenges faced by the SIU in relation to referrals to the National Prosecuting 
Authority, is that all of its matters must be referred to the National Director of Public 
Prosecutions. Whilst historically matters where criminality was identified was referred directly 
to the respective regional jurisdictions of the SAPS and National Prosecuting Authority, during 
2014, this process changed, under Advocate Soni’s reign (Personal Observation, 2014). The 
effect was that in all matters where criminality was identified, the requirement was that the 
matters be referred directly to the office of the National Director of Public Prosecutions in 
Pretoria. With the SIU’s presence and operations in nine provinces, this became a particularly 
frustrating process, as matters referred to the National Prosecuting Authority were becoming 
bottle-necked, and hence feedback to the SIU on the National Director of Public Prosecutions 
decisions to prosecute, was becoming a slow and long-drawn-out process (Personal 
Observation, 2014-2016). 
The rationale offered by Advocate Soni’s argument, was that the SIU Act made provision for 
matters only to be referred to the prosecuting authority and not directly to the SAPS/Hawks; as 
the SIU had previously done in collaboration with the SAPS/Hawks and the National 
SIU
•In terms of Section 4(1)(d) of the 
SIU Act, the SIU must where 
criminality is identified  refer 
such matter to the NPA
NPA
•The NPA reviews the matter with a 
view to making a decision to 
prosecute & then refers the matter 
back to the  SIU for referral to the 
DPCI/SAPS
SIU
DPCI / SAPS
•TheDPCI / SAPS must 
investigate the matter as 
directed by the NPA in 
preparation for prosecution
The SIU receives the matter back 
from the NPA with a decision 
and instructions to hand over to 
the DPCI/SAPS 
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Prosecuting Authority (Personal Observation, 2014). This arrangement of referring matters 
from the SIU to the office of the National Director of Public Prosecutions was concluded 
through mutual agreement between Advocate Soni and Advocate Nxasana, the then National 
Director of Public Prosecutions. With the number of referrals made by the SIU over the last 
two years, it was inevitable that the perceived problems would escalate.  With the increasing 
volume of referrals and slow feedback from the National Prosecuting Authority (Personal 
Observation, 2014-2016);  a formal engagement ensued with a resolution to enhance the 
process flow between the SIU and office of the National Director of Public Prosecutions by 
way of a memorandum of understanding between the two agencies.     
What is concerning despite both the SIU and the National Prosecuting Authority having a 
national decentralized presence in all provinces, with a view towards enhancing access and 
efficiency to its services, centralizing of criminal referrals to the office of the National Director 
of Public Prosecutions seemed counter-productive as critiqued by De Wet (2016) in a Mail & 
Guardian article on the National Prosecuting Authority’s presentation of its annual report to 
Parliament where he points out that “key violent and white-collar crimes which [should] be 
dealt with swiftly as part of a [deterrence strategy] are languishing”. In fact Mathews 
(2009:115) already raised the question of inefficiency of the criminal justice system singling 
out the National Prosecuting Authority despite it having had processes and protocols in place 
with a commitment to agreed “case flow management principles”. He went on to argue that 
poor management was an impediment to service delivery and that a large proportion of cases 
were stalled at a national level. Mathews (2009:117) further criticises the organisational culture 
of the National Prosecuting Authority which appeared to be inward focused - what the superior 
requires; rather than outward focused - what the customer requires. 
This process presented itself to be in conflict with the requirement of expediency as envisaged 
in the SIU Act where, while section 4(1)(d) made provision for the referral of matters ‘pointing 
to the commission of an offence’ to the relevant prosecuting authority; section 4(2) prescribes 
that an SIU inform the relevant prosecuting authority of such commission of an offence ‘as 
soon as practicable’ at which time, such evidence must be dealt with ‘in a manner which best 
serves the interests of the public’ (RSA, SIU Act, 1996a). 
In interpreting the phrases “as soon as practicable” and “in a manner which best serves the 
interests of the public’, whilst the first phrase speaks to expediency, promptness and efficiency, 
the second speaks to a Constitutional imperative (RSA, Constitution, 1996b). It is evident that 
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society’s interests are safeguarded and preserved by the Constitution, and therefore, one would 
be inclined to interpret this phrase as suggesting ‘in a manner which requires Constitutional 
priority and vigour’. So the question then is, how should one approach such a prescriptive 
requirement?  
One potential response is: Firstly, the SIU Act prescribes that a matter be referred to a ‘relevant 
prosecuting authority’. Section 2 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998 (RSA, 
NPA Act, 1998) prescribes that ‘there is a single national prosecuting authority established in 
terms of section 179 of the Constitution’. Secondly, section 4 of the NPA Act prescribes that 
the prosecuting authority comprises of: the National Director, Deputy National Directors, 
Directors, Deputy Directors, and prosecutors (RSA, NPA Act, 1998). Thirdly, section 20(1) 
vests the power to “institute and conduct criminal proceedings on behalf of the State” and to 
“carry out any necessary functions incidental” thereto, on the prosecuting authority. Fourthly, 
given that the prosecuting authority is made up of the various levels as prescribed in section 4, 
then it is evident that the SIU can refer any matter in which the commission of an offence is 
identified, to any of these levels which should have the delegations associated with their 
appointments, from the National Director, even if they were at a regional level. This would be 
both compliant on the basis of both the legislation and the constitutional imperatives.   
    
3.3.7 Referrals to the Public Protector 
 
The SIU during the course of its investigation, may come across matters which may in its 
opinion, best be dealt with by the Public Protector. In this case the SIU in terms of section 
5(6)(b) of the SIU Act, may refer such matter to the Public Protector (RSA, SIU Act, 1996a). 
Similarly, the Public Protector may refer any matter which falls within the SIU’s terms of 
reference, to the SIU as depicted in Figure 3.4 below. These prerogatives lie with both the Head 
of the SIU and the Public Protector respectively.    
 
Figure 3.4: Referrals to the Public Protector 
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Source: Personal Observation, 2014-2016, and Maharaj (2016) 
 
In this regard, it might be worth noting some of the investigations that are duplicated between 
the SIU and the Public Protector. In some cases, investigations even overlap with that of the 
DPCI e.g. the Nkandla matter which was investigated by the Public Protector, the DPCI and 
the SIU (Somiah, 2016). Some significant cases amongst others, according to an online article 
in the DailyVox (2014), on cases that put the Public Protector in the spotlight, an online eNCA 
article by Sello (2016), the Public Protector website (RSA, Public Protector, 2016), and SIU 
Annual Reports 2010/2011; 2011/2012; 2012/2013; 2013/2014 and 2014/2015 respectively, 
with reference to the respective proclamations; are set out in Table 3.1 hereunder.  
Table 3.1: Investigations dealt with by both the Public Protector and the SIU 
 
NO. PUBLIC PROTECTOR SPECIAL INVESTIGATING UNIT 
1 Police Lease Procurement - Durban & 
Pretoria 
South African Police Services (SAPS) - Procs. R42 of 10 August 
2010 & R73 of 22 December 2011 
2 The Midvaal Saga Midvaal Local Municipality -  Proc. R33 of 20 May 2011 
3 Nkandla Debacle Department of Public Works: Prestige Project - Nkandla – 
Proc. R59 of 20 December 2013 
4 SA Post Office Lease (National Head 
Office - Eco Point) 
South African Post Office (SOC) Limited (SAPO) - Procs. R5 of 
06 February 2014 and R56 of 01 August 2014 (amendment) 
5 South African Broadcasting Authority 
(SABC) - Hlaudi Motsoeneng 
SABC - Proc.  R58 of 29 October 2010 
SIU Public Protector
The SIU may refer matters 
to the Public Protector 
The Public Protector may 
refer matters to the SIU 
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6 Department of Communications (DoC) - 
ICT Indaba  -Dina Pule 
Department of Communications - Proc. R 10 of 24 February 
2014 
7 Limpopo Dept of Roads & transport Limpopo Province Intervention - Proc. R21 of 23 March 2012 
 
Source: Adapted from Sello (2016), RSA, Public Protector (2016), and SIU Annual Reports 
2010/2011; 2011/2012; 2012/2013; 2013/2014 and 2014/2015 
What is evident is that efforts to investigate these matters which are generally quite complex 
in nature, are duplicated between the Public Protector and the SIU. This duplication of effort 
by virtue of the complexity of investigations generally unfold within the two Units and spreads 
over an extended period from anything between 1 and 5 or more years, and can be a rather 
expensive exercise. This is evident from the Nkandla investigation for which the Public 
Protector received the first complaint 2011 and only submitted her final report in 2014, 3 years 
later (RSA, Public Protector Report – Secure in Comfort, 2014). The SIU investigation took 
approximately 18 months from December 2013 to mid-2015 (Maharaj, 2016). This appears to 
suggest a duplication of costs, resources, efforts and sometimes unnecessary delays due to 
parallel investigations by two different agencies (Somiah, 2016). These types of situations 
emanate from organizational complexities, where, for example the Public Protector, which is a 
Constitutional body, may not want to relinquish its investigations to the SIU, which is a 
statutory body.  
In this regard, while the Public Protector may at its discretion and only if he or she deems it 
appropriate, refer a matter falling within the ambit of an SIU Proclamation to the SIU, the SIU 
may only refer a matter which it comes across during the course of its investigation, which in 
its opinion may “best be dealt with by the Public Protector”, to the Public Protector (RSA, SIU 
Act, 1996a). In essence, while this section of the SIU Act provides both the agencies with a 
discretion to refer, the SIU is still bound to comply with its terms of reference which is a 
directive by the Presidency in the form of a Proclamation. In contrast, the Public Protector has 
its own discretion in terms of its Act to investigate and refer, any matter falling within the SIU’s 
terms of reference, to the SIU (RSA, Public Protector Act, 1994). The argument here is that the 
Public Protector is not directed by the Presidency, and therefore has more flexibility in referring 
a matter, than the SIU.  
There is a close similarity of the wording relating to the Public Protector’s discretion to refer a 
matter to the SIU and/or a public body or authority, both in the SIU Act (RSA, SIU Act, 1996a) 
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section 5(6)(b) “if he or she deems it appropriate” and, in the Public Protector Act (RSA, Public 
Protector Act, 1994) section 6(4)(c) “at any time prior to, during or after an investigation … 
(ii) if he or she deems it advisable”. The similarity in the words ‘appropriate’ and ‘advisable’ 
provide the Public Protector with a wide discretion and where complexities may be at play, this 
can lead to the unnecessary duplication of effort, costs, time and resources. In addition, the fact 
that the Public Protector may even refer a matter ‘after’ its investigation, would further 
compound this duplication. A review of these two pieces of legislation is therefore essential in 
resolving this impasse. Alternatively, a clear set of guidelines pertaining to referrals between 
the two agencies should be set out in a Memorandum of Understanding entered into between 
the Heads of the two agencies (Personal Observation, 2016).     
 
3.3.8 Referrals for and/or the Institution of Civil Proceedings 
 
One of the significant advantages that the SIU has over other Law Enforcement Agencies is 
that in addition to the power to investigate, it can litigate too. The Unit has the power through 
civil proceedings, to obtain court orders against individuals suspected of wrongdoing 
compelling them to repay an unlawfully acquired benefit. The Unit can also institute civil 
proceedings to cancel unlawful contracts (SIU Annual Report 2010-2011, 2011:7). 
The SIU may in terms of section 5(5) of the SIU Act, take ‘civil proceedings in its own name 
or on behalf of a State institution in a Special Tribunal or any court of law (RSA, SIU Act 
1996a). In addition, in terms of section 5(7) of the SIU Act, the Head of the SIU may bring any 
matter which in his or her opinion, justifies the institution of civil proceedings by a State 
institution against any person (including employees), to the attention of the state attorney or 
the State institution concerned. Matters referred directly to the State Institution may include 
recommendations for disciplinary action against employees as reflected in figure 3.5 below. 
Figure 3.5: Referrals to State Institutions for the institution of Disciplinary proceedings 
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Source: Adapted from Personal Observation 2005-2016 
According to Maharaj (2016), in terms of the current process, the SIU may either refer the 
evidence to the State institution concerned or the State Attorney, or institute proceedings in its 
own name or on behalf of the state institution concerned.  In the former case, it is for the State 
institution or State Attorney to deal with the matter. The SIU assists in developing the matter 
for the institution of civil proceedings, if requested to do so.  It is not inconceivable that the 
State institution may refer the matter back to the SIU in order for the SIU to institute 
proceedings. In the latter case, the SIU instructs the state attorney to brief counsel in order to 
institute proceedings in the SIU’s name or on behalf of a state institution.  
The SIU collaborates with the state attorney and counsel in order to develop the matter for the 
institution of the necessary proceedings.  The SIU consults with the affected state institution 
only if and when necessary.  The SIU, acting in terms of section 5(5) has instituted proceedings 
against state institutions.  In these matters no relief was sought against the affected state 
institutions. They were merely cited as interested parties given that they had an interest in the 
matter. For example, the state institution was a party to a contract that the SIU sought to set 
aside. Maharaj (2016) presents the following as the current case flow or process relating to 
referrals for civil proceedings as set out in Figure 3.6 below: 
Figure 3.6: Referrals for institution of civil proceedings 
 
In consideration of 
applicable legislation, 
policies and procedures, 
the SIU compiles a 
complete evidence file in 
relation to transgressions 
by public officials 
The SIU submits the 
evidence file to the 
Accounting Officer or 
Accounting Authority of 
the relevant government 
department in whose 
employ the public official is
The Accounting Officer / 
Accounting Authority 
authorises disciplinary 
proceedings against the 
relevant public official 
The SIU provides advisory 
support and testifies at 
disciplinary proceedings as 
required 
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Source: Adapted from Personal Observation 2013-2016, and Maharaj (2016)  
 
3.3.9 Civil Recoveries/Proceedings undertaken by the SIU 
 
The SIU also initiates proceedings or takes appropriate civil action on behalf of state 
institutions against individuals (including state employees) and entities (including private 
companies), to recover unlawfully/improperly acquired state funds. This is done by way of the 
SIU negotiating the signing of acknowledgement of debts with the individuals/entities 
concerned to repay the unlawfully/ improperly acquired state funds. The SIU also serves letters 
of demands, whilst administering the debts on behalf of the State Institution concerned. The 
SIU operates a trust account into which the funds recovered are managed and controlled after 
which the funds are returned to the respective State Institutions as reflected in Figure 3.7 below.   
Figure 3.7: Civil recoveries/proceedings undertaken by the SIU 
 
 
SIU
• In terms of Section 5(7) of the SIU 
Act, the SIU may bring any matter 
which in its opinion, justifies the 
institution of civil proceedings by a 
State institution against any person, 
to the attention of the state 
attorney
State Attorney
• The State Attorney must consider 
this matter and brief Counsel in 
consultation with the SIU. 
Counsel's decision is then 
communicated to the SIU with 
instructions for civil action. 
SIU
State Institution
State 
Institution
SIU
The SIU refers a matter for civil action 
directly to a State Institution. The State 
Institution institutes civil action in its 
own name against persons/entities, as 
recommended by the SIU 
The SIU the refers the civil action 
to the State Institution concerned 
to institute civil proceedings 
The State Institution institutes 
civil action in its own name 
against persons/entities, as 
recommended by the SIU 
The State Institution may 
refer matters back to the 
SIU to take civil action on 
its behalf  
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Source: Adapted from Personal Observation 2013-2016, and Maharaj (2016) 
 
3.8 The Impact of the SIU’s work as an anti-corruption agency 
 
The SIU has over the years, had a huge impact on the investigation of fraud, corruption and 
malfeasance in the public sector as is depicted in the annual performance report of the SIU’s 
Annual Report 2011-2012 ((2012:8-9). It has been assigned with a large number of Presidential 
Proclamations and has consistently produced significant outcomes relevant to its 
investigations. The SIU Annual Report 2010-2011 (2011:10) presented the performance 
successes of the SIU from the period 2004/2005 to 2010/2011. As far as its results of 
investigations, the SIU over the said period signed 45 377 acknowledgement of debts which 
were prepared for use in civil litigation (SIU Annual Report, 2011:10). It also prepared 
evidence for 24 299 matters for criminal prosecution and evidence for 28 485 matters for 
disciplinary proceedings. In addition, the Unit prepared evidence for other remedial action 
totalling 563 536, which included recommendations for driver’s license cancellations and 
removals from the Social Pension System (SIU Annual Report, 2011:10). In this way the SIU 
assisted in cleaning up department’s systems, of fraudsters and in so doing improved the 
integrity of the respective department’s governance systems and processes. 
The SIU also in relation to savings, preventions and cash recoveries, effected an actual saving 
which included all social grants removed from the Socpen system for the financial year, of R 
1 147m. In addition it effected future savings of R 16 435m, considering all social grants 
recommended for removal from the Socpen system annualized over a 10 year period at an 
agreed rate. Lastly, the actual value of acknowledgement of debts or civil litigation as well as 
non-acknowledgement of debt recoveries, for example, admission of guilt was R332m (SIU 
SIU negotiates the repayment of unlawfully/improperly  acquired state funds 
with Individuals/Entities responsible for the losses
Individuals /Entities acknowledge debt to the relevant State Institution  by 
signing an acknowledgment of debt with the SIU
Individuals/Entities  make once-off or monthly payments against the debts, 
into the SIU's trust account 
The SIU manages the debt payments made into its trust account
The funds recovered and accumulated in the trust account are paid back to 
the respective State Instituions
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Annual Report 2010-2011, 2011, 10). All amounts recovered by the SIU is administered by the 
Unit in a trust account, and paid back to the respective government departments who suffered 
such losses. Coupled with the savings effected by the SIU to the respective departments, this 
enhances the financial ability of the departments to deliver services to the public.  
These figures reflect the impact of the SIU’s work. In fact the Unit further highlights significant 
results in its Annual Report 2010-2011 (2011:24-27) on some older proclamations which were 
its flagship projects. Firstly, in its Department of Housing project, the Unit signed 1291 
acknowledgement of debts to the value of R 16 275 157.00, prepared 625 matters for criminal 
action and 490 matters for disciplinary action. Secondly, in its Department of Transport 
Driver’s Licence investigation, the Unit identified and referred 37 625 invalidly issued and 
8241 invalidly converted licences for cancellation, it registered 620 criminal cases against 
government officials, municipal officials and private individuals, and referred 168 matters to 
the Department of Transport for disciplinary action against officials. On the Department of 
Transport stolen vehicles investigation, the Unit registered 125 criminal cases and 61 
disciplinary matters were referred to the Department of Transport. Finally on the Unit’s 
Department of Social Development investigation; it verified 26 609 social grant beneficiaries, 
prepared 2809 matters for criminal action of which 2477 convictions were achieved, 2095 
disciplinary matters were referred against public officials, 6326 acknowledgement of debts 
were signed to the value of R 56 269 044, and 6 326 unlawful beneficiaries were removed from 
the system (SIU Annual Report 2010-2011, 2011). 
During the 2011-2012 financial year, some of the highlights on the Department of Public 
Works investigation, through a collaborative effort between the SIU and the Anti-Corruption 
Task Team, a contractor was arrested and charged with 148 counts of fraud and corruption to 
the value of R 123m, assets to the value of R80m was seized from the contractor, 4 Kwazulu 
Natal Department of Public Works officials were arrested for fraud and corruption. In addition, 
the SIU registered a further 5 criminal cases relating to fraud and corruption amounting to R 
211m (SIU Annual Report 2011-2012, 2012:18). In the same report, on the South African 
Broadcasting Authority (SABC) investigation; the Unit registered a total of 29 criminal cases, 
identified irregular expenditure amounting to R 428m and fruitless and wasteful expenditure 
to the value of R 36m, a total of 464 disciplinary matters were referred to the SABC, R 207 
000 worth of recoveries was identified and R 35m in potentially untaxed benefits were referred 
to the South African Revenue Service (SIU Annual Report 2011-2012, 2012:30).   
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In the foreword to the SIU’s 2013-2014 Annual Report (2014: iii), Soni, presented some high 
level outcomes for the SIU between 2009 and 2014 as follows: 
 R799m in potential cash recoverables; 
 R113.8m in actual value of cash/assets recovered; 
 R111m in actual savings; 
 R27.5m in value of contracts set aside; 
 R1.3b in value of expenditure in procurement matters where financial misconduct was 
identified; 
 13 298 matters referred for criminal prosecution; and 
 10 591 matters referred for disciplinary action. 
What is clearly evident from the above examples, is that the SIU with both its investigation and 
litigation powers is a formidable force in the anti-corruption domain and ranks right up at the 
forefront amongst South Africa’s law enforcement agencies and anti-corruption efforts to curb 
the scourge of corruption in the country.   
 
3.9 A Comparative review of the SIU and the Hong Kong’s Independent 
Commission against Corruption  
 
The Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) is regarded, according 
to Quah (2009:177), as a universal model as it is characterized by its “trinity of purpose” with 
the ability to investigate, prevent, and communicate/educate society on corruption (Heilbrunn, 
2006:136). In this regard, the SIU is primarily a law enforcement type, investigative model 
with some evidence of prevention in its systemic recommendations to departments to close 
systemic gaps that create the opportunity for corruption to occur. The SIU however, does not 
embark on full-blown prevention or even public education exercises (Somiah, 2016). In fact, 
the SIU Act is fairly silent on this.  
The ICAC is according to the OECD (2008:31), one of two agencies that had a popular image 
of a successful, independent multi-purpose anti-corruption agency, and is as Chene (2012:2) 
points out, well known for its resounding success in combating corruption, and many countries 
have tried to adopt this universal prototype, with little success. If the question arises as to why 
the ICAC should be selected for the comparison? Then the answer is simple. Any comparison 
or benchmarking, which incidentally according to Quah (2009:172), originated amongst 
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Japanese business firms back in the 1950’s to benchmark the best organisations in other 
countries in order to transfer technology and practices to themselves; should take place against 
the best in the market or the world for that matter, and according to Chene (2012:2), the ICAC 
is a successful example of an anti-corruption agency and is often regarded as best practice and 
the “ultimate institutional response to fight corruption”. This view is further supported by De 
Sousa (2008:4) who also echoes the sentiment that the ICAC model is internationally acclaimed 
as a successful, best-practice model of anti-corruption agencies.    
Quah (2010) further points out that one of the first steps taken to ensure the ICAC’s credibility, 
was to revise existing legislation and to pass to new laws to establish an agency with an anti-
corruption mandate to investigate and refer matters for prosecution, and to ensure that it had a 
strong and supportive legislative framework which criminalized corruption and associated 
offences. In this regard, South African appears to be on par with Hong Kong if what Pillay 
(2014: 56) says is correct in that “South Africa has some of the most comprehensive anti-
corruption legislation in the world”. Some of these Acts have already been referred to in the 
preceding chapter and is seen to be strongly supportive and complementary towards both South 
Africa’s anti-corruption agencies; in this case the SIU, as well as its efforts to combat 
corruption.  
The laws enacted to empower the ICAC gave it far-reaching powers to act against corruption 
which included to search and seize, examine bank accounts, subpoena witnesses, audit private 
assets, arrest and detention and to seize passports and property (Quah, 2010). In the South 
African context, the SIU has its own enabling legislation, the SIU Act, which empowers it with 
all but the powers of arrest and detention, and for that matter, the powers of prosecution. It is 
important to note that the ICAC also lacks the power of prosecution. While the SIU does not 
seize property per se, it is also empowered in terms of its act to litigate and take civil action to 
get court orders compelling the repayment of unlawfully acquired benefits, or the surrendering 
of property to the sheriff of the courts in lieu of payment, by perpetrators. The Unit, also 
through close collaboration, works cooperatively with the DPCI and the Asset Forfeiture Unit 
to complement its lack of powers to arrest, seize and forfeit property.     
Unfortunately, the SIU does not share the same experience as the ICAC, in terms of solid 
budgetary support or financing. In 2001, the ICAC according to Heilbrunn (2006:137) received 
about $90 million, which equates to R1.249 billion, at a current rand equivalent of R13.88 (as 
at 29 November 2016) to the dollar. The SIU, with just over 600 staff, is approximately half 
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the size of the ICAC, who according to De Sousa (2008:9), had a staffing of 1350 contracted 
officers. While the SIU does not have prevention and community relations departments, but 
rather Business Management and Business Support, like the ICAC, its biggest department is 
the Business Operations which conducts its investigations. The ICAC’s Corruption Prevention 
Department funds corruption-related studies, conducts seminars and assists both public and 
businesses to find corruption-prevention strategies. Its Community Relations Department 
“builds awareness on the societal costs of corruption” with business and the community 
(Heilbrunn, 2006:137).  
The SIU has no such focus and has not endeavoured into awareness building programs 
(Personal Observation, 2005-2016). The United Nations body, UNCAC’s (2004:10), on the 
other hand, is guided by article 6 of their Act, where State Parties are required to “ensure the 
existence of a body or bodies” that prevent corruption by implementing anti-corruption 
policies; and “increasing and disseminating knowledge about the prevention of corruption”. 
There is thus a gap in the role of the South African SIU, which in line with UNCAC’s 
guidelines and provisions, suggests that the SIU should reconsider its roles and responsibilities 
in this regard. This will ensure that South Africa is in line with its international obligations in 
terms of its UNCAC ratification.    
Whereas the ICAC’s reporting hierarchy according to Heilbrunn (2006:137,) constituted the 
“Special Administrator”, the ICAC Director” and three oversight committees including: the 
“Operations Review Committee”, the “Corruption Prevention Advisory Committee” and the 
“Citizen Advisory Committee on Community Relations”; the SIU only has the Head of the 
Unit and an ‘Operations Review Committee’ which was only recently established (Personal 
Observation, 2014-2016). Like the ICAC, the SIU too has to submit regular reports and follow 
guidelines as set out in its project plan. The SIU’s project plans however, which is investigation 
or project specific, may not be the type of “clear procedural guidelines” as envisaged by the 
ICAC. This is especially in regards to uniformity in investigations, property seizures (civil 
litigation in the case of the SIU), and the duration of investigations (Somiah, 2016). In the case 
of the SIU, the duration and activities is set out in its project plan which is generally adhered 
to quite strictly. While it should be noted that the SIU lacks a Standard Operating Procedure 
for investigations, it is worth noting that this is currently being developed for the Unit (Personal 
Observation, 2014-2016).  
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The SIU like the ICAC, maintains a strong degree of integrity with its members and operations, 
so much so that it has its own Internal Integrity Unit (IIU) set up within the confines of its 
Business Management division (Somiah, 2016). This division ensures that the SIU recruits and 
maintains staff of the highest calibre by subjecting them to stringent annual vetting processes. 
In relation to reporting of corruption to the ICAC by citizens, while the ICAC according to 
Heilbrunn (2004:3), is able to freely investigate any allegations of corruption with specific 
police powers to investigate and prevent corruption,, the SIU cannot investigate as freely as its 
mandate or terms of reference emanates only from Presidential Proclamations, without which 
the Unit may not exercise its powers (Personal Observation, 2016; Maharaj, 2016). 
While the ICAC appears to have generated a reputation for combating corruption, the SIU too 
has thus far been very successful in the execution of its mandate with minimum criticism and 
maximum praise as reflected in a parliamentary statement issued by Khubayi (2016) where the 
Parliamentary Committee on Telecommunications and Postal Services welcomed the SIU’s 
progress made on the investigation into tender irregularities, irregular appointments, theft, 
fraud and corruption. Parliament felt reassured that investigations were progressing swiftly and 
that matters had been referred to the National Prosecuting Authority, while the Asset Forfeiture 
Unit and civil processes were underway. In fact what is significant in this regard, is 
Parliament’s support of the set-up of a Special Tribunal which can be set up to deal with any 
civil litigation matter brought before it by a Special Investigating Unit, thereby enhancing the 
Unit’s ability promptly deal and with, and dispose of its matters through a dedicated court.      
From the above it is evident that while the SIU has many similarities to the Hong Kong ICAC 
in terms of success, work still has to be done for it to become as formidable as its counterpart 
in Hong Kong. Even in its own multi-agency approach and this, significantly by virtue of South 
Africa’s population size in contrast with Hong Kong, the SIU has potential to become as 
resilient as the ICAC, especially if it were to benchmark itself against the ICAC and implement 
processes to overcome at least some of its shortfalls, whilst working within the ambit of 
international guidelines for anti-corruption agencies.   
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Chapter 4: Presentation and Discussion of Results  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The gathering of primary data for this research entailed the utilization of the purposive 
sampling technique.  The main rationale here was to seek out the responses of a target 
population who potentially bore sufficient knowledge of the subject matter. The SIU comprises 
of 32 Managers in the Business Operations management component, comprising: Programme, 
Project and, Assistant Managers (Personal Observation, 2014). A semi-structured 
questionnaire was administered via email to all 32 managers in random order subsequent to 
which only 12 managers responded making up 37% of managers, which effectively constitutes 
one third of the total population of operational managers in the Unit.   
The questionnaire was made up of a range of questions that sought to gain information that 
would assist in responding to the research questions. As a result, the questionnaire was divided 
into three essential categories namely: organisational independence, functional independence 
and financial independence (See Appendix 1). The data retrieved from these questionnaires 
was tabulated onto excel and the results was collated using pivot tables and charts. The results 
of this exercise provided primary data on the real-life challenges affecting the SIU’s 
independence. This Chapter provides a presentation of these findings according to the three 
essential categories, namely; organisational independence, functional independence and 
financial independence. 
 
4.2 Organisational Independence 
 
The point of departure for the discussion on the SIU’s organisational independence is 
essentially sections 2 and 3 of the SIU Act which speaks to the establishment of the SIU and 
its composition, including its appointment procedures. Section 2(1) by virtue of the wording 
‘whenever he or she deems it necessary’, places the establishment of the SIU by way of a 
proclamation, at the sole discretion of the President. So too does the President have the sole 
discretion in terms of section 2(4) to amend the proclamation establishing the SIU. In simple 
terms, this suggests that the President has the prerogative to either establish, or disestablish an 
SIU.   
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A number of questions were posed under this section to the respondents to illicit real-life 
responses. Due to the nature of the questions being a combination of open-ended and closed 
ended, responses to open-ended questions will be presented as narrative discussions while 
closed questions will be presented as tables or graphs.   
 
4.2.1 Understanding of the term “Independence” 
 
The first question related to their understanding of the term independent. All 12 respondents 
were unanimous in their response that “independence” referred to instances where:  
 there was no interference;  
 there was autonomy;  
 one could act without fear, favour or prejudice,  
 there was freedom to exercise a mandate; and 
 one could act within the ambit of one’s terms of reference without fear of reprisal.  
 
4.2.2 Other independent anti-corruption agencies 
 
On the question of which other anti-corruption agencies existed in South Africa; 7 of the 12 
respondents pointed out the Public Protector. Of these 7, one respondent also cited the SIU, 
whilst two also cited the SAPS/DPCI. The remaining 5 respondents cited the DPCI, SIU, and 
Corruption Watch. In general however, it is clear that the majority of the managers interviewed 
acknowledged that the Public Protector was recognised as one of the other independent anti-
corruption agencies, by virtue of its constitutional establishment.  
 
4.2.3 The independence of other anti-corruption agencies 
 
Question 3 presented a follow-up question to the above, and sought to determine why these 
agencies were seen to be independent. 7 of the 12 respondents cited the Public Protector, by 
virtue of: 
 it being able to investigate immediately on receipt of a compliant; 
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 the fact that no permission was needed to initiate an investigation; and 
 its accountability to Parliament and not to the executive (Head of State/President).  
However some of the 7 respondents also cited the DPCI as being able to investigate 
immediately once a complaint was received; and the SIU as not being dictated to by political 
formations. The remaining 5 respondents cited both the DPCI and SIU as not being politically 
dictated to; and the SIU for investigating without fear or favour when carrying out their duties. 
Again, the responses by a majority of the managers place the Public Protector in a dominant 
position over the SIU and DPCI as an independent agency and critically due to its ability to 
initiate an investigation and its reporting line to Parliament.   
 
4.2.4 The implication of Chapter 9 of the Constitution on the office of Public Protector  
 
In terms of the respondents understanding of the Public Protector as being an institution 
established in terms of Chapter 9 of the Constitution, all 12 respondents were unanimous in 
their responses that by implication, the role of this institution was to support and strengthen 
Constitutional democracy.  Further, that it was independent from executive, that it was regarded 
as a watchdog of the Constitution, and that its primary duty was to protect public interests.  
 
4.2.5 The degree of independence between the Public Protector and the SIU 
 
The respondents were additionally, asked to draw a comparison on the degree of independence 
between the Public Protector as a Chapter 9, Constitutional body; and the SIU as a statutory 
body. In essence, the question posed was: Which of the two bodies enjoyed a higher degree of 
independence? The response was unanimous from all 12 respondents that the Public Protector 
enjoyed a higher degree of independence due to its establishment as a Constitutional body. This 
is a clear indication that the Public Protector’s degree of independence far outweighs that of 
the SIU due to its constitutional status. This is an indication that the lower degree of 
independence of the SIU may be a cause for concern and compromise the Unit in the execution 
of its anti-corruption mandate.   
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4.2.6 The independence of the SIU as an anti-corruption agency in terms of the SIU Act 
 
On a general level, as to whether the SIU was considered to be an independent anti-corruption 
agency in South Africa and, if this was by virtue of its founding legislation the SIU Act, 5 of 
the 12 respondents responded in the affirmative that it was indeed independent, whilst 7 
disagreed that it was independent. Consequently, 5 respondents felt that the SIU’s 
independence could be attributed to the SIU Act, while 7 felt that the SIU Act was in fact an 
inhibitor to its independence. The majority response indicated that the SIU was not independent 
and that this was attributed to the SIU Act which did not provide sufficient independence to 
the Unit. 
 
4.2.7 Respondents’ personal view of the independence of the SIU 
 
On an individual level, when asked whether they personally considered the SIU to be an 
independent anti-corruption agency considering South Africa’s Constitutional dispensation and 
legislative prescripts; 3 agreed that the SIU was indeed independent while 9 disagreed citing: 
 the SIU’s dependency on the President for permission (in the form of a proclamation), 
to investigate;  
 the limitations to what the Proclamation specified it could investigate; and 
 the feeling that political pressure influenced certain matters. 
These responses are first-hand and can be considered a measure of the managers’ personal 
experience of independence within the organisation. The aspects presented justifying their view 
of a lack of independence are arguably, dependencies and outside pressures that is bound to 
have a material effect on the Unit’s independence.  
   
4.2.8 The independence requirements of the SIU as an anti-corruption agency 
 
On whether the SIU as an anti-corruption agency was required to be independent; while one 
respondent disagreed that it had to be independent, 11 respondents agreed citing that 
independence was necessary: 
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 in order to fulfil its mandate;  
 due to the controversial nature of its work; 
 to be able to act without fear, favour or prejudice; 
 to be in line with the Glenister judgement; and 
 in order for the outcomes and recommendations of the SIU to be implemented without 
fear. 
The responses in support of the SIU’s need for independence are overwhelming and the 
reasons advanced seems compelling enough to justify the need for the Unit’s independence. 
 
4.2.9 Public perception of the SIU’s independence 
 
The respondents, as members of the Unit, were asked for their view as to whether those 
interviewed by the Unit actually saw the SIU as being independent. Whilst 3 respondents 
agreed that people interviewed by the Unit perceived it to be independent; 9 respondents 
indicated that people interviewed by the Unit did not perceived it to be  independent, as it was 
seen merely as a puppet of the Executive (President), an organ of state, or a government 
department.  These responses reflect the views of the managers while interacting with public 
and private sector individuals during the execution of their duties as they indicate that it is often 
easy to assess the public perception of the Units’ standing within the anti-corruption 
environment and amongst other anti-corruption agencies. Typically, with the political scandals 
surrounding the Presidency, just by virtue of them knowing that the Unit reports to the 
President creates the perception that the Unit lacks independence.  
 
4.2.10 Factors that make the SIU independent / not-independent 
 
In response to the question of what factors made the SIU independent or not-independent, the 
responses received is set out in figure 4.1 hereunder, whilst the motivations for the responses 
were collated in tabular form and presented thereafter in table 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1: SIU independence 
 
 
Source: Research data from questionnaires administered to SIU managers 
 
10 of the 12 managers felt that the Unit was not independent while 2 felt that it was 
independent. In their responses, the managers presented factors associated with their 
respective responses. The motivations for the above responses are set out in tabular format in 
Table 4.1 hereunder. 
 
Table 4.1: Motivation for SIU Independence of Non-Independence 
 
No. of 
Respondents 
Category Motivation 
2 Independent  The SIU can prepare a motivation for a proclamation without 
permission from the subjects to be investigated; 
 It has its own budget which it can utilize as it deems fit. 
10 Not 
Independent 
 It is dependent on the President for a proclamation/mandate; 
 Its finances is controlled by government; 
 The appointment of the HoU is made by the President; 
 Appointment of staff can be influenced by government; 
 Financial limitations in relation the charging of fees for its services; 
 Presidential oversight of the Unit and its reporting obligations to 
the President; 
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 Budget approval by the Justice Ministry; 
 Its establishment by the President which can be changed by the 
executive or influenced by the legislature; 
 The SIU cannot initiate an investigation on receipt of a complaint. 
 
Source: Adapted from Research data from questionnaires administered to SIU managers, 2016 
 
In reviewing the responses from managers who felt that the Unit was in fact “independent”, it 
is easy to detect the contradictions with the responses from those that felt the Unit was “not 
independent”. Typically, while those that felt the Unit was independent by virtue of the Unit 
not requiring permission to motivate for a proclamation from persons to be investigated, the 
very fact that the Unit could neither investigate on receipt of a complaint nor without a 
proclamation was a more pressing issue that seem to affect the Unit’s independence than 
motivating for a proclamation. The issue of finances is also contradictory with 3 of the 10 
responses motivating for “not independent” highlighting government’s control of finances, 
financial limitations in relation to charging of fees; as well as the Unit’s budgetary approval by 
the Justice Ministry. This may well diminish the financial autonomy of the Unit. 
What is evident from these responses is that the majority of responses indicate reasons or 
limitations to the independence which are synonymous with what is prescribed in the SIU Act. 
This therefore could add some weight to their arguments. 
 
4.2.11 Challenges in the SIU Act that affect the Unit’s independence 
 
In response to the question that required the Respondents to identify those challenges in the 
SIU Act (RSA, SIU Act, 1996a) which they felt, affected the Unit’s independence, their 
responses, in no particular order, included:  
 Section 2(1) - The SIU can only investigate once a proclamation is signed by the 
President, and in this regard the SIU in many cases, experiences significant delays in 
the authorization of proclamations; 
 Section 2(1) and (4) - The SIU is established by the President and the proclamation 
establishing the SIU can be amended at any time, by the President; 
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 Section 3(1) - The appointment of the Head of the Unit by the President;  
 Section 3(5)(b) - Payment of allowances to members may be determined by the 
Ministers of Justice and Finance; 
 Section 4(f) and (g) - The SIU is obliged to report to President on its investigations; 
 Section 4(1)(d) - As an anti-corruption agency, its primary function is civil litigation, 
while criminality must be referred to the prosecuting authority as it has no prosecutorial 
powers;  
 Section 5(1) - Financial limitations in relation to the recovery of fees from state 
institutions for services rendered; and 
 Section 5 - The SIU does not have arresting powers. 
Most of these challenges are synonymous with issues that many authors as well as 
international legal instruments highlight as being inhibiting factors towards the independence 
of anti-corruption agencies. 
 
4.2.12 The SIU’s accountability and the associated challenges 
 
On the SIU’s accountability, 10 of the respondents agreed that the SIU was accountable to both 
the President and to Parliament, while 2 respondents indicated that the SIU was only 
accountable to the President. As a follow-up question in relation to challenges relating to the 
SIU’s accountability, while 3 respondents saw no challenges, the other 9 presented the 
following challenges: 
 The SIU is directly accountable to the President and not to Parliament; 
 This may have an impact on investigations in which either the President or the ruling 
Party may be the focus of investigations; 
 The SIU’s accountability to the Minister of Justice in respect of finances/expenditure; 
 Political interference due to its reporting obligations to the Presidency; and 
 The accountability in relation to the submission of final reports to the President may 
provide the opportunity for reports to be tampered with.  
It is clear from the responses that the majority of the managers agree that the Unit reports to 
both the President and to Parliament, however, 2 managers were of the view that the Unit 
only reported to the President. The responses are in line with the SIU Act in that while the 
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Unit’s direct reporting line is in fact to the President, the Act also makes provision for the 
Unit’s reporting twice annually to Parliament. Clearly, the major challenge to the Unit’s 
accountability is highlighted as its reporting obligations to the Executive. 
 
4.2.13 The SIU’s appointment procedures 
 
All 12 respondents agreed that the Head of the SIU is appointed by the President. This is in 
fact in line with prescripts in the SIU Act. In this regard the respondents identified the following 
challenges: 
 The President may appoint someone he can manipulate;  
 He may appoint someone toothless to Head up the Unit thereby compromising the 
efficiency of the Unit and as a result, inhibit anti-corruption efforts;  
 Due to the appointment of the Head of the Unit by the Presidency, his/her loyalty will 
lie with the President;  
 The Head of the Unit may show bias and not execute tasks without fear or favour; and 
 By virtue of the President being the Head of the ruling party, his appointment of the 
Head of the Unit may be subject to political influence. 
While the argument that the Executive appointment of the Head of the Unit can compromise 
the Unit, there are some arguments as explained later in this chapter in the international 
context, that are both for and against this practice. It however, remains a challenge in the anti-
corruption context.   
 
4.2.14 Permanency of the SIU as a State Institution 
 
On the permanency of the SIU as a government institution, all 12 respondents agreed that the 
SIU was neither a permanent national government department, nor was it perceived as a 
“permanent” entity, agency or other institutional form. Eight of the 12 respondents indicated 
that the SIU was fostered by the Department of Justice & Constitutional Development 
(DoJ&CD) which was its parent department, while 3 respondents indicated that the SIU Act in 
fact gave the Unit mandatory “temporary” existence. One respondent indicated that the SIU 
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was a creature of statute. This type of set-up for an anti-corruption agency is devoid of security 
if tenure and can weaken an anti-corruption agency.  
 
4.2.15 Establishment of the SIU by the President 
 
On whether the SIU could be disbanded/disestablished by the President without consulting 
Parliament; 11 of the 12 respondents agreed that this was in fact possible by virtue of s.2(4) of 
the SIU Act, which makes no provision for the President to consult with Parliament in respect 
of either the establishment or disestablishment/closure of the SIU. One respondent disagreed. 
The overwhelming majority point out a critical compromise to the Unit’s independence as there 
appears to be no security of tenure for the organisation. 
 
4.2.16 Political Interference in the SIU  
 
In response to the question probing whether the SIU was free from political influence, whilst 
two agreed that it was, 10 disagreed that the Unit was free from political influence citing 
amongst other things the following: 
 The Head of the Unit is appointed by the President who himself is the head of the ruling 
party; 
 The President himself decides on what the SIU investigates by virtue of the issuance of 
a proclamation setting out the terms of reference for the SIU;  
 Political influence is possible by the ruling party via the President; and 
 The SIU, as it is structured to operate within the ambit of its Act, will never be free 
from political interference. 
This is a rather sensitive question and can compromise an anti-corruption agency’s 
independence quite severely. Political influence is possibly the greatest risk for such a body. 
 
4.2.17 Political pressure on investigations 
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The last question under organisational independence was by far the most sensitive one. The 
respondents were asked to indicate whether they had ever felt political pressure on any of their 
investigations. Seven of the 12 respondents indicated that they did feel some form of political 
pressure at some time or the other, whilst 4 indicated that they did not feel any political 
pressure. One respondent indicated that although political pressure was experienced, it was not 
direct. No elaboration was sought in this regard, due to the sensitivity of the Unit’s work. It is 
a given that once an anti-corruption agency is politically captured, it compromises the Unit and 
reduces public faith in an organisation. The issue of political influence and interference is an 
issue that requires serious attention by lawmakers in order to preserve the integrity of anti-
corruption agencies.   
 
4.3 Discussion and interpretation of results on organisational independence 
 
There is no doubt that the SIU, as an anti-corruption agency, must be afforded the associated 
organisational independence as prescribed in Articles 6 and 36 of the UNCAC (2004). As one 
of the fundamental international legal instruments to which South Africa is party to, both 
Articles 6 and 36 of the UNCAC (2004:10), aptly compels State Parties to grant the body or 
bodies tasked with the prevention of corruption the “…necessary independence … to enable 
the body or bodies to carry out its or their functions effectively and free from any undue 
influence”.  In other words, they ought to be allowed to function without fear or favour. 
Despite the fact that the DPCI is established as South Africa’s key anti-corruption agency, the 
SIU is also expected to be independent by the public.  This is based upon the rationale that it 
is one of the bodies which derives an anti-corruption mandate through section 2 of the SIU Act, 
which makes provision for the President to refer any matter on the grounds of any alleged 
“offences referred to in Part 1 to 4, or section 17, 20 or 21 of Chapter 2 of the PACOCA Act, 
2004; ... which was committed in connection with the affairs of any State institution”; to an 
existing SIU (RSA, SIU Act, 1996a). In the absence of the provisions of the PACOCA Act, an 
argument for the SIU’s independence would have been a modest one. Its PACOCA mandate 
therefore triggers the requirement for appropriate independence. 
The SIU therefore, in the execution of its anti-corruption mandate of “investigating serious 
malpractices or maladministration in connection with the administration of State institutions, 
State assets and public money as well as any conduct which may seriously harm the interests 
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of the public”; must have the necessary independence to investigate without undue influence 
(RSA, SIU Act, 1996a), In this regard, individuals responsible for oversight in state institutions 
or agencies at both national and local government level may become the focus of an SIU 
investigation. To this extent, the independence of the SIU’s investigation, by virtue of its 
reporting obligation to the President as the head of the ruling party, might be seen as a risk to 
the Unit’s independence. The SIU must maintain its integrity and guard itself against 
compromising its independence. This may entail a steadfast, no-nonsense approach to its 
investigations with some evasive manoeuvres to avoid political capture or manipulation. 
The independence necessary would in this sense apply to the SIU’s establishment, the 
appointment procedures of the Head of the Unit and the composition of the Unit.  
 
4.3.1 Establishment of the SIU, Appointment procedures and Permanency, in relation to 
the SIU Act 
 
According to Section 2 of the SIU Act (RSA, SIU Act, 1996a), only the President can establish 
a Special Investigating Unit; and, only he or she can disestablish such Unit. Whilst there was a 
unanimous agreement by all the respondents in this regard, in the preceding section that the 
establishment of the SIU is at the sole discretion of the President, one of the concerns raised 
was that the SIU Act did not make the SIU a permanent state institution.  Neither does the Act 
provide any guarantee as to the permanency of the Unit, nor that of its Head. These concerns 
are reiterated in the responses provided by the respondents on challenges in the SIU Act.   
In comparison, Heilbrunn (2004:6) points out that despite the Singapore’s CPIB’s progressive 
accountability to four different ministries over a period of 15 years, its positioning directly in 
the executive and being directly accountable and reporting to the Presidency, afforded it with 
a significant degree of influence. Similarly, one could argue that by virtue of the SIU’s 
establishment by the Presidency, the Unit may well enjoy similar benefits to that of the CPIB.  
In contrast however, Heilbrunn (2004:6) further presents the argument by some observers that, 
while the placement of the “CPIB directly in the Executive branch” may indicate a high level 
of political commitment, “its reporting obligations reinforces the executive’s influence while 
reducing the CPIB’s independence”. 
The respondents’ arguments among other things in the preceding section, were that as a result 
of the appointment of the Head of the Unit by the President, he or she would be beholden to 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
89 
 
the executive and this would affect his or her partiality on investigations focused on the 
executive or the ruling party, which, as a result, would affect the credibility and independence 
of the Unit. This is supported by the Public Affairs Research Institute’s view (PARI, 2012:106), 
in its Diagnostic Report on Corruption, Non-Compliance and Weak Organisations compiled 
for the Technical Assistance Unit of the National Treasury;  that “apart from the technical 
(policing and legal) skills required, anti-corruption agencies tend to stand and fall on the basis 
of their perceived fairness”. This is evidenced by the dissolution of the Scorpions because of 
its perceived impartiality in relation to groups within the African National Congress. 
In tracking the establishment and existence of the SIU as far back as 1996, one needs to 
consider several key factors. The Heath Commission by virtue of Proclamation R72 of 1997, 
and the President’s amendments to the said Proclamation by virtue of Proclamation R.24 of 14 
March 1997, as amended by Proclamation R.72 of 11 November 1997 and subsequent 
establishment of the SIU vide Proclamation R118 of 2001. What is evident from these is that 
in this space of approximately 20 years, amidst these Proclamations and amendments, neither 
the Heath Commission nor SIU has been dissolved by the President. In fact this is eloquently 
pointed out in the Constitutional Court judgement by Yacoob J (2008) in Chagi and Others v 
Special Investigating Unit where in paragraph 24, he found that the 2001 Proclamation did not 
shut down or close the first Unit, it rather repealed the 1997 proclamation that created it and 
created the second Unit giving it the power to continue with investigations assigned to the first 
Unit.  
The effect of this proclamation was that the Head of the Unit, Judge Willem Heath, had to step 
down as a result of the ruling that a sitting Judge could not be the Head of the SIU.  Hofmeyr 
was appointed by the President as a replacement for Heath in 2001, and remained in this 
position until his removal in 2011 (Underhill, 20 August 2015). Since 2001 essentially, there 
have been no proclamations establishing an SIU or other SIU’s.  The Unit was therefore never 
shut down nor disestablished. Rather, the numerous proclamations authorized by the 
Presidency to date, served to, in terms of s. 2 of the SIU Act, refer such matters to the existing 
SIU. 
In response to the respondents’ concern relating to permanency of the SIU, in a pertinent 
Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) judgement in Special Investigating Unit v Nadasen (5/2001) 
[2001] ZASCA 117; [2001] 2 All SA 170 (A) (28 September, 2001), Marais RM points out that 
s. 2(1) of the SIU Act:  
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“envisages the appointment of any number of units but does not entitle the President to 
appoint a roving unit or substitute police force with an unbounded mandate to investigate 
possible corruption wherever it may exist…”.  
The identifiable challenges in this interpretation include the fact that the President cannot 
“appoint a roving Unit or a substitute police force” (Special Investigating Unit v Nadasen) 
whose mandate has no boundaries, and that it is the President’s prerogative to “appoint or 
establish a unit” (RSA, SIU Act, 1996a). Considering that the SIU has been in existence for 
more than 20 years now, may be tantamount to it being perceived as a “roving unit”, however, 
the fact is that it does not have an “unbounded mandate” (RSA, SIU Act, 1996a). It still operates 
within the strict and specific terms of reference of the SIU Act and applicable proclamations. 
This approach appears consistent with Meagher’s (2002:3) finding that one of the lessons learnt 
in his review of the experiences of anti-corruption agencies, was that “no agency could cope 
with an unlimited mandate” and that choices had to be made. Perhaps the consideration here 
therefore, should be for permanency of the Unit as an institution, the operations of which could 
still be subject to the terms of reference as contained in relevant Proclamations.   
Despite this interpretation and specificity by the SCA, in relation to the establishment of the 
SIU by the President, in paragraph 43 of his Constitutional Court judgement in the South 
African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath and Others, Judge Chaskalson P, 
makes an interesting point that the SIU Act does not make provision for the appointment of the 
SIU Head for a specific period as the scope and nature of work.  The judgement also highlighted 
that the effective functioning of the Unit may be adversely affected if the SIU Head was 
appointed temporarily as this would potentially minimize the “continuity and control” that is 
evident in a “permanent appointment or at least an appointment for an indefinite but long term” 
(South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath and Others). 
In as much as the above interpretation supports a lengthy indefinite appointment of the Head 
of the SIU, the idea of security of tenure is not protected within the prescripts of the SIU Act, 
and may be subject to interpretation. Being open to interpretation may positively or negatively 
impact on the Unit functionality. Perhaps the value of this interpretation may be the building 
block to an argument for an amendment to the prescripts to afford the position of the Head of 
the Unit more security of tenure by prescribing the periods or tenure of service like that of the 
Public Protector.  
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In the same judgement of South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath and 
Others, Judge Chaskalson in paragraph 38, further contends that the SIU Head should be a 
person with a high degree of integrity especially as the functions he has to perform are 
executive functions. In this vein, the President irrespective of his own personal agenda is 
compelled to appoint such a person to the office of the Head of the SIU, that is, someone that 
is “fit and proper” (RSA, SIU Act, 1996b). Thus, any appointment contrary to this would be 
unconstitutional and invalid and may be the subject of legal challenges. The greater challenge 
would be the actual performance of these executive functions by the appointed SIU Head 
towards acting with integrity, and without fear, favour or prejudice.  
The contention that the SIU was never dissolved in over 20 years does not however absolve 
the SIU Act from catering for a prescriptive permanency of the Unit.  Neither is it absolved 
from the perceived partisan presidential appointment of the Head of the Unit. The responses 
highlighted in the preceding section, by the respondents, raise alarm-bells over these critical 
issues. The gist of the above-mentioned legal interpretations may however, add some value on 
any future arguments relating to a revision of the SIU Act.  Perhaps what also needs to be 
highlighted, is that Judge Chaskalson, aptly pointed out in paragraph 67 of his same 
Constitutional Court judgement, in South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v 
Heath and Others, as early as 2001, that there was a need for the State to consider the 
constitutionality of issues related to the structure of the SIU Act and its provisions.  
Based upon the concerns raised by the respondents in relation to the discretionary powers 
towards the establishment and disestablishment of the SIU by the President, the uncertainty of 
the Unit’s permanency; and, the appointment of the Head of the Unit by the Presidency the 
State need some attention in considering the future of the Unit. Perhaps a review the prescripts 
of the Act needs to be undertaken in order to bring it in line with its international obligations 
in terms of the UNCAC (2004), to ensure that the SIU Act does not inhibit the independence 
requirements of an anti-corruption body as envisaged by the UNCAC. 
Given these concerns over powers and permanency, consideration within the SIU Act needs to 
be given to the SIU as an institution tasked with an anti-corruption mandate, even if it has to 
still rely on proclamations, as its terms of reference to investigate. Proclamations would then 
serve the purpose of setting the boundaries for an SIU investigation so as not to overlap with 
the mandate of other agencies. Permanency in this regard is seen as essential for an agency 
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tasked with an anti-corruption mandate to ensure and preserve the continuity of highly sensitive 
investigations. 
 
4.3.2 Is the SIU Independent or seen to be Independent? 
 
According to Gould (2012:1), in the March edition of the SA Crime Quarterly, in order for 
South Africa to meet with Constitutional and international obligations, an agency tasked with 
combating corruption must be independent, and must be seen as independent. These sentiments 
were echoed by Soni (2015) when punting aspects for consideration during this research. On 
this note, the most critical source of determining whether the Unit is indeed independent or 
seen to be independent would be those that are employed by the Unit as they would have the 
most practical exposure to instances where the Unit’s independence may be inhibited, or to 
perceptions by persons interviewed in the course of the execution of their mandates. In this 
regard and in line with the Constitutional imperative as set out by Gould (2012), the majority 
of the respondents interviewed are in agreement with Gould’s proposal of the Constitutional 
imperative that an anti-corruption agency was required to be independent; and as such, the SIU 
was required to be independent; and, seen to be independent.  
It is important to note that the majority of the respondents felt that people interviewed by the 
SIU did not see the SIU as being independent, but more as a ‘puppet’ of the Executive citing 
the Unit’s dependency on the Executive and on Proclamations by the President. In light of this, 
as an agency or organisation charged with an anti-corruption mandate, the emerging picture to 
a large extent, is that the SIU lacks the degree of independence required of it as an anti-
corruption agency.  Further, it is not viewed to be independent by the majority it interacts with. 
In this regard, the SIU appears to fail to comply with the Constitutional imperative of being an 
independent anti-corruption agency.  
To this end, both sections 2 and 3 of the SIU Act need to be reviewed to determine the extent 
to which the current prescriptive requirements of the SIU conform to South Africa’s regional 
and international obligations, as well as its legislative guidelines. Particularly the Glenister I 
judgement of Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others [2008] ZACC 
19 needs to be considered in relation to the establishment of an appointment procedures within 
its anti-corruption bodies. The Constitution should serve as the supreme guide for the 
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establishment of an anti-corruption agency such as the SIU and for the appointment of its Head. 
This is critical to preserve the integrity of the Unit’s work.  
Like the Office of the Public Protector, the Head of the SIU ought to be subject to the same 
intricate and transparent parliamentary selection processes to eliminate bias and subjectivity. 
The champions of this initiative, ideally, should be the political parties of the day, private sector 
businesses, non-profit organisations and civil society. Government, in this regard, in response 
to efforts by the Unit to motivate for, and secure this type of review and/or amendments to its 
Act, may be limited to the extent that it is accountable to the executive and further, that the 
amendment of legislation remains at the authority of the National Legislature.  This is a political 
process whose objectivity may be affected by party politicking.  
 
4.4 Functional Independence 
 
The next section that the respondents were subjected to was that of the SIU’s functional 
independence. The focus of the questions was to illicit responses which could clarify the degree 
to which the SIU enjoyed functional independence in the execution of its mandate and 
functions. 
 
4.4.1 Powers of the SIU in terms of the SIU Act 
 
The first question related to whether the SIU Act made provision for sufficient powers for the 
Unit to execute its mandate. Nine of the 12 respondents agreed that it did indeed, citing the 
powers to: 
 Investigate; 
 litigate (civilly) to recover losses suffered by the state; 
 search and seize; 
 compel witness testimony even if it incriminated such witness (provided such 
testimony would be inadmissible in subsequent criminal proceedings against such 
witness); and 
 engage other Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA’s) e.g. National Prosecuting Authority. 
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The remaining 3 respondents disagreed that the SIU Act made provision for sufficient powers, 
citing such reasons such as the Special Tribunal not being operational for civil litigation.  
 
4.4.2 Other agencies with more powers that the SIU 
 
Coupled with the above, four follow-up questions were administered to the respondents. The 
first being whether there were other agencies with more powers to investigate corruption than 
the SIU. While 2 of the respondents indicated there were none, 10 respondents agreed that there 
were indeed agencies with more powers than the SIU. These included the SAPS, the DPCI, the 
Public Protector, and the National Prosecuting Authority.  
 
4.4.3 Why do these agencies have more powers? 
 
The second question sought the reason for the respondents concluding that these agencies had 
more powers. The following reasoning was presented by the respondents: 
 They did not need a proclamation to investigate; 
 They may initiate an investigation on receipt of a complaint; and 
 Agencies like the SAPS and DPCI have the powers of arrest, & to charge suspects and 
bring them before court. 
 
4.4.4 Powers that the SIU lack 
 
The third question sought to illicit responses in relation to powers that the SIU did not have. 
The responses were as follows: 
 The powers of arrest; 
 The powers of prosecution; and 
 The power to report to persons other than the President. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
95 
 
4.4.5 SIU powers that other agencies lack 
 
In contrast, the fourth question sought to determine whether the SIU had powers which other 
agencies did not have. In response, while two of the respondents disagreed that the SIU had 
powers that the other agencies did not have, 10 of the respondents indicated that some of the 
powers that the SIU had over and above the powers that other agencies had, were the power to: 
 Conduct civil litigation in its own name or on behalf of a state institution; 
 Hold hearings and question witnesses and/or compel witnesses to answer questions 
even if it incriminated them (without using such evidence in subsequent criminal 
proceedings); and 
 Litigate to recover misappropriated state funds. 
 
4.4.6 The SIU’s reliance on other agencies to investigate corruption 
 
On whether the SIU relied on the assistance of other agencies to investigate corruption, 5 
respondents indicated that the SIU did not rely on the assistance of other agencies, while 7 
indicated that the SIU did in fact rely on other agencies as follows: 
 The National Prosecuting Authority for Prosecutions;  
 The SAPS/DPCI for arrests; and 
 The Asset Forfeiture Unit for asset forfeiture. 
 
4.4.7 Can the SIU initiate a prosecution? 
 
On whether the SIU could initiate a prosecution on matters investigated by the Unit, 6 
respondents replied in the affirmative by virtue of a referral to the National Prosecuting 
Authority. On the other hand, 6 replied in the negative, citing that the decision to prosecute still 
lay with the National Prosecuting Authority. Notwithstanding the conflicting responses in the 
affirmative and negative by the respondents, by virtue of the National Prosecuting Authority 
being the common agency in all 12 responses to whom referrals for prosecution are made by 
the SIU, and with whom the decision to prosecute lay, the foregone conclusion in this regard 
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is that the SIU cannot prosecute, period. This is supported by the fact that prosecution is the 
sole mandate of the National Prosecuting Authority in terms section 2 of Chapter 2 of the 
National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998 (RSA, NPA Act, 1998) which prescribes that 
“there is a single national prosecuting authority established in terms of section 179 of the 
Constitution, as determined in this Act”. 
 
4.4.8 The SIU’s access to information 
 
On the question of whether the SIU has independent access to information required to 
investigate corruption, 4 replied in the affirmative citing that the SIU could utilize its powers 
in terms of section 5 of the SIU Act to request information from any person or entity. The other 
8 respondents replied in the negative, citing that the SIU relied on other agencies for 
information including: the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC), the Companies and Intellectual 
Properties Commission (CIPC), the South African Revenue Services (SARS), the South 
African Banking Risk Information Centre (SABRIC), and the SAPS. 
 
4.4.9 The adequacy of SIU resources 
 
The final question under functional independence was whether the SIU had sufficient skilled 
staff to conduct its investigations or whether it relied on external skills. While 7 of the 
respondents agreed that the SIU did in fact have sufficient skilled staff with one exception that 
the SIU relied on external professionals for technical skills e.g. engineering or architecture, 5 
of the respondents disagreed citing that the SIU had a shortage of skilled staff in the fields of 
auditing and accounting. 
 
4.5 Discussion and interpretation of results on functional independence 
 
The SIU unfortunately does not have the power to initiate its own investigations nor does it 
have a choice in respect of what to investigate. The scope of its mandate is derived wholly from 
a Presidential Proclamation which is at the sole discretion of the President. Only on the issue 
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of a Proclamation can the SIU exercise its statutory powers. The question that then arises is, 
what does this imply? Is this seen as a weakness or strength?  
 
4.5.1 The Powers and Functions of the SIU 
 
What is evident from the responses obtained from the respondents in the preceding section in 
relation to the SIU’s ability to initiate an investigation of its own volition, is that this is seen as 
a weakness and an impediment to the Unit’s functional independence. The respondents views 
are that the prerogative to investigate, and what to investigate should lie with the SIU, and not 
the executive. In contrast however, an interesting argument pointed out in the PARI’s 
Diagnostic Report (2012) is that one of the vulnerabilities of anti-corruption agencies is that 
they can choose what to investigate and what not to. This could imply partisan behaviour on 
their part. The report therefore recommends that a critical requirement be that anti-corruption 
agencies select cases objectively.  
In considering this argument, perhaps the fact that in the current context of a presidentially 
proclaimed mandate and terms of reference where the SIU cannot play a role in case selection, 
is to its advantage. This is based on the rationale that partisan behaviour on the part of the Unit 
in case selection, would then be eliminated. But then, one may question the role of the President 
in the case selection and assignment to the SIU? The major argument raised by the respondents 
in this regard was that the President as the executive may be biased in case selection as he 
‘may’ assign cases at his discretion and not necessarily in the interests of the state or society.  
This appeared to be evident in the United Democratic Movement’s (2001:4) report entitled 
“Comrades in Corruption 2” in reaction to the Arms Deal Joint Investigation Report where they 
point out that although Parliament’s Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) 
recommended that the investigation be conducted by the SIU, the Director of Public 
Prosecutions, the Public Protector and the Auditor General.  This resulted in what could be 
considered panic in the ruling party. SCOPA’s decision was subsequently over-ruled by the 
Speaker of Parliament and no Proclamation was issued by the President for the SIU to 
investigate the Arms Deal (United Democratic Movement, 2001:4). Subsequent to this the SIU 
at the time known as the Heath Commission, was dissolved or the proclamation establishing it 
was repealed, and the Arms Deal investigation was assigned to the remaining three agencies. 
The situation intensified when the Deputy President at the time and his Cabinet, as indicated 
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in the United Democratic Movement Report (2001:5) publicly chastised SCOPA and in the 
process, “undermined Parliament’s decision”. Critically, the United Democratic Movement 
Report (2001:5) concluded that a number of incidents emanated from the Executive 
interference which “undermined the credibility of any investigation”. This included, SCOPA’s 
independence being compromised; the SIU with more powers (civil) than other agencies, was 
withdrawn from the investigation and dissolved; and the investigation had no public legitimacy.        
An interesting consideration should be what the international practice in relation to anti-
corruption agencies functional independence is. Heilbrunn (2004:6), in reference to Singapore, 
suggests that the President is also at the top of Singapore’s CPIB and that he receives all reports 
from the agency and can therefore make the final decision as to whether CPIB acts against 
alleged corruption. He also points out that the CPIB director is accountable to the President. 
The critical factor despite this perceived functional impediment with accountability to the 
executive though, is that the CPIB still had the reputation of high levels of successful 
investigations and that since its establishment, public sector corruption had decreased annually.  
The respondents, in the current study, identified several challenges in the SIU Act. These 
included, the SIU’s reporting obligations to the President; the reliance on the prosecuting 
authority to prosecute offenders it might have identified as criminal perpetrators; its reliance 
on other law enforcement agencies to investigate criminality it had identified in the first place; 
the lack of the power to initiate an investigation without a Proclamation; and the lack of 
arresting powers by the SIU.       
As an investigative type model of an anti-corruption agency, these are somewhat concerning 
issues that may warrant further analysis and interventions. On the reporting obligation to the 
Presidency, however, what is evident from the SIU Act and, on a closer analysis of s.4(1) (f), 
(g) and (h) of the Act, is the reality that it not only makes provision for the SIU to report to the 
Presidency, but the Unit is also required to report twice annually to Parliament on its 
investigations and  “activities, composition and expenditure of the Unit” (RSA, SIU Act, 
1996a). It must be noted that, while s.4 (1)(f) makes provision for reporting on progress on 
investigations “from time to time as directed by the President”, s.4(1)(g) requires that upon the 
conclusion of an investigation, the Unit is compelled to submit a final report to the President.   
Additionally, s.4(1)(h) of the SIU Act (RSA, SIU Act, 1996a) makes provision for 
Parliamentary reporting twice annually. This confirms that besides the executive oversight 
during and upon conclusion of an investigation, there is a regular and ongoing reporting 
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obligation and oversight role played by the National Legislature. This oversight role could 
potentially serve to limit any form of manipulation by the executive of the SIU’s investigations 
without being detected by the Legislature. This provides the degree of independence required 
of the SIU as an anti-corruption agency and is consistent with international practice and 
recommendations as both executive and parliamentary oversight provide for the independence 
necessary of an anti-corruption agency.   
Whilst the powers of arrest might be not be easily achievable for the sole reason of not 
duplicating the powers and mandates of the SAPS, it should be an important consideration in 
the context of the anti-corruption mandate of the SIU. Perhaps this needs to also be considered 
in light of the lack of certain constraints in agencies like the Independent Complaints 
Directorate (ICD), now the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID). Indeed Faull 
(2011a:5) raises doubt as to whether the ICD would be able to do justice to its mandate in light 
of budgetary and capacity constraints, or merely be compelled to pass complaints on to 
agencies like the SIU. Faull (2011a:5) goes on to argue that since it may be impossible for the 
IPID to “hire more investigators and provide them with specialised training required to 
investigate corruption”; it would have to “re-negotiate its relationships with … other agencies 
to ensure that complaints are investigated”. In this regard, the handling of investigations 
without full policing powers specifically that of arrest, may be problematic for agencies like 
the SIU.    
 
Perhaps in this context one should consider these other agencies in South Africa that currently 
retain powers of arrest including the SAPS/DPCI and the IPID. This could potentially give rise 
to the argument that the powers of arrest are not necessarily limited to the police, but extend to 
other agencies as well like Singapore’s CPIB which is independent from Singapore’s Police 
Force, but retain police powers of arrest as set out in section 15 of Part IV of the Republic of 
Singapore’s Prevention of Corruption Act (Republic of Singapore, Prevention of Corruption 
Act Chapter 241 of 1993, 1993:17). Faull (2011b:2) presents a worrying view of the police’s 
susceptibility to corruption by virtue of their “state-sanctioned discretionary powers” which 
include the use of force and arrest and the fact that these powers may be subject to abuse. The 
fact that the police and potentially the DPCI within the police, may be easily susceptible to 
corrupt acts by virtue of the power they wield may warrant some consideration of assigning 
the powers of arrest to a statutorily independent body like the SIU especially in light of their 
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reputation for maintaining high levels of integrity whilst combating corruption. The emerging 
question then, is why the SIU, as an anti-corruption agency, does not possess policing powers 
of arrest, similar to Singapore’s CPIB. Interestingly, De Sousa (2010:7) suggests that 
specialized bodies should be studied for various reasons which include amongst other things, 
that: 
 their sole mission is to combat corruption; 
 they are an attempt by governments to overcome the insufficiency and/or inadequacy of 
conventional law enforcement agencies in coping with the growing sophistication of corrupt 
mechanisms and transactions and detecting and/or preparing complex corruption cases; 
 in contrast to law enforcement agencies, Anti-Corruption Agencies have also been designed to 
develop a preventive capacity and generate a knowledge-based approach to corruption through 
research; and 
 these bodies are provided with a team of experts (… drawing on the knowledge and experience 
of several other monitoring and regulatory units and giving their own in exchange), an ample 
mandate, investigative powers, statutory autonomy and adequate funding to ensure that 
effective preventive steps are identified and put in place. 
 
How then would a government hope to overcome the insufficiency or inadequacy of the 
conventional police force by granting less power to its anti-corruption agency or agencies than 
its police force? In this regard, an interesting observation is made by Quah (2010), where he 
points out that Singapore’s success in combating corruption can be attributed to its reliance on 
the CPIB for this purpose instead of the police due to the rampant corruption in its police force. 
In concurrence, Quah (2010) makes it abundantly clear that the British colonial government’s 
grave policy mistake of initially assigning the anti-corruption mandate to its police force was 
only realised and rectified 15 years after the legislative enactment of the Prevention of 
Corruption Ordinance in December 1937; by which time in October 1952, the CPIB was 
established as an agency separate from the Singapore Police Force. Implicitly, in the South 
African context, Faull (2011a:1) highlights the number of “high-profile police scandals” 
involving some of SAPS’ top management and the fact that these incidents have a ripple effect 
on the organisation’s ability to effectively combat widespread corruption. Considering the 
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effects of corruption on society and its Constitutional imperatives, it would bode well for South 
Africa to not wait 15 years, but rather remedy this situation sooner than later.  
With the increase in corruption in South Africa, combined with media and public outcry of 
deliberate manipulation of investigations under the control of the police and National 
Prosecuting Authority, perhaps both Quah (2010) and De Sousa’s (2010) observations must be 
given some consideration.  They suggest moving from a reliance on conventional law 
enforcement authorities and the colonial way of relying on the police to curb corruption.  This 
is an interesting and critical viewpoint for consideration in relation to the South African 
context, where the anti-corruption reliance is more on the DPCI which falls under the SAPS, 
rather than the SIU. Typically, a tendency to shift this reliance to the SIU may be more 
conducive in the South African context, especially in the current situation, where a 
manipulation through poor leadership appointments by the executive, to agencies within the 
criminal justice system and organisations tasked with combating corruption according to 
Tamukamoyo & Mofana (2013), is becoming increasingly evident.  
This however, would require some review and amendments to legislation and protocols 
between the SIU, DPCI and the National Prosecuting Authority. The researcher suggests that 
this is a possibility if current processes are revised accordingly.  This is based upon the rationale 
that current practice with the SIU’s process flow, is that the SIU Act prescribes that once 
criminality is identified, the matter must be referred to the National Prosecuting Authority, 
which then decides on prosecution and returns the matter to the SIU with a directive that the 
matter be handed over by the SIU, to the SAPS or the DPCI. Once in the hands of the police, 
the SIU has no control over the investigation or outcomes. Considering the overwhelming 
arguments in the Constitutional Court relating to the independence of the DPCI; the risk of 
executive and political interference on the Unit’s investigations and functioning, within the 
confines of the SAPS (Pereira et.al., 2012:40-41); it would auger well for South Africa’s law-
makers to reconsider the requirement that the SIU hand over matters to the SAPS or DPCI after 
it is returned by the National Prosecuting Authority.  
It is important to note the proposal that after a referral by the SIU and once a decision to 
prosecute is made by the National Prosecuting Authority, the matter should be returned to the 
SIU to finalize the criminal investigations, during which time, the SAPS or DPCI must be 
compelled to provide the necessary support in terms of policing powers, to the SIU.  The aim 
here is to allow the matter to be brought to a successful conclusion under the watchful and 
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competent eye of the SIU which sentiments are echoed by Democratic Alliance Member of 
Parliament (MP) Dene Smuts in Hartley (2011) where she suggests that the Hawks remain in 
the police while the SIU should form the basis of South Africa’s independent anti-corruption 
Unit, to work closely with the National Prosecuting Authority and the police to bring a criminal  
matter through a successful  prosecution. With the extensive multi-disciplinary forensic 
expertise and capabilities it possesses, it is neither inconceivable nor baseless for the SIU to 
lead an investigation; provided it is supported with policing powers of the DPCI. This approach 
is supported by a provision in the NPA Act, section 24(4)(c)(ii)(aa) which caters for a Director 
of Public Prosecutions to give written directions or furnish  guidelines not only to the Provincial 
Commissioner of the police, but also to “any other person who within his or her area of 
jurisdiction, conducts investigations in relation to offences” (RSA, NPA Act, 1998).   
In any event, should the matter be referred to the Provincial Commissioner of police with a 
request for assistance with investigations in terms of section 24(7) of the NPA Act, the Director 
may still give directions or guidelines in terms of section 24(4)(c)(ii), to such Provincial 
Commissioner to corporate with the SIU in investigating a matter. 
  
4.5.2 The power to initiate or conduct preliminary investigations 
 
Another major inhibiting factor for the SIU, as identified by the respondents, is its inability or 
lack thereof to initiate an investigation on the receipt of a complaint or of its own volition, if it 
becomes aware of incidents of malfeasance in the public sector (Maharaj, 2016). Any 
investigation by the SIU in the absence of a Proclamation would be considered ultra vires 
(outside the terms of reference) to the SIU Act and therefore unlawful. Based on its current 
legislative model, even if the SIU receives a complaint, it cannot conduct any preliminary 
investigations in order to either firm up the allegations or establish, at a prima facie level (at 
first sight), the veracity of the allegations as the Act precludes any preliminary investigation.  
To this extent, the SIU would have to rely on ‘evidence’ voluntarily handed in by a whistle-
blower or other interested party in order to motivate for a Proclamation (Maharaj, 2016).  
This suggests that on receipt of a valid complaint but in the absence of information, documents 
or other material evidence, the SIU would have no course to apply for a Proclamation from the 
Presidency. This is particularly worrying and compromises the value and contribution of the 
SIU as an anti-corruption agency. This has the potential to diminish confidence in the SIU as 
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a recognized anti-corruption agency in South Africa. In this vein, consideration must be given 
to empowering the SIU to initiate investigations or at least preliminary investigations on the 
receipt of a complaint or even of its own volition depending on the merit of such complaint 
which may purport to fall within the ambit of s.2 of the SIU Act, in order to justify an 
application for a proclamation to the Presidency.  
In order for this to be possible, an amendment to the SIU Act, in relation to its powers, is 
necessary and this should be similarly worded to s.6 (4)(a) of the Public Protector Act and read: 
“The Head of the Special Investigating Unit or duly delegated members of the SIU should be 
competent to investigate allegations falling with the ambit of s.2 of the SIU Act, on his or her 
own initiative or on receipt of a complaint, any alleged…maladministration…”. The wording 
could even be drafted to limit the SIU’s preliminary investigation at inception to gathering 
sufficient information supporting the allegations, to apply for a Proclamation to the President. 
This will in essence set the boundaries for investigations after a first complaint is received by 
the SIU. 
In this way, despite initiating preliminary investigations at its discretion, the mandate for a full 
investigation can still be subject to an application for a Proclamation from the President. This 
application will be first subject to scrutiny by the DoJ&CD and then by the Presidency before 
it is signed and authorized by the President. This would eliminate perceptions of ‘partisan’ 
behaviour on the part of the SIU in its case selection. This has the potential to serve as a safe-
guard on the part of the SIU as case selection will not be solely at the discretion of the SIU but 
subject to ministerial as well as executive oversight and consideration. 
Perhaps an essential observation on the part of the SIU obtaining its mandate from the 
Presidency, by virtue of a Proclamation authorized by the President, is that it is not entirely 
true that the types of cases assigned to the SIU is at the sole discretion of the President as this 
is still subject to the scrutiny of Parliament. This occurs by way of the SIU’s reporting to the 
National Legislature when questions may be raised in relation to applications for Proclamations 
that are still pending between the DoJ&CD and the Presidency. In this way, the National 
Legislature exercises Parliamentary oversight on Proclamations pending authorization by the 
Presidency (Maharaj, 2016). 
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4.5.3 Reporting obligations 
 
The reporting structure was identified by the respondents as an issue of concern.  However in 
the context of the SIU Act, what is prescribed therein in relation to its reporting obligations to 
Parliament and the oversight role played by Parliament, appears to be in line with what is 
suggested by Stapenhurst, Ulrich and Strohal (2006:5) in the first chapter on ‘Parliamentarians 
Fighting Corruption’. Stapenhurst et. al. (2006:5) notes that “to work successfully, anti-
corruption commissions must be independent, part of a broader anti-corruption strategy, 
embedded in a reporting hierarchy encompassing the legislative and executive, and have the 
government enact its recommendations”. The SIU operates within this context of reporting to 
the Executive as well as to Parliament and therefore derives a degree of independence by virtue 
its reporting obligations to Parliament and hence parliamentary oversight on its activities. 
In addition, in consideration of Quah’s (2009) observations as well as the current turmoil 
between the DPCI and the National Prosecuting Authority over the Finance Minister, Pravin 
Gordhan, perhaps the SIU should be allowed to proceed with its criminal investigations 
throughout the prosecutorial process to bring its matters to finality in court. This is suggested 
as an alternative to the matter being referred or reported to the SAPS or DPCI, who in turn 
must rely on the support of the SIU (this is of course at the discretion of the SAPS or DPCI, 
should they decide to consult with the SIU).  Rather, the suggestion is that, the SIU should 
retain the matter and the SAPS/DPCI should be compelled to provide support in relation to 
policing powers, to the SIU, to enable it to bring the criminal investigations to a conclusion.  
 
4.6 Financial Independence 
 
The final section of the questionnaire focused on issues related to financial independence. The 
questions sought to determine the extent to which the SIU enjoyed financial independence and 
as an anti-corruption agency and, the challenges it faced in this regard, if any.  
 
4.6.1 The SIU’s budget allocation 
 
The first question examined the extent to which the SIU had its own budget allocated by 
Parliament.  Five respondents indicated that the SIU has its own budget. Of these 5 affirmative 
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responses, one respondent cited partial funding from Parliament. The remaining 7 respondents 
denied that the SIU had its own budget allocated by Parliament, with 2 of the 7 citing that the 
SIU received its budget from the National Treasury through the DoJ, and one citing that the 
SIU received its budget directly from the DoJ. 
 
4.6.2 Sources of the SIU funding 
 
The follow up question to the above was how, or where does the SIU receive its funding. The 
respondents submitted as follows: 
 From the National Treasury; 
 From the National Treasury through the DoJ; 
 From the DoJ; and 
 From departments (fees recovered for forensic investigative services rendered). 
 
4.6.3 The SIU Act on its funding 
 
On the question of whether the SIU Act made provision for the Unit’s funding, 9 respondents 
indicated that it did indeed, whilst also citing the recovery of fees from departments for forensic 
services rendered. The other 3 disagreed. 
 
4.6.4 Adequacy of the SIU budget 
 
On whether the SIU’s budget was adequate for its operations, 6 respondents thought it was 
adequate, citing that the baseline budget from National Treasury and fees recovered from 
departments were sufficient. Whilst 2 replied in the negative, citing that the National Treasury 
baseline budget catered for salaries, while operations were reliant on fees recovered from 
departments. In essence, this implies that if departments failed to effect payment on the SIU 
invoices, this would pose a financial constraint as operational funds may become depleted. 
Four respondents however, indicated that they were uncertain if the SIU’s budget was in fact 
sufficient.  
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4.6.5 SIU’s historical experience of a depletion of funds 
 
The next question sought to determine whether the SIU had run out of funds to perform 
operations in any prior financial year. Four respondents replied in the affirmative, indicating 
that indeed the SIU had to approach National Treasury for financial assistance at some stage 
during its existence, while eight replied in the negative, citing that they were unaware of 
instances where the SIU had in fact run out of funds.  
 
4.6.6 Discretion on budget utilization 
 
On whether the SIU had its own discretion in the utilization of its funds, 5 respondents replied 
in the affirmative, citing that the SIU managed its own budget, whilst 3 replied in the negative 
with no substantiation. One replied that the SIU did not have sole discretion while three 
indicated that they were uncertain. 
 
4.6.7 Does the SIU enjoy financial autonomy? 
 
The final conclusive question in this section was whether the SIU enjoyed financial autonomy. 
Three respondents agreed that the SIU did enjoy financial autonomy, as it could recruit, hire 
services and utilize its budget as required.  Seven respondents disagreed that the Unit had 
financial autonomy, citing its dependence on National Treasury, the Ministries of Justice and 
Finance, and its regulation in terms of the PFMA. Two respondents indicated that they were 
uncertain.   
 
4.7 Discussion and interpretation of results on financial independence 
 
The results of this section of the questionnaire, presents a view by the respondents that the SIU 
lacks financial independence.  It is however not a unanimous view. Respondents appeared to 
be somewhat divided in terms of the SIU’s financial independence and this could be attributed 
to the fact that being operational managers, some of them had some uncertainty in relation to 
the origin & distribution of some of the SIU’s finances. Although about forty one percent of 
respondents interviewed believe that the SIU did indeed receive its funding from Parliament, 
fifty eight percent disagreed saying that it was appropriated through the DOJ&CD from 
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National Treasury as well as from departments for forensic services rendered to them, while 
thirty three percent of the respondents felt that the SIU did indeed run out of funds at some 
stage and had to approach National Treasury for additional funding. 
 
4.7.1 The SIU Budget 
 
A general indication by a majority of the respondents was that the SIU’s budget was indeed 
adequate for its operations and that the Unit had its own discretion in relation to the utilization 
of its finances. On the main question, however, of whether they felt that the SIU enjoyed 
financial autonomy, fifty eight percent felt that the SIU lacked financial autonomy while twenty 
five percent felt that it enjoyed financial autonomy. The remaining sixteen percent of 
respondents were uncertain. 
Perhaps the most overwhelmingly positive response from the respondents related to whether 
the SIU Act made provision for its budget or funding. To this question, seventy five percent of 
the respondents agreed that the SIU Act did indeed make adequate and appropriate provision 
for the budget and funding of the Unit. In fact this is qualified and reiterated in the provisions 
of s.13A(1) of the SIU Act (RSA, SIU Act, 1996a) which provides that the funds of an SIU 
consists of: 
(a) “money appropriated by Parliament; 
(b) money lawfully accruing from any other source, including fees and expenses recoverable 
for services rendered; 
(c) donations or contributions; … and 
(d) money otherwise becoming available to a Special Investigating Unit”. 
 
4.7.2 A comparison of the funding model of the SIU and the Auditor General  
 
The Act clearly makes provision for a number of ways, in which the SIU can appropriate funds 
but predominantly, from Parliament. Interestingly it seems the fees and expenses recovered for 
services rendered replicates the funding model of the Auditor General of South Africa which 
affords the institution financial independence. The relevance of this funding model to financial 
independence, is aptly presented by Woolman & Schutte (2008:24B-5) in a chapter on the 
Auditor General in “Constitutional Law of South Africa”. Here the authors point out that fiscal 
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independence is one of the unique features of the Auditor General of South Africa which 
affords it the ability to generate revenue from “fees charged for audit services”, thereby 
ensuring that it has “money necessary to discharge its constitutional duties” (Woolman & 
Schutte 2008:24B-5).  
Pointedly, these financial resources is said to immunize the Auditor General of South Africa 
from budgetary constraints that have undermined the independence of other Chapter 9 
institutions. The authors maintain that the Auditor General of South Africa’s ability to recoup 
fees charged for auditing services in essence, enhances its political independence.  This they 
emphasised is prevalent in a landscape where other Chapter 9 institutions, like that of the Public 
Protector, “constantly complain that they are under-funded and under-resourced and therefore 
incapable of discharging their constitutional duties” (Woolman & Schutte 2008:24B-5). The 
conclusion in light of the above in the authors view, is that the Auditor General of South Africa 
is the only Chapter 9 institution to be truly both financially and administratively independent 
of national government.  
Given the above statements and arguments, the ability to recoup or recover fees for forensic 
services rendered by the SIU, once a unique feature of the Auditor General of South Africa - a 
Constitutional Chapter 9 institution, certainly provides the Unit with the same or similar degree 
of financial independence. This development, a result of an amendment, proposed by the Unit, 
to its Act, and subsequently enacted in 2012 by the National Legislature, is a phenomenal 
achievement towards enhancing the Unit’s financial independence. Certainly, the respondents’ 
views coupled with the above argument; reinforces the SIU’s financial autonomy and suggests 
that the SIU may be sufficiently financially independent. 
As is evident from the above discussion, there seems to be little fault with the SIU’s funding 
model or its financial independence as it is quite similar to that of the Auditor General of South 
Africa. However, perhaps still, a recommendation could be that consideration ought to be 
given, by parliament, to ensure that a sufficiently adequate budgetary allocation of funds is 
granted to the SIU at the onset. This is especially due to the fact that in some instances, 
departments or public bodies requiring the services of the SIU, cannot afford such services or 
do not have adequate budgets to reimburse the SIU for its services. Where this is the case, and 
the SIU’s baseline funding allocation from Parliament is insufficient, this could pose a serious 
threat to the SIU being able to execute its mandate in relation to allegations of fraud, corruption 
or maladministration pertaining to a specific department or public institution. 
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4.8 Conclusion 
 
This Chapter provided an account of the responses by managers within the SIU who are directly 
confronted with many of the issues posed to them in the research questionnaire. The main aim 
was to comment on the responses received in relation to the extent to which the SIU enjoys 
independence in regard to organisational, functional and financial levels. The Chapter revealed 
that in all three areas of independence reviewed, there are material shortfalls in the SIU’s 
independence. This however does not suggest that the SIU by virtue of these challenges cannot 
function or is compromised to the extent that it cannot execute its mandate. It does however 
point out some material deficiencies that warrant intervention by lawmakers in order to further 
enable the SIU’s efficiency and effectiveness in the execution of its anti-corruption mandate. 
In addition, a review of the legislative hindrances and other material operational or functional 
obstacles will further serve to bolster the Units efforts to tackle corruption in a more confident 
and independent manner in keeping with both constitutional imperatives as well as 
international obligations relating to anti-corruption.  
 
In the following Chapter, conclusions are drawn and recommendations made on the basis of 
the interpretations and discussions in this chapter, of the information and data sourced though 
this research. The discussion and interpretation of results provides evidence of legislative 
problems with the organisational, functional and financial independence of the SIU which 
should be attended to as a matter of urgency to preserve the SIU’s integrity as an anti-corruption 
agency, as well as to maintain South Africa’s integrity in the ratification of the UNCAC as well 
as other international obligations.  
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Chapter 5: Recommendations and Conclusion 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The World Bank, in 2002, coined the term ‘State Capture’ as “the illicit provision of private 
gains to public officials, via informal, non-transparent, and highly preferential channels of 
access” (Karklins 2002:27). Fourteen years on, South Africa is now experiencing its own ‘State 
Capture’ which was recently revealed in the report of the Public Protector of South Africa 
(2016), entitled “State of Capture”, where evidence of systematic high-level maladministration 
and possible corruption relating to cabinet appointments and tenders was alleged.  The evidence 
in the Report implicates the Presidency, Ministries, State-Owned Entities and, the controversial 
Gupta family. 
Emphasis on anti-corruption, has reached an elevated status on the international agenda. 
Countries are constantly seeking new ways of dealing effectively with corruption.  Rutkowski 
& Ocieczek (2016), officials from the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau in Poland, note that 
some of the critical basis upon which these efforts towards dealing with corruption are based 
upon the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, as well as conventions 
against corruption, which include that of UNCAC and the Council of Europe. Rutkowski & 
Ocieczek (2016) note that consideration of the Transparency International’s corruption 
perception index and the UNCAC requirements led to the creation of the Polish Central Anti-
Corruption Bureau which has full policing powers and report to the Prime Minister.  
Research into finding new ways of dealing with corruption are useful as they offer mechanisms 
by which governments can find practical solutions in dealing with the scourge of corruption. 
These efforts are critical towards improving political and social perceptions, as mentioned 
earlier in this dissertation. The overall aim of this study was to determine the level of 
independence of anti-corruption agencies, through a case investigation of the SIU. Further, the 
study sought to carry out this investigation through several research objectives that guided the 
inquiry. These are: 
 To assess the nature and the level of independence of the  SIU and the challenges 
thereof; 
 To compare the  SIU’s level of independence in relation to other anti-corruption 
agencies in South Africa; 
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 To determine what the international standards and practices are in terms of the 
establishment and mandates of anti-corruption agencies; 
 To establish the level of compliance by South Africa in terms of its international 
multi-lateral anti-corruption obligations; and 
 To make recommendations based on the research findings on the degree of 
independence which is incumbent of an anti-corruption agency in South Africa. 
This Chapter seeks to respond to these research objectives and offers recommendations in light 
of the findings.  The sections that follow, hence, provide insight thereof. 
 
5.2 Parliament’s Role in securing independence for its anti-corruption 
agency/agencies 
 
Within South Africa, the focus on corruption has gained significance over the last few years.  
This has resulted in media attention combined with societal and political outcries in response 
to these reports of corruption and maladministration. The SIU’s level of influence in the 
prosecutorial process of any of its matters by the National Prosecuting Authority and further 
criminal investigation by the Hawks, is limited and this has the potential to compromise the 
impact of the Unit’s work. The relevance of this argument is presented in the current context 
of the recent Hawks/NPA/SARS-Gordhan saga that recently played itself out. Here, the Hawks 
investigated the Finance Minister, Pravin Gordhan, where after the National Prosecuting 
Authority initiated a prosecution but shortly thereafter, withdrew its decision to prosecute. The 
general perception was clearly that both the National Prosecuting Authority and the Hawks 
were being utilised as pawns by the executive, to fight political battles as evidenced in a 
Democratic Alliance (2015:1) argument, that institutions of our democracy were “increasingly 
being undermined” and that the executive had “presided over a systematic project of state 
capture” where key institutions were eroded by “cadre deployment and ANC majoritarianism”. 
This type of situation raises issues over the status of these two pivotal agencies in the 
investigation and prosecution of corruption matters. 
When anti-corruption agencies become compromised in this way, it warrants a review of its 
status and role in the anti-corruption arena, as well as the relevant prescripts governing 
institutional operation. An important consideration therefore would be that perhaps a review of 
how the dependencies of agencies like the SIU on other agencies for support in the execution 
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of its anti-corruption mandates, is affected when the integrity and independence of these 
agencies are compromised.  The rationale here would be to determine whether these 
dependencies compromise the effective functioning of agencies like the SIU as in the case of 
the Hawks where Quintal (2016) cites DA Member of Parliament Zakhele Mbhele as 
suggesting that the Hawks have been compromised by political interference where positions 
are given to individuals to settle political scores. In this regard, Pope (2006:51-53) points out 
Parliament’s crucial role in enacting laws relevant to the fight against corruption including the 
following questions that Parliament should consider when enacting laws: 
 “What was the capacity of agencies required to enforce the law? And if they lack capacity, 
whether there was a need for other institutions to be involved? 
 Are the police, prosecutors and enforcement agencies staffed with honest and technical 
professionals? 
 whether the enforcers were independent from the executive both in theory and in practice? 
and 
 To whom and in what ways, were the enforcers accountable?” (Pope 2006:51-53). 
 
Essentially, Pope (2006:53) emphasizes the need during this strengthening process, for 
Parliament to consider “the weaknesses of the agencies that will be responsible for enforcing 
the laws they prepare”. Once institutional weaknesses are identified in agencies that are 
charged with an anti-corruption mandate, it is Parliament’s duty to review laws that compound 
these weaknesses, with a view to enhancing such agencies ability to execute its mandate more 
effectively. Within South Africa’s constitutional dispensation, this is an imperative that simply 
cannot be ignored especially in light of the peaking levels of corruption and the deeply 
compromised elite networks within government which appear “to be shaping and destabilising 
current anti-corruption efforts (Van Vuuren, 2014:1). It is particularly worrying to note as 
suggested by Van Vuuren (2014:1), the presence of elements of the political elite with anti-
democratic tendencies in South Africa’s functioning democracy; that seek to undermine 
democratic institutions “by ensuring that the rule of law is applied inconsistently”. The South 
African legislature is therefore bound to ensure that they duly comply with the constitutional 
imperative of reviewing laws with a view to strengthening and adequately enabling anti-
corruption agencies; through legislative amendments, to prevent the compromised political 
elite, from undermining these agencies.    
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
113 
 
Matiangi (2006:69,74) in a case study examination in the role of the Kenyan Parliament in the 
war against corruption, points out a significant contribution by Parliament in a bold initiative, 
where it introduced an Anti-Corruption Select Committee (ACSC) to among other things, 
“study and investigate the causes, nature, extent, and impact of corruption…; identify the key 
perpetrators and beneficiaries of corruption; recommend effective and immediate measures to 
be taken against such individuals…; and recover public property appropriated by them”. The 
Committee made a number of recommendations including the introduction of new anti-
corruption legislation outlawing certain practices within the public sphere, as well as other 
major judicial reforms. While South Africa does have a Parliamentary Anti-Corruption Inter-
Ministerial Committee (ACIMC), its terms of reference is “to coordinate and oversee the work 
of state organs aimed at fighting and combating the scourge of corruption in the public and 
private sectors” (RSA, Department of Public Service and Administration, Parliamentary 
Question 3977, 2015). Primarily however, , the ACIMC’s role is to oversee and monitor the 
work of the Anti-Corruption Task Team (ACTT) which is expected to work in a collaborative 
environment with various agencies to achieve targets of prosecution of 100 corruption cases, 
each to the value of R5 million or more. In comparison however, the ACIMC’s role, barely 
covers what the Kenyan ACSC was mandated with.   
 
Parliament’s role in curbing corruption cannot be over-emphasized.  Further, the South African 
Parliament, have an opportunity to learn from the case of Kenya. This would require assertions 
in regards to anti-corruption endeavours within the context of its own constitutional framework, 
as this has the potential to contribute to an increased perception of trust by society in 
Parliament’s integrity (Matiangi, 2006:76). In turn, this will serve to enhance Parliament’s 
legitimacy in the current South African context where corruption is seen to be rife and 
particularly amongst senior officials of the ruling political party.   
 
5.3 Summary of Chapters 
 
The research chapters were structured in order to provide a chronological view of the research 
problem. While chapter one introduced the problem of the independence of the SIU and set out 
the methodology that would be used to examine the SIU’s independence, chapter two covered 
the conceptual framework of anti-corruption agencies in both the national and international 
contexts and included a discussion of how South Africa’s legislative framework supported its 
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anti-corruption obligations and agencies. The chapter also introduced South Africa’s key 
agencies entrusted with the challenging mandate of fighting corruption. In addition, a 
comparative presentation was provided of South Africa’s dedicated anti-corruption agency to 
some international anti-comparative agencies. The chapter also provides an overview of South 
Africa’s multi-agency approach towards anti-corruption.   
Chapter three elaborated on the SIU as a case study, its legislative mandate, how it operates, 
the impact of its work and a comparative review of the Unit with Hong Kong’s ICAC, 
considered to be one of the best anti-corruption agencies in the world. Chapter four presented 
the results and an interpretation and discussion of the research in relation to the SIU’s 
organisational, functional and financial independence. The last chapter concludes with a 
summary of chapters, an highlight of Parliament’s role in affording adequate independence to 
the country’s anti-corruption agencies, and finally some recommendations are presented to 
enhance the independence of the SIU as determined by the research.        
 
5.4 Recommendations to Enhance the Independence of the SIU 
 
There can be no doubt that certain considerations must be afforded by the Legislature as to the 
adequacy of independence that the SIU enjoys. The importance of independence to the success 
of anti-corruption agencies is highlighted by Meagher (2002:2), where he points out that this 
is precisely what enables them to operate in a consistent and professional manner, with little 
partisan intrusion. He goes on to aptly imply that where agencies are not structurally 
independent, then it is “no more powerful that its bureaucratic and political patrons” (Meagher 
2002:2). The results and interpretation of results of this research as presented in the previous 
chapter therefore propose that several legislative amendments that could potentially enhance 
the independence factor of the SIU, must be considered in relation to the following:  
 
5.4.1 Organisational independence 
 Parliament should review the provisions of section 8 of the SIU Act relating to the “powers 
and functions of a Special Tribunal, and make it equally applicable to the SIU through an 
amendment to section 5 so that the SIU too, is empowered to be “independent and impartial 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
115 
 
and perform its functions without fear, favour or prejudice and subject only to the 
Constitution and the law” (RSA, SIU Act, 1996a);  
 Parliament must assert itself by reinforcing its constitutional obligations to society by 
reviewing and enhancing the independence of South Africa’s anti-corruption agencies and 
further, by way of setting up an Anti-Corruption Select Committee, similar to the Kenyan 
experience, to effectively:  
o coordinate anti-corruption efforts with all its anti-corruption agencies;  
o consider and implement in collaboration with responsible agencies a centralised and 
coordinated record keeping of all corruption matters reported or under investigation 
by all agencies; 
o in collaboration - study and research the causes, nature, extent, and impact of 
corruption on society;  
o in collaboration with all responsible agencies, conduct regular trend and pattern 
analyses on anti-corruption efforts and corruption tendencies; 
o in a concerted effort in a regular dialogue with key law enforcement and anti-
corruption agencies - facilitate the identification of key perpetrators and 
beneficiaries of corruption; and  
o recommend effective and immediate measures to be taken against such individuals 
to recover public funds/property appropriated by them.  
 In this regard and by virtue of section 7(2) of the Constitution (RSA, the Constitution, 
1996b) which compels the State to “respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill 
of Rights”, Parliament’s intervention is seen as a constitutional imperative with a legal 
obligation to act appropriately, to arrest, and suppress the prevalence of corruption in 
society which has damning effects on rights protected by the Constitution; 
 Parliament must review and consider the adequacy of its Chapter 9 institutions considering 
the prevalence of corruption in the country as its last review of Chapter 9 and associated 
institutions was conducted in 2007, 10 years after the advent of Democracy (RSA, 
Parliament, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of Chapter 9 and Associated 
Institutions, 2015). Interestingly, the SIU was not reviewed during this process. It is now 
22 years after the advent of Democracy and still we suffer the pain of corruption. There is 
therefore an urgent need to review their effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, adequacy, 
scope etc. in keeping with constitutional principles so as to determine whether there is a 
need to consider whether the establishment of an additional independent Chapter 9 
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institution may be warranted considering the impact of corruption on society’s fundamental 
constitutional rights; or, the re-constituting or rationalisation of existing institutions to 
wield constitutional authority; 
 The SIU must be established as a permanent state institution charged with an anti-
corruption mandate, by the Presidency in consultation with Parliament. Legislative 
amendments is warranted in this regard to cater for permanency of the Unit, and security 
of tenure for the Head and staff; 
 The Head of the SIU must be subject to a transparent Parliamentary appointment process 
like that of the Public Protector. Existing legislation must be reviewed and amended in this 
regard; 
 The Head of the Unit must be appointed for a fixed period similar to the Public Protector.  
For example, a 7 year non-renewable term. The appointment period must not be aligned to 
electoral terms. For this purpose, cadre deployment should not be a consideration. Existing 
legislation must be reviewed and amended in this regard; 
 Regulations should be promulgated by the Minister of Justice in terms of section 11 of the 
SIU Act as amended compelling all State institutions (national and local government), State 
entities, municipalities, parastatals etc. to use the SIU as the first port of call to report all 
matters falling with the ambit of section 2(2) of the Act to eliminate the need for lengthy 
processes of motivations for proclamations to the Presidency, by the SIU; as well as to 
reduce cost implications for the state in procuring expensive forensic services at exorbitant 
costs from the private sector, while the SIU provides the exact same service.  . 
 
5.4.2 Functional independence 
 
 It is recommended that Parliament ought to implement a separate central anti-corruption 
coordinating mechanism, or alternatively, build such responsibility into the authority of an 
existing institution like the SIU, similar to Poland’s experience. This responsibility, 
according to Rutkowski & Ocieczek (2016), lies with the Head of the Central Anti-
Corruption Bureau to accurately record all cases of corruption dealt with by the various 
agencies, and to prevent a duplication of effort, resourcing and costs associated therewith 
across various agencies. This is similar to the UNODC’s (2015:34) proposal for affiliate 
countries to put a single high-level entity, preferably one that reports to the executive; in 
charge of coordination and implementation of its anti-corruption strategy’s policies and 
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objectives. This central mechanism needs to be effectively managed in order to provide 
Parliament with accurate statistics related to the prevalence of corruption nationally. In this 
regard the UNODC (2015:36) further highlights the power of reputation of the coordinating 
Unit could be harnessed to potentially propel or motivate other implementing agencies to 
act effectively through regular reports on progress made by various the various agencies, 
judiciary and prosecuting authority in the fight against corruption e.g. success rates in 
prosecuting corruption cases. This has the potential to further enhance; through trend and 
pattern analyses, the country’s ability to correctly assess and address the levels of 
corruption, and progressively enable the institution of applicable reforms. As an alternative, 
this could be facilitated by way of regulations which may be promulgated by the Minister 
of Justice in terms of section 11 of the SIU Act as amended.  
 Parliament and/or the SIU, ought to consider legislative amendments or regulations that 
compel anti-corruption agencies to implement functions relevant to the prevention, 
education and awareness of corruption, as part of their core functions as required by article 
6(1) of the UNCAC (2004:10).  
 The SIU ought to have the power to, at the least, initiate a preliminary investigation on 
receipt of a complaint or of its own volition, should information of transgressions falling 
within its mandate come to its attention, and whether the Proclamation remains its primary 
terms of reference or not. This preliminary investigation may serve as a solid basis for the 
motivation for a Proclamation to the Presidency. This has the potential to encourage public 
reporting and whistleblowing, and enhance public confidence in the SIU as an anti-
corruption agency. 
 Consideration should be given to removing the requirement for a proclamation authorizing 
the SIU’s investigation, due to its perceived subjectivity by virtue of its authorization by 
the executive and, the associated delays therewith. 
 It is recommended that consideration be given to providing the SIU with the powers of 
arrest or, at the least, a feasibility study be undertaken to determine whether this power 
would be appropriate given that the mandate of the SIU includes the investigation of corrupt 
offences or practices as prohibited by the PACOCA Act.  It is important to highlight that 
other agencies with similar mandates, like the SAPS/DPCI, and IPID, retain the powers of 
arrest. This would be in line with international practices where most international anti-
corruption agencies like Hong Kong’s ICAC, Singapore’s CPIB, Poland’s Central Anti-
Corruption Bureau, France’s Agence Francaise Anti-corruption (AFA), Lithuania’s 
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Special Investigative Services (SIS), Botswana’s Directorate  on Corruption and Economic 
Crime (DCEC), to name but a few, are all endowed with full policing powers. 
 Alternatively, consideration should be given to amend either section 4 of the SIU Act 
(enhance the functions of the SIU to include the investigation of criminality after the 
National Prosecuting Authority has pronounced its decision to prosecute), or section 5 of 
the SIU Act (empower the SIU to request or compel the assistance/support of the 
SAPS/DPCI to provide the necessary support in relation to policing powers and functions 
required in an SIU investigation); to enable the SIU to retain custodial authority of an 
investigation and to facilitate it through the prosecutorial and judicial processes. This in 
effect suggests an amendment to cater for prescripts that would compel that the SIU be 
provided with investigative support relating to policing powers, from the SAPS/DPCI (or 
other relevant agencies).  
 
5.4.3 Financial independence 
 
 It is recommended that Parliament ought to independently allocate a sufficiently adequate 
budget to the SIU without relying on baseline funding via the Department of Justice; nor, 
funding that the SIU may appropriate through the recovery of fees from departments. This 
type of funding reliance has the potential to compromise the Unit’s ability to promptly deal 
with allegations once received, as some departments delay payment against SIU invoices 
which could result in financial shortfalls in the SIU’s operational budget.  
 Alternatively, Parliament should, in consultation with the Finance Minister and the 
National Treasury; determine the most appropriate manner of retrieving or retaining 
funding from all national and/or provincial departments, State-Owned Entities etc. into a 
central fund managed by Treasury to facilitate the SIU’s direct access to funding for SIU 
investigations, thereby removing the SIU’s reliance on departments honouring SIU 
invoices with payment for forensic services rendered.  
 
5.5 Legislative amendments drafted by the SIU 
 
It must be noted that at the very conclusion of this research, it was established that the SIU had 
begun a process of drafting legislative amendments. As advised, some of these amendments 
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proposed by the Unit are of significance to this research and bears relevance to some of the 
above-mentioned recommendations. The significant amendments proposed include the Unit 
being empowered to amongst other things; conduct preliminary investigations on the receipt of 
a complaint; to report to specified persons or entities; to publish its final report as directed by 
the President; have funds set aside by the National Treasury from money appropriated to a 
State institution in order to fund an SIU proclaimed investigation; for Special Tribunals to make 
an order that a High Court would be competent to make; and, for a Special Tribunal to impose 
a financial penalty where impropriety has been established (Maharaj, 2016).  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
While the PSC (2001b: 74), as early as 2001,  in its  ‘review of South Africa’s national anti-
corruption agencies’ suggested that the SIU was ‘not independent but a mechanism which the 
Executive can use to recover public monies’, this does not explicitly appear to be the case with 
the SIU as is suggested in the results of this research. The SIU has since its inception, evolved 
and developed significantly, with some associated legislative amendments in 2012, which 
enhanced its civil litigation capabilities, as well as providing it with additional powers to 
recover fees for services rendered by it to departments. While the SIU does enjoy some degree 
of independence, there is work to be done in relation to enhancing this critical requirement to 
align with the Unit’s organisational, functional and financial independence.  The rationale is to 
adequately empower the Unit to deal more effectively with the scourge of corruption.  
What was required at the onset of this research was an intricate and rigorous dissection and 
interpretation of the prescripts of the SIU Act coupled with the requirements of international 
agreements and established best practices on anti-corruption agencies, aligned to the South 
African context. The analysis has shown that by way of some legislative amendments, the SIU 
has progressed in terms of enhancing its independence. There is no doubt that there are some 
inhibiting factors which are yet to be resolved through further legislative review and 
amendments. These have the potential to propel the SIU into an anti-corruption agency that 
would be seen to be on par with what is required in terms of both local and international 
standards.      
The current South African temperament on corruption is extremely sensitive and volatile and 
what is emerging, is a “precipitating crisis” which Heilbrunn (2006:145) suggests is the very 
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type of situation that “forces political leaders to undertake significant reforms”. This he says is 
evidenced from the Hong Kong, New South Wales and Singapore experience where certain 
scandals forced policy-makers to establish commissions with broad powers, which were 
independent of the police. Heilbrunn (2006:146) impresses the fact the some of the 
prerequisites for the success of anti-corruption agencies is its ‘independence’; its reporting 
hierarchy comprising the executive, parliament and public oversight committees; and, 
government’s commitment to enact reforms that may be politically difficult.  
This investigation has shown that the tasks of anti-corruption agencies are of a rather complex 
nature as pointed out by Johnson, Hechler, De Sousa & Mathisen (2011:2) where the 
expectations are that they combat corruption independently and skilfully by “developing 
specialized enforcement competencies along with preventative and educational/research 
capacity.” In addition, they are expected to “overcome the inadequacy” of traditional law 
enforcement authorities and, take a leading role in the implementation of “national anti-
corruption strategies.”  
In the current South African context, in order for the ruling party to enhance its legislative and 
political reputation as well as for it to maintain political support; it is necessary for anti-
corruption reforms that further entrench and support constitutional democracy to be part of our  
immediate landscape. This will have the potential to improve investor and societal confidence. 
The Legislature’s interventions therefore, with a strong support from the ruling party; should 
be significantly focused on identifying anti-corruption agency deficiencies and implementing 
effective reforms in strengthening and enhancing its institutional capacity to fight corruption. 
The critical focus of such enhancement should be that of the independence of its anti-corruption 
agencies, like the SIU.           
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